


CHINA

Cultural Revolution and After

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& B.P. Barakhta



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Introduction

It is hard to recall any of the high-ranking foreign visitors to Peking in the past few years, be it the US President, the Foreign Minister of France, the Chancellor of the FRG or the leader of the ultra-Rightist opposition in that country, who was not told that it was impossible to achieve detente, that World War III was "imminent", and that "a super-power," often plainly stated to be the country which called itself socialist, was allegedly striving for world hegemony.

The Maoist leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) camouflages its betrayal of the cause of world socialism by conducting a struggle against what it calls the "hegemonistic aspirations" of the Soviet Union. It is common knowledge that the Maoist rulers of China are now openly siding with extreme reactionary circles and are against the world socialist community, and all the progressive forces. The revolutionary principles which constituted the cornerstone of the People's Republic of China, the principles of friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries and the world revolutionary movement, have in fact been betrayed by the Mao Tse-tung group.

The Maoists' attempts to undermine detente, their efforts to provoke a world war and to step up a "united front" which would be directed against the world socialist system under the slogan of "struggle against the hegemony of super-powers", are in fact aimed at establishing their own hegemony in the world. Posing as fighters against the "policy of aggression and war pursued by imperialism and social-imperialism" they are in reality themselves trying to create seats of tensions, only to ignite wars and conflicts.

The dangerous adventuristic nature of the policy of the present PRC leadership lends special urgency to the Chinese problem. The problem of Maoism as an ideology and a political

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policy can no longer be regarded as an internal problem of China. And, likewise, it is no longer a problem that concerns the world socialist system or the world communist movement alone. It is now in fact, a situation which all states would do well to take into consideration, regardless of their respective social systems.

The Maoists now demand for example, that the historically formed state frontiers should be revised, and are actually making territorial claims against the Soviet Union, India, Japan, Vietnam and other states. The systematic violation of the frontiers of Burma is in line with that policy. So also are their annexationist designs against the Mongolian People's Republic.

It goes without saying that such a policy is alien to a socialist state. It is, on the other hand, a direct outcome of the anti-socialist process which is deepening in China. The process is developing not only in the superstructure but also in the basic components of the PRC's social system. Making demagogical use of Marxism and resorting to methods of political blackmail and economic coercion the Maoist leadership is trying to indoctrinate the Chinese people with Maoism and to insulate them against the ideas of scientific socialism, depriving them thereby of the opportunity of learning from the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. That is why in the course of the military and political coup, euphemistically called "the great proletarian cultural revolution," the Maoists attempted first of all to destroy the political system which had been built as a result of the application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the then conditions of China, and which had successfully imbibed the general laws of socialist construction as well as the practical experience of the USSR and other socialist countries. The continuation of that system would have ruled out the anti-popular Maoist course which needs a corresponding administrative and political apparatus and social institutions to sustain it. The establishment of such an apparatus and such institutions, alongside of the indoctrination of the masses with the Maoist ideology, underline the basic content of the internal political development of the PRC after the "cultural revolution" which marked the beginning of the anti-socialist process. Its subsequent milestones.

were, in essence, political and ideological campaigns of "struggle against swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type", and later "against swindlers of the Lin Piao type," the 10th Congress of the CPC, the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucious campaign," the first Session of the Fourth National People's Congress and the legal consolidation of the Maoist regime in the new constitution of the PRC, and the campaign of "learning the theory of the dictatorship of proletariat" and "criticism of the novel *Shui Hu Chuan* (Backwaters)."

The decade that has elapsed after the beginning of the "cultural revolution" is also marked by an anti-socialist distortion of the economic base of the state which resulted from an attempt by the Maoists to achieve their aim of turning China, by the end of the present century into a super-power with a big military and industrial potential. For an economically underdeveloped country like China, which is still lagging behind many countries in a number of major economic indices, this means the dooming of hundreds of millions of working people to a minimum standard of living for many years to come. It also augurs a prolonged period of socio-cultural regression since the arms build-up and the militarisation of the country are a drain on the resources which could otherwise be utilised for the development of education, health and cultural sectors in the interests of the working people. Under such conditions state property, the most developed form of socialist property, gradually loses its public character, because it ceases to serve the economic, cultural and other vital interests of the working masses. The fruits of labour are distributed to suit the political and ideological interests of the military and bureaucratic elite and not in such a manner as to serve the aims of improving the working conditions and raising the living standards of the Chinese working people. As a result, an objective process is underway in which the direct producers are alienated from public ownership of the means of production and the socialist character of labour is allowed to wither away. The socialised means of production (not only state-owned but also cooperative-owned) begin to appear to the working people as something alien to them, and the work carried out under military and administrative coercion acquires the character of forced labour.

The Maoists have long ignored the main economic law of socialism which consists in the maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of the members of socialist society. In a pamphlet issued by the *hungweipings* (*The Hundred Crimes of Chen Yuan against Mao Tse-tung's Thought*) at the time of the "cultural revolution" it was said that "the most important aim of the revolution is to do away with classes and the class struggle the world over, and not the betterment of the life of the individual." The present Chinese leaders relegate socialism to an indefinite future when revolution, as the Maoists interpret it, "has triumphed throughout the world", or when, as they hope, the world hegemony of China will have been established.

Maoism has failed to counterpose anything constructive or positive to the dynamic socio-economic development of the socialist countries which provides an example to the whole world of how to build an advanced socialist society. The Maoists are therefore doing all they can to besmirch the achievements of the socialist countries. And they are trying to convince not only the Chinese people but the world public too that the achievements of the socialist countries are "unstable" or a mere "illusion."

In early 1974 the Maoist leadership denied the existence of any such thing as the socialist camp. This lie has been used by the Maoists as a "theoretical" basis for the forging of all kinds of political links with the enemies of socialism. In doing so Peking is trying to find a pretext for relieving itself and its supporters of any commitments to world socialism, and at the same time justifying any means of struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries.

Thus, the Maoist leadership has opened a "second front" in the international class struggle directed against world socialism and all the revolutionary forces of our day. On this, front Maoism poses a threat not only to the greater unity of the socialist countries and the revolutionary ranks, but also to the very cause of world peace and the security of nations. Such a threat necessarily calls for a determined struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism as such a struggle would in effect be a struggle for the triumph of the principles of scientific

socialism, for the defence of the gains of the Chinese revolution, and the interests of the world revolutionary movement. Such a struggle would also constitute a form of international support to the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people and a way of assisting the Chinese revolution in its present, tragic period. It is necessary that the socialist future of the People's Republic of China is secured by bringing it back into the ranks of fighters against imperialism.

A study of the political situation in China during the past decade, in particular, the military and bureaucratic aspects of the reconstruction of the political system of China, is of great importance for understanding the essence of the anti-socialist processes that have led it to oppose world socialism and betray interests of the international revolutionary movement.

This book, a joint effort of a group of research scholars of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences attempts to examine this situation and the main stages of its development.

The Authors

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1

Establishment of Military-Bureaucratic Regime

1. *Dismantling of Socialist Apparatus*

In the course of the "cultural revolution", which was in fact a *coup d'état* carried out by the Mao Tse-tung group, the political system of the People's Republic of China, based on the Constitution of 1954, the Rules of the Communist Party of China adopted in 1956, and the documents of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and of other public organisations, was completely smashed.

This development system was not accidental. The country's political structure had been formed and developed in the early years of the PRC and it conformed to the Leninist principles of the building of a socialist state and to the experience accumulated by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In the main, it served the aims and tasks of the building of a socialist society in China. Had the country advanced along the socialist road, conditions would have been conducive to a fuller expression of the democratic essence of people's power, invigoration of political life, and broader participation of the multi-million masses of the working people in the running of state affairs.

However, the mechanism of people's power in China, embodying the general laws which had first been developed and applied in the Soviet Union, was basically foreign to the Maoist understanding of the content and form of government.

Furthermore, the Maoists were unsure of their political positions so long as such a mechanism remained in operation.

Their general outlook and particularly their views on political power were essentially petty-bourgeois and eclectic. It is typical of Maoism to disregard the working class, gloss over the class essence of power, rely on the mass of politically immature peasants and indulge in "leftist" phraseology and political gambling.

In many respects, Maoism was not new at all. It frequently voiced opportunist opinions which, years ago, had been criticised and discarded by the international communist movement. The desire of Maoism to ignore the objective factors of social development, employ methods of coercion, and militarise all spheres of life makes it akin to Trotskyism.

Maoism, however, is not simply a repetition of other ideological trends. One cannot fail to see that the views of the Maoists are basically determined by the specific features of China's development, and by its largely peasant population. The low cultural level, the survivals of feudal and semi-feudal traditions and way of thinking, the outcome of the long domination of militarist cliques, and the influence of Confucianism—all this facilitated the introduction of military-bureaucratic methods of government, as well as the suppression and undermining of democratic institutions. The great authority enjoyed by the army, as a result of the long years of revolutionary struggle, not only as a military force but also as a political organiser, largely explains the comparative ease with which the Maoists were able to militarise life in China.

The establishment of Maoism as the official ideology should not be understood as a natural and inevitable consequence of the social conditions in which the people's revolution triumphed in China. If the CPC leadership had remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism, if the proletarian character of power had been further strengthened, if socialist transformations in all spheres of life had been consistently carried out and if close, fraternal ties and friendship with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with the USSR and with all other Marxist-Leninist Parties had been preserved, the consolidation of China's revolutionary gains and its rapid advance along the

socialist road would have been ensured.

It should be noted that Maoist conceptions, although inculcated systematically, have never been shared by all the Chinese Communists, much less by all the members of the CPC leadership. A number of Party, government and military leaders opposed the Maoists' petty-bourgeois and chauvinistic line. From the very beginning, these leaders advocated that the country could advance only in conformity with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and on the basis of the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries and close friendship with them.

The stand adopted by the Maoists, who sought to foster the personality cult, apply dictatorial methods of rule, and militarise state and public affairs, ran sharply counter to the democratic organisation of political life, enhancement of class consciousness, and development of the creative initiative of the masses. A consistent implementation of the provisions proclaimed in the PRC Constitution of 1954 and in the resolutions of the first session of the Eighth CPC Congress, concerning the need to fight bureaucracy, observe legality and respect the democratic rights and freedoms of the citizens, would have created an insurmountable obstacle in the way of concentration of all power in the hands of Mao's group, making brutal treatment of political adversaries impossible.

Preparations for the smashing up of the political system which bore a socialist character began long before the "cultural revolution" of 1966-1969. Realising that their anti-socialist schemes would inevitably meet with strong resistance on the part of true Communists, the working class and other working people of China, Mao Tse-tung and his associates paid special attention to the People's Liberation Army, to which they assigned the main role in their planned coup. The army was purged after the Lushan Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee in 1959. The servicemen who had been trained in the Soviet Union, and the generals and other officers who adhered to Soviet military science in the training of troops or demanded that the affairs of the army should be conducted in line with the decisions of the first session of the Eighth Congress of the CPC, were dismissed. The army became that part of the Chinese society which was

brainwashed most of all in the Maoist spirit. Following the removal of Peng Te-huai, Lin Piao became the new Defence Minister. He did everything in his power to turn the army into a reliable tool of Mao Tse-tung and his group.

At the same time, the Maoists conditioned the population ideologically and politically for a coup. In the late 50s and early 60s, they overcame strong opposition in the Party and state apparatus and carried out a number of vociferous political campaigns, which were accompanied by mass repressions. Mao Tse-tung and his group had already shown their hostility towards people's power, their distrust of the people's creative abilities, initiative and energy, and their deep fear of the will of the masses. The true essence of Maoism was camouflaged by loud demagogic talk about the need for following the line of the masses, about the "inexhaustible creativity concealed in the popular masses", about the importance of establishing "close ties with the masses", and about leaders being obliged "to lean on the popular masses" and "serve the people".

From the late 50s up to the launching of the "cultural revolution", China's political system had passed through a complicated evolution, departing more and more from the principles of socialist democracy. Its basic structure, however, remained unchanged; the corresponding laws and regulations continued to operate and the principles of organisation and activities of its main institutions were formally preserved, though greatly distorted in practice. For this reason, they could be used by the forces opposing Maoism. Mao Tse-tung and his group did not succeed at that time in reorganising the Party and government bodies and transforming them into instruments of their undivided rule.

The "cultural revolution" was a military and state coup which led to radical changes in China's political system. In the early stages, it was camouflaged as a mass movement, while at the very beginning it started as a campaign in the press against a number of writers and scientists.

November 1965 is usually considered to mark the beginning of the "cultural revolution". It was at that time that the Shanghai newspaper, *Wenhuei Pao*, published an article by Yao Wen-yuan on "The New Edition of the Historical Play, *The*

Degradation of Hai Jui." The playwright, Wu Han, a well-known historian, was accused of having intended to discredit Mao Tse-tung's line.¹ Wu Han, however, was not only a man of letters and a historian, but also the Vice-Chairman of the Peking City People's Committee. This made it clear against whom the attack was actually directed. Indeed, next to be attacked were Teng To, Secretary of the Peking CPC Committee and former editor of the newspaper *Jenmin Jihpao*, and Liao Mo-sha, Head of the Ideological Department of the Committee, a literary critic, philosopher and historian. The unbridled campaign against them was accompanied by hints about some more distinguished personalities standing behind them.

It was not difficult to see that the hints, above all, concerned Peng Cheng, First Secretary of the Peking CPC Committee, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Chairman of the Peking City People's Committee. Peng Cheng found himself without a job when, on May 25, 1966, a decision was adopted on the reorganisation of the Peking CPC Committee. Talk was resumed in the press about more eminent people standing behind Peng Cheng. The Maoists at first hit out against personalities of secondary importance. The "cultural revolution" continued to grow, affecting more and more people. By the end of May and in early June 1966, a concentrated blow was delivered at the executives and professors of higher educational establishments. Its specific meaning became clear a little later when the *hungweipings* (Red Guards) emerged in the streets. Simultaneously there began the persecution of many prominent scientists, writers, and workers in the sphere of culture and the arts. In June 1966 disgrace began to be heaped also on some of the leaders on the ideological front. This campaign began with attacks against Chou Yang, Deputy Head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the CPC Central Committee.

While the defamation of those people and their removal from their posts continued to be accompanied by a propaganda campaign, the Maoists paid special attention in the early summer of 1966 to the ideological conditioning of school

children and students. Thus started a period of a virtually Trotskyite flirting with the young people and setting them against the Party functionaries.

When in August 1966 the 11th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee was convened to approve the already widespread "cultural revolution", the members and alternate members of the Central Committee could hardly be seen among the mass of "revolutionary students" and army servicemen who had been invited to the meeting and who were ready to thwart any opposition on the part of the Party functionaries. It is worth recalling that there was no quorum at the meeting, thus contradicting the Rules of the CPC. The Maoist leading group, however, was not to be deterred by such a trifle once it had adopted arbitrariness and lawlessness as its banner. In this respect, the resolution of that Plenary Meeting was simply unique. It said, among other things, that the "revolutionary students", who were soon to take to the city streets, would not be held responsible for the "crimes and offences that might be committed in the course of the movement, except for murder, poisoning, arson, sabotage, stealing of state secrets, and counter-revolutionary crimes, of which there is convincing proof".² It will be recalled that the "revolutionary youth" went much further than that: the *hungweipings* got away also with murder.

The *hungweiping* contingents began mushrooming everywhere after the Plenary Meeting. On August 18, they were blessed by the "Great Helmsman" himself, who significantly appeared on the platform in Tienanmen Square wearing a military uniform and a *hungweiping* band. Mass shows of this kind were organised by the inspirers of the "cultural revolution" several times during which it became clear that Defence Minister Lin Piao was rising to the next top place, after Mao, in the Peking hierarchy, and that Liu Shao-chi was fast losing his position.

Meanwhile, inspired by "Chairman Mao's" blessings, the *hungweipings* swung into action. Following a brief warming-up campaign — which was more comical than tragic — against "bourgeois" hair styles, fashions, and perfumery, "feudal" names of streets, "revisionist literature", etc., the *hungweipings*

were thrown into the fray against government and Party bodies. On August 5, 1966, during the 11th Plenary Meeting, "Chairman Mao" himself wrote a *tatsupao*, "Fire on the Headquarters!", calling for the smashing up of constitutional state bodies and statutory Party bodies as well as of the committees of the Chinese Young Communist League and trade unions. A reactionary *coup d'etat* began, threatening the gains of socialism.

The *hungweipings*, joined shortly thereafter by gangs of *tsaofans* (Red Rebels), recruited mainly from among the demoralised unskilled workers and employees, played the part of storm troopers of the Maoist counter-revolution. The choice of students and senior-form school children as the "first echelon" of the coup was not accidental. This assignment could not be given to those who had participated in political life till 1958. The older and middle generations of the Chinese people know very well the role played by the Soviet Army in defeating imperialist Japan, and are also aware that in the first 10 years following the victory of the revolution, the USSR sent 10,500 engineers and other specialists to China, and helped it in the construction of 256 big industrial enterprises. They know that this assistance helped China to embark on the road of modernisation and industrialisation.

It was not easy to get such people to believe that capitalism had been restored in the Soviet Union and that it had become the "No. 1 enemy" of the Chinese people and of all revolutionaries of the world. Therefore, these generations were discarded as being unsuitable material. The pioneers of the "cultural revolution" became those young people whom the Maoist propaganda began to vigorously educate in an anti-Soviet and anti-humanistic spirit. In the course of seven to eight years, Maoism succeeded in rearing among the inexperienced youth an impressive number of corrupt grave-diggers of the people's democracy — "Chairman Mao's" storm-troopers.

Having organised students and school children as the "first echelon" of the military coup, the masterminds of the "cultural revolution" tried to give it a semblance of a "mass movement".

The *hungweipings* became an organisation opposed to the

Party, the Young Communist League, the mass organisations and to the socialist political system, as a whole. True, in the beginning, for a very brief period, voices were raised in some places among the *hungweiping* ranks demanding a struggle against the real bourgeoisie, notably, asking for the cancellation of payment of interest on the capital of joint state-capitalist enterprises, for the banning of bourgeois parties, etc. These voices, however, were silenced with stunning speed. All the forces of the *hungweipings* were hurled against the Party, the YCL and trade union bodies, the constitutional organs of people's power, and the embassies of the socialist states. As regards the Chinese bourgeoisie, it proved to be a privileged class in the "proletarian cultural revolution", its representatives not being subjected to any attacks or criticism whatsoever.

From the very outset, the *hungweipings* operated under the leadership of the military men. Their internal organisation was militarised. The army's leadership over the *hungweipings* was exercised through the so-called "liaison centres" of the *hungweiping* groups, staffed with regular military instructors and technical personnel, and equipped with printing facilities, telephones, etc., provided by the army. Representatives of the People's Liberation Army were placed in charge of the state of affairs. If necessary, they got in touch with the Central Committee group for the affairs of the "cultural revolution." The *hungweipings* moved from city to city, their travel expenses having been taken care of, with instructions to hold "rallies for the establishment of close contact" and "exchange of experience". The army provided them with uniforms, food, and lorries. The teenagers drawn into the *hungweiping* gangs exercised virtually unrestricted power over the population, but, naturally, they were not the ones to decide as to which people had to be exposed as "revisionists" and subjected to public disgrace, nor did they establish priorities in the smashing up of Party and people's committees. This was plotted and decided upon by adults, by those who had in advance proclaimed that all *hungweiping* actions were "in order". This "indulgence" was also extended to the *tsaofans* who were a little older than the *hungweipings* in age, but equally inexperienced politically.³

The "Great Helmsman" felt sure that these people would not let him down: they were nurtured in the spirit of total obedience to Mao Tse-tung's instructions. Year after year, these young people were conditioned to become blind fanatics. It was they alone who were capable of believing that Mao Tse-tung did everything and guided everything and everyone. It was they alone who could be made to believe that "revolutionary spirit" consisted in nothing else but in adoring "Chairman Mao" and obeying his orders.

However, it would be an oversimplification to think that all *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* were fanatics. Firstly, many were attracted to the *hungweiping* ranks not by their hero-worship of Mao Tse-tung, but by the desire to make their way up, to occupy high positions, in those troubled times. Secondly, many young people joined the *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* with the hope of squaring accounts with someone, or making a fortune, and many were simply criminals.

The first victims of the *hungweiping* hoodlums were the teachers of general, specialised secondary and higher schools. Practically all of them, with the exception of those who had managed to turn "left", were publicly humiliated. The teachers were beaten up and tied in ropes, and were dragged along the streets with signs bearing words of disgrace slung round their necks, and some were even killed. The same methods were later applied in dealing with functionaries of the Party and people's committees and elected members of the YCL and trade union bodies. The bandits squared accounts with youngsters of their own age in the same brutal manner. Soon clashes began to take place between the *hungweiping* and *tsaofan* gangs. On the face of it it looked as if they were fighting over the question of correct interpretation of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, but, in actual fact, it was a struggle for power in a particular area, office or educational establishment, strikingly reminiscent of underworld gang warfare for the right to hold sway over a certain territory. Only in this case the winner was the one with whom the army sided.

One can imagine what great possibilities were created by the "cultural revolution" for the criminal elements. As soon as one put on a *hungweiping* band (not registered

anywhere), one was free to take anything one pleased as having been "confiscated" for revolutionary needs (they did not touch, by the way, for reasons stated above, the property of the national bourgeoisie—the privileged class of the "cultural revolution").⁴

The press carried reports on *hungweiping* ringleaders, who, like the *hunghus* (bandits) of the past, demanded ransom from the relatives of their victims. This money, together with receipts from "black market" sales of confiscated property, was later squandered in flesh-pots.

It was difficult to imagine more favourable conditions than those of the "cultural revolution" for the activities of real counter-revolutionaries. They were now able to eliminate Communists and activists.

It is difficult, naturally, in the chaos of the "cultural revolution" to distinguish between the victims of internecine clashes and those of counter-revolution. However, there are certain indications that the existing situation was utilised by the notorious enemies of people's power. The "cultural revolution" received blessings from the No. 2 war criminal, Li Tsung-jen, former acting president of Kuomintang China, who had returned to the People's Republic of China from the United States. The Chiang Kai-shek clique and the imperialists were elated over the developments in mainland China. The public denunciation of the Secretary of the Party organisation of the Peking University canteen was made by its barman, an ex-sergeant in the Chiang Kai-shek police. Seeing tears well in the eyes of the victim, this counter-revolutionary cried: "Look at that snake, he's weeping! That's how he takes correct criticism!"⁵ This happened on June 9, 1966, i.e., before the *hungweipings* went out into the streets, but already after first such groups had been set up at the Peking University. It was also at this University that the first *tatsupao* appeared, calling for the smashing-up of the CPC committees. By the will of the Maoists, China's oldest University was destined to play a disgraceful role in the "cultural revolution".

The *hungweiping* gangs began to be extensively used in August 1966 for raids on Party and government bodies. They were told whom to attack, and the result was that out of the

17 members of the Political Bureau, elected immediately after the Eighth Congress of the CPC, only Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao escaped from being abused and publicly disgraced. Following the 11th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, the statutory executive bodies were dissolved. They were virtually replaced by the "cultural revolution" group, headed by Chen Po-ta, the former private secretary of Mao Tse-tung. Chen's right-hand man was Kang Sheng, Secretary of the CPC Central Committee (since 1962), who was called the "executioner of the Party". Chiang Ching, the wife of Mao Tse-tung, also gained promotion moving from an inconspicuous job at the Ministry of Culture to occupy a high position. Not being even a member of the CPC Central Committee, Chiang Ching was now elevated to the position of secretary of a standing Political Bureau committee. Chiang Ching's promotion showed how narrow had become the group of those persons whom Mao Tse-tung could directly rely upon.

The campaign of *hungweiping* and *tsaofan* terror was directed not only against high-ranking Party and government leaders who posed an immediate danger to the Maoists in the fight for power. It was also directed against local Party organisations and organs of people's power, at some national government institutions, national and local YCL and trade union bodies, Party committees and administrations of educational establishments, research centres, factories and offices. "Black bandits", "revisionists" and Party members in power who allegedly favoured the capitalist road of development were "discovered" everywhere. Reprisals were carried out not only against real opponents of Maoism, but also against all these who entertained doubts, and were not zealous enough in preaching the Mao personality cult. It also became clear soon afterwards that the matter did not end with the ill treatment of individuals, but went far beyond and indicated a process which was to effect major changes in the entire political system.

These changes, naturally, could not come about unless individuals upholding ideas opposed to those of the Maoists were silenced. Soon it became obvious that the main blow in the higher Party and government bodies was being directed against Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the PRC. Next came Teng

Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee.⁶ Besides these two, the *hungweipings* hit out at Peng Cheng, Head of the Propaganda Department, member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Lu Ting-yi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture, and other prominent national and local leaders. Many of them were seized by the *hungweipings* and subjected to public disgrace.

The *hungweipings* and *tsaofns* liked to disgrace their victims publicly, parading them in processions or along "circles of disgrace" on foot or in open lorries, making them wear fool's caps and hanging boards bearing words of abuse round their necks. Death sentences were also passed at these *hungweiping*-staged "trials".

Overt acts of terrorism were only a part of the "work" of the "little leaders" of the "cultural revolution", as the *hungweipings* were called in the Maoist press. There were also many covert acts of terrorism in *hungweiping* prison cells. A particularly bad name was earned by the *hungweipings* of School No. 6, in the heart of Peking. They began operating in the summer of 1966 and were immediately praised by the ringleader of the "cultural revolution" group, Chen Po-ta, for successful actions in smashing the "black gangs" at the Higher Party School, in the Central Committee of the Chinese Young Communist League, and in the main department store in Wangfuching Street.

In response to a call of the leaders of the coup to seek "new forms" of struggle against the enemies of "Chairman Mao", they set up torture chambers and a prison in their school (the whole complex was called *liaokaiso*, i.e., a corrective labour prison). Here the *hungweipings* did whatever they wished to those who, in their opinion, were opposed to Mao Tse-tung's ideas. Of the hundreds who went through the *liaokaiso*, 50 were tortured to death or crippled for life. Among them were students, teachers, workers, office employees, and Party and YCL functionaries.

Proclaimed as ideal revolutionaries, the Peking *hungweipings*, shortly after the pogroms in the capital, began to be sent out, at government expense, to the provinces to break up Party and people's committees there. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of *hungweipings* began streaming into Peking from the provinces for an "exchange of experience". Their return

home and the arrival of Peking *hungweipings* in the provinces were accompanied by fresh acts of terrorism, which claimed fresh victims. The Maoists incensed the youth with stories about atrocities having allegedly been committed by the opponents of the "cultural revolution."⁷

The visits of the *hungweipings* to the national areas were accompanied by wild outbursts of Great-Han chauvinism. In Tibet, for instance, the "cultural revolution" began with acts derogatory to the Tibetans' religious feelings, and attacks on their national customs. The main monastery in Lhasa and other big monasteries were demolished, and idols and books, for centuries held sacred by the Tibetans, were burnt in bonfires. Instead of Buddhist texts, the lamas were ordered to read books containing Mao Tse-tung's sayings. Homes were broken into by the *hungweipings*, who beat up the inmates wherever they came across articles of religion or national dress, utensils, etc. The Tibetans were forced to cut their hair short and to wear Chinese dress, and to change their names in the Chinese manner. The numerically-weak Tibetan intelligentsia was subjected to harsh treatments. Actually not a single Tibetan secular or religious leader remained free. In Sinkiang, the "cultural revolution" was marked by the smashing-up of the local government bodies, publishing houses and radio stations, and the closing down of Uigur and Kazakh newspapers and magazines and national schools. The *hungweipings* forced the Uigurs and Kazakhs to give up their age-old customs, eat pork and cremate their dead. Traditional burial rites were banned. The non-Chinese population in the national areas was thus to be intimidated and forced to resign itself to the fate prepared by the Maoists for it.

The trips of the Peking *hungweipings* to the provinces, however, were not always triumphant. In many cities, and especially in big industrial centres, the workers came to the defence of the Party and people's committees. Only a comparatively small section of the working class swallowed the bait of the leaders of the "cultural revolution" and allowed itself to be drawn into the *tsaofan* organisations. The class-conscious workers did not accept the "cultural revolution". Mass demonstrations of workers began even at the end of 1966

in many towns and provinces (Shanghai, Tientsin, Sian, Loyang, Lanchow, Wuhan, Chengtu, Shantung, Kwangtung, Yunnan, Shensi and Heilungkiang).

The Maoists, naturally, wanted that their actions should be supported by the workers. Consequently, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions was not attacked at all till the end of 1966. The resistance of the workers to the "cultural revolution" revealed to the Maoists that that organisation could not be used as an instrument to make the masses of workers and office employees follow them. Addressing the *hungweipings* at the end of December 1966, Chiang Ching stated that, following the victory of the revolution, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions had failed to popularise "Mao Tse-tung's thoughts among the workers", and had conducted "a counter-revolutionary revisionist policy". This trade union federation, with its membership of 21 million, was dissolved by the *tsaofans* on December 27, 1966.

Much earlier, at the very beginning of the "cultural revolution", a similar fate befell the Chinese Young Communist League. In August 1966, the *hungweipings* started calling the YCL a "poisonous weed", and demanded that YCL badges be thrown away. This was done, despite the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the YCL leadership had for a number of years before the "cultural revolution" done a great deal in educating the youth in the spirit of fanatical loyalty to Mao Tse-tung, and in the spirit of anti-Sovietism.

The instigators of the "cultural revolution" found that the organisational principles of the YCL, and, first of all, the principle of democratic centralism (even though curtailed, this principle to some extent restricted the possibility of acting in an arbitrary manner) did not suit them. The men behind the "cultural revolution" also disliked the idea that, under YCL rules, YCL primary organisations and elected bodies were directed by elected Party bodies. As distinguished from YCL members, the *hungweipings* were urged not to serve the people or the Party's cause, but only Mao Tse-tung directly, and not to abide by the decisions of Party bodies, but by Mao's "sovereign word".

All the organisations of the Chinese Young Communist

League were dissolved during the "cultural revolution". The YCL Central Committee was accused of conducting a "completely revisionist line from beginning to end", and of "trying to convert the leading organisation of proletarian youth into a nursery of revisionism."

The period of the "cultural revolution" saw the disappearance of other public organisations from the Chinese political scene.

Exactly a month after the dissolution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the army emerged openly in the arena of political struggle. While staying behind the scene at the beginning of the "cultural revolution", the army now stepped out into the open. The army units, which had formally been "non-interfering", began, in January 1967, on Mao Tse-tung's instructions, to openly help the *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* in breaking up the government and Party bodies, the constitutional bodies of people's power, and public organisations. The army newspaper, *Chienfangchiun Pao*, which during the "cultural revolution" had become the main organ of the Mao group, frankly admitted that the "rebels" (i.e. supporters of Mao Tse-tung) were "temporarily in a minority", and urged the army to "actively support the proletarian left-revolutionaries."⁸ The main agency of the coup thus came into the open.

2. The Army—The Main Lever

The choice of the army as the main lever of the coup was not accidental. Such was the logic of thinking of Mao Tse-tung, a petty-bourgeois leader, favouring militarisation of government and public affairs. Militarisation attracted the Maoists by its certain specific features. First, army discipline, which means unquestioning obedience; second, the fact that material incentives play practically no role in the soldiers' fulfilment of their duties; third, army rationing, under which all soldiers are treated at par; and, fourth, its great mobility and mobilising potential.

It was precisely such an organisation that Mao needed to conduct his left-adventurist policy with its barrack-type discipline, unquestioning obedience to orders, allegiance to the

leader, equal rations for all, and renunciation of material stimuli.

The army's support of the *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* was led by the so-called "committees of support for the left" set up under the military district commands throughout the country. Bureaus, groups and commands of "support for the left" came into existence in the military districts and garrisons of large cities. Special "support for the left" troops were put under their command. However, not all military units were entrusted with this mission.

These organisations and troops throughout the country were directed by the group for the affairs of "support for the left" under the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, headed by Hsieh Fu-chih, one of the leaders of the "cultural revolution".

The army's intervention in the "cultural revolution" was effected under the formula "three supports, two military participations", which meant support for the "left", support of agriculture and support of industry, involvement in military control and military training (the latter mainly concerned educational establishments).

Besides armed support for the "left", army interference meant occupation by the army everywhere of offices, industrial and transportation enterprises and educational establishments. Under a directive of the CPC Central Committee of February 23, 1967, the army was made responsible for the organisation of spring field-work in the countryside. Since China has never experienced a shortage of workhands, one can easily see that the soldiers actually acted as wardens and overseers.

Military control was established both over individual enterprises and offices and over administrative-territorial units. Military control meant, in fact, the creation of a military administration. This is borne out, for instance, by a letter of instructions on the establishment of military control over the mining and other industrial enterprises and economic bodies in the province of Shansi. It said, in particular, that all units subject to military control must be put "under a single leadership, under all-round army control", and that interference by "any other departments and mass organisations" and also any attempt at

influencing the working of military control or its undermining in any form whatsoever were inadmissible. As many as 10,000 army servicemen were sent to this province to exercise military control at industrial enterprises, in districts, village communes and production teams.

In a number of instances, military control committees were organised in administrative-territorial units (notably, such a committee was set up on a provincial level in Tsinghai), but the greater part of these units began to be directed by the army through the "revolutionary committees". Prior to the setting up of the provincial "revolutionary committees", all power was in the hands of the command and Party and political bodies of the provincial military areas.

At the same time, military control agencies began to be set up in offices where it had been impossible to set up military control earlier. For instance, no one would have ever thought of establishing military control over the public security agencies, the strongest weapon of the revolution. During the "cultural revolution" these bodies came under military control, and, evidently, were thoroughly purged. At any rate, the army newspaper, *Chienfangchium Pao*, criticised the former Minister of Public Security, Lo Jui-ching, and local executive officers of this department.

The judiciary also fell under military control together with the public security bodies. In a number of cases, united bodies of military control were set up over local political and legal agencies, i.e., over the public security agencies, the courts and the Procurator's Offices. All mass-media agencies were put under military control simultaneously.

Military control was established directly by the army or through the *minping* (people's militia). The following instructions were published in the newspaper *Jenmin Jihpao* concerning the concrete form of this control: "There must be a military representative or a representative of the militia from top to bottom, in all units where power has to be seized... This line must be conducted everywhere—at industrial enterprises, in the rural areas, in trade, finance, culture and education (institutes, secondary and elementary schools), in Party and government bodies, and mass organisations. Military representatives must be

sent everywhere at district and higher levels, and representatives of the militia to the communes and lower levels."⁹ The primary military control unit was called a military team of propaganda of "Mao Tse-tung's thought", and its leader, military representative of the unit.

The main task of these teams was to check the chaos caused by the breaking up of the apparatus, and to crush the resistance of the working people to the "cultural revolution". The army and militia representatives in the local units took up the posts of administrators and political organisers.

The form of military control depended on the degree of resistance of the working people to the Maoists' measures.¹⁰ The following comment by Mao Tse-tung was invoked to substantiate the extensive interference of the army in the political and economic life of the country: "...The Red Army exists not merely to fight; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should also shoulder such important tasks as agitation among the masses, organising them, arming them, and helping them to set up revolutionary political power, and even establishing organisations of the Communist Party."¹¹

Special bodies were set up by the army and the people's militia for the guidance of military teams and military representatives in the economic and other units. Among the first such bodies were the agricultural offices, called upon to "promote the revolution and stimulate production". At the beginning (in 1967), these offices were assigned the job of organising spring-sowing work. Later on, they took over charge of general agricultural management which lasted virtually throughout the entire period of the "cultural revolution". These offices were set up by the commands of the provincial military districts and special areas.

Along with agricultural offices, a number of sectoral offices were set up simultaneously, for instance, offices for water economy and forestry, finance and trade, communications, and for farm production. Similar offices were also established by the people's militia departments in districts and small towns. A month later, army offices were founded in industry as well. They made their appearance after the publication of the "Letter of the CPC Central Committee to all the Revolutionary Workers

and Employees, to All the Revolutionary Functionaries of China."¹² These offices used army servicemen and the *minping* to form "teams of propaganda of Mao Tse-tung's thought," and directed their activities after they took over the administration of the enterprises. The sectoral offices were subsequently integrated with the "revolutionary committees". The army servicemen sent to work in civil organisations and administrative bodies were placed under the command of offices or bureaus of assistance set up under military district commands.

Thus, the entire country was put under military control. Its lowest and "oldest" links were the army "teams of propaganda of Mao Tse-tung's thought", or groups of army servicemen which had been sent to educational establishments to take charge of military training there. It was from the army teams entrenched in factories, offices and educational institutions that the military sections of the "revolutionary committees" subsequently sprang up and assumed the leading position. Later they came to occupy leading positions in the "revolutionary committees" and Party committees not only at enterprises, communes, and educational establishments, but also in administrative-territorial units. Holding one post or another in the administrative and Party apparatus, the army servicemen usually remained on active service, and did not always give up their former military posts.

The Chinese press repeatedly carried reports on army servicemen leading Party committees and "revolutionary committees" of various levels. As regards the provinces, autonomous regions, and big cities, only a few of these were headed by civilians; the commanders or political instructors of military districts and garrisons were usually the heads of "revolutionary committees" and Party committees at this level. Another remarkable feature was the appointment to military posts of representatives of the Maoist elite, who had gained prominence during the period of the "cultural revolution". For example, the posts of political instructors in the Shanghai garrison were given to the political bosses of the city and members of the new Political Bureau of the CPC, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, who were also First and Second Secretaries of the Shanghai Party

Committee, and head and assistant head of the city's "revolutionary committee".

Military control was also established over the central ministries and departments. First, military control committees or groups¹³ were set up. Later offices of military representatives were organised on their basis. Usually military representatives in the central ministries and departments were appointed from among high-ranking military officers. For instance, the military representative in the Ministry of Finance was Ying Cheng-chan, the assistant chief of the finance department of the Main Logistic Administration of the People's Liberation Army (at the beginning, he headed the military control committee of the Ministry). The same post was held in the Ministry of Food Supply by Fang Shen-hsuan, chief of the food and fodder office of the Main Logistic Administration, and in the Ministry of Trade by Fan Tzu-yu, chief of the material supplies department of the Main Logistic Administration. Some of the military representatives in the ministries were subsequently appointed heads of those same or reorganised ministries. For instance, Pai Hsiang-kuo, assistant chief of the political department of the Kwangchow military district, was put in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, where till then he had been the military representative.¹⁴ The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, which replaced the former Ministry of Agriculture and Development of Virgin and Long-Fallow Land and the Water Economy Department of the former Ministry of Economy and Electric Power, was headed by Sha Feng, chief of the Armoured Academy of the People's Liberation Army, who had been military representative at the former Ministry of Agriculture.

Military control was established even over the CPC Central Committee. In the Department of International Relations of the CPC Central Committee, for instance, the military control group was headed by Jen Yuan-chung, the political instructor of the Heilungkiang military district, who, however, did not become the chief of the department after the "cultural revolution".

The entire system of military control was headed by the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, which assumed

powers extending far beyond the functions of the Central Committee Commission for Military Affairs. In fact, it put itself above the Central Committee of the Party.

As pointed out earlier, direct military control was not the only form of militarisation of the government system and of political guidance of society. At first the so-called "revolutionary committees" also carried out functions of military administration. It is also important to note that in the period of the "cultural revolution" the Party and political departments of the People's Liberation Army were not abolished. At a certain stage, especially before the establishment of the "revolutionary committees", they assumed the functions of provincial and lower Party and people's committees, thereby checking the chaos that had been caused by the abolition of these bodies. Subsequent developments in the country showed that, in spite of the frequent changes of slogans, the army's involvement in running the state had become an immanent feature of the Maoist political regime, whose continued existence became inconceivable without the support of the army. The Maoists themselves made no secret of this. They constantly emphasised in their press that "the army is the main support of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (read : military-bureaucratic dictatorship).

3. "Revolutionary Committees"

In the course of the "cultural revolution," a political system developed under which administrative and political bodies began to merge. This process started with the breaking up of the Party and people's committees, and attempts to replace them with new bodies. For instance, back at the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, in August 1966, it was announced that it was necessary to set up "groups, committees and conferences of the 'cultural revolution', elected by a Paris Commune-type general election, as organs of power of the 'cultural revolution.'" ¹⁵

The Maoists, however, were unable to rely upon these bodies. Set up by the Party committees, they were used in a number of cases by the Party functionaries to resist Maoist arbitrariness and widespread repression and for directing developments along some kind of a legal channel. It was then that the Maoists let

loose the *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* against these bodies. The latter ceased to exist in the autumn of 1966, while simultaneously the smashing up of the Party committees continued under cover of talk about "the usurpation of people's power by representatives of the bourgeoisie," which was, in fact, the rather worn-out Trotskyite thesis about the "degeneration" of the Party. The *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* were set the task of "seizing power" from the "bourgeoisie", as the leaders of the Party and people's committees began to be called.

In the beginning of 1967, an attempt was made to set up new Maoist local government bodies in place of the former Party and people's committees. In January, two active members of the Maoist group, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, who had led the "seizure of power" in Shanghai were given an assignment by the "Great Helmsman" to establish an organ of power there that would serve as a model for other cities and provinces. The seizure of power was announced on January 24, and the establishment of the "Shanghai commune", headed by Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, was proclaimed on February 5. That same month "communes" were set up in Harbin, Changchun, and a number of other cities. The establishment of the "communes" was accompanied by loud demagogic talk about "highest-ever mass-scale democracy". However, from the very beginning, this was not the only form of organisation of local power. Military men and Party functionaries, who had escaped the purge, seized power in the province of Shansi in January 1967 and set up a local organ of power based on the principle of "joining up three sides" ("revolutionary" functionaries, military representatives, and *hungweipings* and *tsaofans*). Bodies of this type were called "revolutionary committees", and were destined to oust the "communes" and to become the main bodies of the Maoist military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

The rejection of the "communes" is to be explained by the fact that the Maoists had realised that the very principle of electivity to the local organs of power was fraught with the danger of loss of certain political positions. The membership of "revolutionary committees" was usually announced at rallies of servicemen, *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* and "revolutionary

cadres". During the formation of the "revolutionary committees" an acute struggle took place between organisations of storm-troopers and military men. Both parties tried to win the officials over to their side, but the latter, naturally, were not the arbiters in this fight for power. The decision always rested with the army which ultimately determined as to which of the organisations of storm-troopers were really "revolutionary", i.e., truly Maoist. Both the military men and storm-troopers sought to utilise the administrative experience of the officials which was important for the establishment and functioning of the new political system.

In the course of the winter and spring of 1967, only six "revolutionary committees" were formed—in the provinces of Heilungkiang, Kweichow, Shantung and Shansi, and in the cities of Peking and Shanghai. The *hungweiping* and *tsaofan* organisations were widely represented. During the initial stage the "revolutionary committees" were frequently headed by former Party leaders, but already then the military men constituted the majority in the leadership.

Later on, the fear of an outbreak of chaos in the country forced Mao Tse-tung to agree to the wielding of supreme power by military men in the "revolutionary committees". This was the distinguishing feature of the 12 "revolutionary committees" organised in the period between August 1967 and March 1968. The military headed nine of them and military men occupied the posts of Vice-Chairmen in the other three. Among the Vice-Chairmen of these "revolutionary committees" were some rehabilitated Party leaders. The establishment of "revolutionary committees" in the national areas usually proceeded without the participation of local functionaries. Practically none of the "revolutionary committees" set up in the autonomous areas was headed by local people. However, in a number of cases, the local people were allowed to hold the posts of Vice-Chairmen of the "revolutionary committees", the majority of whose members consisted of Chinese.

The local cadres were subjected to brutal treatment. One of the victims was Ulanfu, at that time the only non-Chinese alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Vice-Premier of the State Council of the PRC, and

Chairman of the People's Committee of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, who was later restored to the Maoist elite as a Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. According to reports in the *hungweiping* leaflets, Ulanfu was accused of "favouring the study of the Mongolian language", of "fighting for 30 years" against Great-Han chauvinism, and also of claiming that the minorities in China must resolve their own internal problems.

In the period of establishment of the "revolutionary committees", the *hungweipings* began to be gradually pushed into the background. They had done their work, and the masterminds of the Maoist coup began to get rid of the "little leaders of the revolution".

A new stage in the establishment of "revolutionary committees" as organs of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship began in March 1968, when fresh instructions of Mao Tse-tung concerning the further development of these bodies were made public.¹⁶

Mao Tse-tung clearly indicated his support for the idea of fusion of Party and government bodies in the "revolutionary committees", and pointed out the need for eliminating the "duplicate administrative apparatus". With the publication of these instructions, the press stopped referring to the "revolutionary committees" as "provisional organs of power".

In addition to the elimination of the "duplicate administrative apparatus", Mao Tse-tung's instructions of March 1968 called for "compact and effective" organs of power, and insisted that they should "have a small leadership and a small executive group", and that "inflated staffs should be reduced". The main aim of these instructions was to rid the new organs of power of unsuitable people. The spring of 1968 witnessed the intensified establishment of "revolutionary committees", not only at the provincial level, but also in other administrative-territorial units, and especially in offices and "people's communes", and enterprises.

The establishment of "revolutionary committees" was accompanied by a hullabaloo about "revolutionisation of administration", "fusion with the masses", "reduction of administrative staff", etc. The Chinese press carried reports about large reductions of managerial staffs of enterprises, offices

and territorial units.¹⁷ Possibly, such reductions were carried out, but, in assessing this measure, one should take into consideration that, firstly, the administrative staffs in China had always been inflated and their reduction, even on a large scale, could not be really effective; secondly, reductions were not extended to the army at all, including the military bodies which had assumed the functions of military control, and ordinary administrative functions; thirdly, in a number of cases departments dealing with really essential questions were closed down, like, for instance, the departments of labour and irrigation in the Fohsichen autonomous region in Inner Mongolia. The curtailment of essential branches of work by means of Mao's "revolutionisation" was even more strikingly illustrated by the example of factory managements. As during the "great leap," here, too, entire offices were abolished, including those of chief engineer, chief mechanic, chief bookkeeper. The "revolutionary committees" at industrial enterprises had by then dissolved management groups, departments and services and had begun to rely on two or three departments or groups and an office. For instance, the "revolutionary committee" at the Waichuang mining enterprises in Shantung Province had two groups and an office. The first, political group, was in charge of the study of "Mao Tse-tung's thought" by the personnel. The second, production group, handled a wide range of questions related to production. The office was in charge of various subjects, including bookkeeping, and, for some odd reason, circulation of periodicals, reception of visitors, and "establishment of ties between workers and peasants". No room was found in this structure of "revolutionised management" for a work-safety department.¹⁸

As regards the "revolutionisation of the style of work" and "fusion with the masses", it boiled down to a drastic cut in the salaries of engineers and technicians and to longer working hours and additional physical labour.

The establishment of the "revolutionary committees" at the provincial level was completed by the autumn of 1968. A rally commemorating this event was held in Peking on September 7. Though not so pompous, it signified the end of a definite stage of the "cultural revolution", during which the Maoists, with the

decisive assistance of the army, had managed to set up control over the principal administrative-territorial units. Subsequent developments have shown that this control was not firm everywhere. The Maoists themselves harboured no illusions in this regard. Hence, the comments in the Chinese press on "the tendency for a return to the old order", on attempts to set up "independent domains", and assertions that "there are contradictions in one form or another among the leading personnel at different levels of management". The newspaper *Heilungkiang Jihpao* commented on February 15, 1969: "The establishment of the 'revolutionary committee' does not at all mean the end of the struggle between the two roads, between the two political lines". The Maoist "teaching" on "the continuation of the revolution in conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat" presupposed, the paper said, an intensified "class struggle" inside the "revolutionary committees", and even a repetition of a campaign of terror of the "cultural revolution" type.

Be that as it may, it was precisely after the establishment of the "revolutionary committees" in all provincial-level units that the Maoists began to talk in earnest about the holding of the Ninth Congress of the CPC, about which they had been speaking so often earlier. In the provincial and other lower "revolutionary committees", the Maoists had created obedient bodies on which they could rely to appoint suitable delegates to the Congress. Not a single delegate was elected at the provincial level. Instead, they were selected and appointed by the so-called "hard nuclei". At that time the "revolutionary committees" consisted of the plenum, the standing committee¹⁹ and the "hard nucleus", i.e., Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Chief Secretary of the committee.

The "hard nuclei" directed the practical activities of the "revolutionary committees", most of which in the provinces were headed by the military. The military also held the posts of Deputy Chairmen. As for the "revolutionary committees" of the cities, districts, special areas and other administrative-territorial units, the military appeared in various roles there. Information on the structure of the "revolutionary committees" was first published in the press back in 1967.

At the end of July and the beginning of August 1968, when

the establishment of the "revolutionary committees" had almost been completed in the provinces, the Maoist clique made a sharp political turn and suddenly started "remembering" the working class. Up till then, throughout the entire "cultural revolution", the word "proletariat" had been used only in the term "dictatorship of the proletariat", and which only meant reprisals against the Communists, who had turned out to be "representatives of the bourgeoisie".

At the end of July, "workers' teams of propaganda of Mao Tse-tung's thought" appeared on the campuses of a number of higher educational institutions (the first team entered Chinghua University on July 27). They were a new variety of storm-troopers hurled this time mainly against the *hungweipings*, who were no longer needed by the Maoists and even represented a certain danger to them. These young people had taken part in the overthrow of top leaders and had been trained to defy the "authorities". In the new conditions, they could easily ally themselves with an entirely different side. Being well aware of this danger, the Maoists launched a fresh campaign for "revolutionary education", this time in the form of moving "the literate youth", as they put it, out of the urban communities.

Naturally, this process was accompanied by the usual demagoguery about "Mao Tse-tung's latest instructions" calling for the education of the urban youth by "the poor and lower strata of middle peasants". (It will be recalled that the Maoists began reviving these class traditions 20 years after the formation of the PRC, 17 years after the completion of the agrarian reform, and 15 years after the achievement of cent per cent production cooperation in agriculture.) As a result of this "educational" measure of the Maoists, millions of young people were sent away from the larger cities to far-off rural areas. There was no need now for the Maoists to fear any opposition. This treatment of the *hungweipings* vividly demonstrated the Bonapartist nature of the Maoist regime, which alternately relied on various social forces and set them at loggerheads.

The Maoist press forgot the "little leaders of the revolution", and began showering praise upon the working class,

extolling in every possible way the activities of the so-called "worker's teams" of propaganda of "Mao Tse-tung's thought". Naturally, there was not the slightest shred of sincerity in the praise of the working class. As ever, the Maoists had no intention at all of relying on the working class, which by its very class nature is hostile to a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. It also goes without saying that no change took place in the summer of 1968 in the essence of the Maoist dictatorship. The reason for the Maoists' flirtation with the working class was to camouflage their dictatorship. As for the "workers' teams", widely publicised by the Maoist press, they were not led by the workers: the majority of their members and the leadership consisted of military men from units permanently stationed at enterprises since the beginning of 1967.

The activities of the "workers' teams" were not confined exclusively to the sphere of propaganda, though, of course, they organised groups where people learnt and sang the "Great Helmsman's" sayings in chorus. The "workers' teams" were another form of Maoist detachments of storm-troopers, militarised and virtually part of the army system.

The establishment of the "workers' teams" was followed by the militarisation of industrial enterprises. In the autumn of 1968, the Chinese press began publishing enthusiastic reports about completely militarised factories and production shops. For instance, on September 18, 1968, the newspaper, *Chianghsi Jihpao* carried a long article which stated that the way to run a factory was to set up a military system there. The paper asserted, in particular, that "some people believe that a military system can be established only in the People's Liberation Army, and not at industrial enterprises and in other sectors. They resort to all kinds of pretexts to oppose the introduction of a military system at industrial enterprises. All their arguments are groundless."

As regards the groundlessness of these arguments the newspaper offered no explanation (this is how the Maoist press always dealt with the arguments of the opposition). Instead, it praised the factories for having organised army-type companies and for marching workers to and from work, and for "watching over the mood in the shops" which had now become

easier because of the introduction of the military system.

After removing the *hungweipings* from the cities and launching upon the militarisation of the working class, the Maoists also found ways of expelling from urban communities those functionaries who were potentially hostile towards them or were not zealous enough in carrying out their instructions. The so-called "May 7 schools" were set up for this purpose in remote rural localities. Originally these were a variety of corrective labour institutions, though they had no guards. Deprived of their posts by the "cultural revolution" and "revolutionisation of administration", these functionaries were assigned hard physical labour, which was combined with the learning by rote of Mao Tse-tung's sayings. Naturally, the press described this measure as effective "revolutionary education", aimed at bringing administrative and Party workers back from the "capitalist road" on to the "mass road".

Following the above-mentioned measures, which coincided with the completion of the establishment of provincial-level "revolutionary committees", the Maoists deemed it possible to launch preparations for an assembly of their supporters under the false signboard of a CPC Congress, which, above all, was expected to consolidate the results of the Maoist coup, and, secondly, to try to create among the people in their own country and abroad the illusion of the existence of the old Communist Party of China and utilise its name and prestige in pursuit of great-power and hegemonistic aspirations.

4. Harnessing Punitive and Repressive Systems

A legal system based on a socialist-type constitution could not exist under the conditions of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. The latter needed its own punitive and repressive apparatus, one which would not be interested in protecting the rights of the working people and the laws of the state but would be capable of suppressing the resistance of the popular masses to the policy of the Maoist top clique. The constitutional legal agencies had been dissolved during the "cultural revolution", while at the same time the number of bodies and organisations carrying out punitive functions had increased.

Above all, coercion was bound to be applied on an extensive scale by the *hungweipings*, and later, by the *tsaofans*. The activities of the Maoist storm-troopers were of a punitive nature. With the connivance of the army, they assumed the right to arrest and try their victims at "rallies of struggle", subject functionaries and workers in the sphere of science, culture and the arts to torture and public humiliation. The press carried reports on the setting up by the *hungweipings* of *liakaises* (prisons) at educational and industrial establishments.

In the period of the "cultural revolution" punitive functions were also extensively carried out by the army, from which, as mentioned earlier, special "troops of support for the left" were formed. In particular, these troops were used to crush the resistance of the workers to the smashing up of the Party and people's committees. The military control committees set up in the period of the "cultural revolution" were primarily punitive bodies. Punitive functions were likewise carried out by the contingents of *minpings* together with the People's Liberation Army.

The process of the merging of public security bodies, courts and Procurator's Offices continued. This process began in the period of the "great leap", when all these bodies were put under military control. In a number of cases, this step was preceded by *hungweiping* raids on offices of legal bodies (the premises of the Supreme People's Court were demolished in September 1966). There were also some instances of *hungweiping* attacks on public security offices. At a *hungweiping* rally on December 18, 1966, Mao Tse-tung's wife, Chiang Ching, bluntly stated: "The public security bodies, the Procurator's Office and the Supreme Court have all come from the capitalist states, and they stand above the Party and the government. In the final analysis, they exercise surveillance over us, and provide incriminating material against us. They are all bureaucratic agencies. Throughout the last few years they have invariably opposed Chairman Mao."

Placed under military control and united into one body, the public security and legal bodies were given the name of *king-chian-fa* (the first hieroglyphs of the names "public security", "procurator's office", and "court"). This was not

the only name: numerous trials during the "cultural revolution" had been staged by the so-called "commissions for the eradication of counter-revolution", which made arrests and conducted interrogations. By the end of the "cultural revolution", the combined punitive agencies of the Maoist dictatorship were named "organs (committees, departments, headquarters) of the dictatorship of the proletariat", or simply "organs of dictatorship". Thus, the Maoists once again showed that they considered the dictatorship of the proletariat to be nothing but an instrument of violence.

The "Draft Provisional Revolutionary Rules of the Shansi Provincial Revolutionary Committee"—one of the few legal documents of the period of the "cultural revolution" (March 1967)—defined the functions of a combined punitive organ of the Maoist dictatorship as follows: "The Committee of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is the highest executive body of the dictatorship of Shansi Province. It carries out all the functions of public security bodies, the Procurator's Office, and the courts....It metes out strong punishment for counter-revolutionary crimes, and delivers blows at criminals". The "Draft" emphasised that each department of the Committee must be the fusion of "the three sides", in other words, all the Committee departments were to be under the control of the military. It goes without saying that the existence of such an organisation, where different bodies had to work in close co-operation while being under the control of others, increased the possibility of arbitrariness.

Mob trials, usually staged at stadiums, became a common feature of life during the "cultural revolution". They were especially frequent at times when the political situation became more aggravated, which happened often during the long-drawn-out coup. One such tense period was the spring of 1968 when the provincial and other lower "revolutionary committees" were formed. A "trial" took place on April 26, 1968, in Changchun of a large group of local functionaries accused of having acted against "Mao's headquarters". Six of the accused were sentenced to death, and the rest to life imprisonment or to long terms of imprisonment.

A similar trial was held on April 27 in Shanghai in a

square named after the "cultural revolution". Seven persons were charged with having attacked Mao Tse-tung and Lin Biao. They were sentenced to death and shot immediately (Radio Shanghai reported that the *hungweipings* "jumped with joy" during the execution). All this was shown on television in Shanghai.

On the eve of the Ninth Congress of the CPC, those *hungweipings* who had only recently "jumped with joy" during the executions of functionaries now themselves became the targets of show trials. Severely punished were those "little leaders of the cultural revolution" who had returned to the cities without permission from the permanent "literate youth" settlements, and who had endeavoured to regain their previous influence and restore their organisations which in the eyes of the authorities had already become illegal and even "counter-revolutionary". It was reported in the foreign press on January 27, 1969, that 19 former *hungweipings* were executed at a public rally in a Peking stadium. Shortly afterwards the radio station in Taiyuan (administrative centre of Shansi Province) announced that show trials were held in the city of Yangchenghsion on February 10 and 11 in the presence of 50,000 people. The death sentences were also carried out immediately.

As at mob trials in the past, at all these staged trials rallies of raving mobs took the place of court proceedings. The accused had no chance to say even one word in their defence. They just stood on high platforms silently, with posters round their necks relating the story of their "crimes". One speech of denunciation followed another, interrupted with the cries *Sha* (death) from the frenzied crowd. Desecration of the bodies of those executed in the period of the "cultural revolution" began to be considered a manifestation of the highest degree of political consciousness. The medieval mob trials and stage-managed executions were revived by the Maoists to maintain an atmosphere of fear. The ravings of the mobs directed by them began to be lauded as a "line of the masses" and a "democracy of the highest order".

The "cultural revolution" created a situation where numerous agencies and organisations were set up one after another in an attempt to check chaos and, especially, the

growth of crime arising from the *hungweiping* activities. For instance, in Nanchan, the struggle against profiteers and other criminal elements was led by the city "command of the revolutionary workers' militia." According to press reports, a raid carried out by this "command" in late January 1968 revealed the existence of private clandestine industrial enterprises and stores of goods. It was also reported that more than 100 dens had been wiped out.²⁰

The military control committee of the *kung-chiang-fa* in Shanghai formed teams of "struggle by conviction and defence by force" in order to protect the city. These teams were united under the Shanghai city "headquarters of struggle by conviction and defence by force." "Main commands to combat profiteering" were set up in a number of cities. However, these emergency measures did not result in any marked reduction in crime.

Concentration camps of three kinds—corrective labour, reformatory labour and forced labour camps—became essential appendages of the punitive organs of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship. The prisoners in the corrective labour camps were those sentenced by the courts and other punitive bodies of the Maoist dictatorship to various terms of imprisonment or to life imprisonment, and also those sentenced to death with deferment of execution (there is such a form of punishment in the PRC). People sentenced by administrative bodies were sent to the reformatory labour camps. Up till the mid-1960s, the "educational process" in most cases was limited to three years of detention, but after the "cultural revolution" prisoners in general were not released from these camps. Unemployed people and tramps were kept in the forced labour camps. They were detained without any charges having been levelled against them, and were soon afterwards proclaimed to be "volunteers" (a special document had to be signed about this). If they behaved well and were keen to learn the "Great Helmsman's sayings", their relatives were allowed to pay them brief visits. In all camps the prisoners (like other free citizens) had to devote two to three hours every night to "self-criticism", irrespective of the length of their working day. This "self-criticism", or, so to say, a system of openly informing on one another, was

conducted at meetings of groups of 12 to 20 headed by monitors from among the "activists" (prisoners thought to be worthy of an early discharge). The members of the group pledged to "criticise" themselves and others. Should such "self-criticism" reveal facts of insufficiently "honest labour" or conduct or "improper remarks" on the part of some, it would mean harder work, less food, and a longer term of imprisonment for them. Some activists, with the connivance of the wardens, tried to reduce their terms of imprisonment by beating their fellow-prisoners whom they considered to be obstinate and "not trustworthy".

Just how large this department of the repressive system of the Maoist dictatorship was can be judged by the fact that, on the eve of the "cultural revolution", there were one million prisoners in various concentration camps in Kwangtung Province alone.

Naturally, the repressive institutions were not limited to concentration camps. There were also a large number of prisons both under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security and various "revolutionary committees" and directly under the army. At the height of the "cultural revolution" there were numerous "temporary" *hungweiping* in prisons.

Besides throwing people into concentration camps and prisons, in the concluding stage of the "cultural revolution" the Maoists also began extensively resorting to mass-scale banishment of the urban population (mainly the youth) to distant rural settlements. Formally, those exiled were not kept under guard but in reality they were under the surveillance of army units stationed in these areas and of the *minping*. The banishment in itself was a form of punishment like work under surveillance at enterprises and in the "communes" to which former functionaries were now condemned.²¹

The "schools of functionaries" occupied a special place among the repressive organs of the Maoist regime. They were usually called "May 7 schools" and were named so after Mao Tse-tung's letter to Lin Piao of May 7, 1966, pointing out that "a highly favourable possibility for additional education has been created for functionaries by making them do some physical work." The "May 7 schools" were first established in 1968.

They were, above all, meant for providing employment to the functionaries cast out by the "cultural revolution" from offices, enterprises and the People's Liberation Army and who had to be brainwashed and subjected to fresh humiliation, because hardly anyone, including the "Great Helmsman" himself, believed that the peasants, the majority of whom were illiterate, could politically educate "in a new way" the revolutionary cadres who had gone through the crucible of the national-liberation and class struggle, and had taken part in the restoration and development of the economy. In addition, in many cases, the "May 7 schools" were set up in sparsely-populated virgin-lands and mountainous areas. The first of these schools was opened near the community of Liuho, Chinan District, Heilungkiang Province, high in the Lesser Khingan Mountains. The first 141 functionaries banished there lived in caves in the most difficult conditions. With their bare hands they built clay huts and ploughed the virgin soil with hardly any monetary help from the state. Among the first inmates of this "school" were men who had taken part in the "Long March" (this is how the strategic retreat of China's Red Army from the southern regions of the country to the north-west in 1934-1935 is called), i.e., men well advanced in age.²²

It is characteristic that "May 7 schools" were not set up at industrial enterprises. This was not surprising, because the working class was hostile to Maoist barrack-type "socialism". Matters were altogether different in the case of the peasants who were impressed by the humiliation of Party intellectuals and by the slogan "We and you are in the same filth." Thus the Maoists played on the inborn hatred of the peasants for town-folk, which was now directed against the inmates of "May 7 schools". Naturally, the peasants could teach the functionaries nothing, but "May 7 schools" were a means of creating among the peasants an illusion of social justice and equality in the military-bureaucratic state.

With the passage of time the "May 7 schools" became China's permanent political institutions. The object was to put the majority of government and army workers through them. This kind of "education" was convenient because it could be repeated from time to time with no guarantee that those "educated"

would be able to return to their old jobs. Thus the aim of the "May 7 schools" was to create an atmosphere of constant uncertainty and fear among the functionaries. But besides being basically repressive institutions, these schools were, at the same time, organisations for the ideological brainwashing of the working people and could also be regarded as part of the country's economic system, like the production-construction corps of the People's Liberation Army or forced labour camps. However, the main role of the "May 7 schools" and of the system of *chatui* was to humiliate office employees and keep them constantly in fear of being banished at any moment from the cities and sent to corrective institutions or doomed to a life of constant privation in the highlands and virgin-land areas.

5. Ideological Brainwashing

Public organisations were dissolved in the People's Republic of China in the course of the "cultural revolution". The only ones to avoid immediate dissolution were the so-called "democratic parties" (small political groups of the national bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Chinese equivalent of a united front organisation. However, these organisations did not display much initiative at that time.

The place of public organisations in the political system of the PRC in those years was taken over by the organisations of *hungweipings* and *tsaofans*, who were without a centralised leadership and acted as directed by the military command, and, later by the "revolutionary committees", carrying out the orders of the Maoist top clique.

These organisations, however, were not similar to those which had existed earlier. They were units of Mao's storm-troopers, designed to carry out a coup and create a semblance of mass support for the emergent military-bureaucratic dictatorship by various means, including the ideological brainwashing of the working people.

The organisations of *hungweipings*²³ and *tsaofans* were temporary, needed only for committing acts of terror during the "cultural revolution". Later on, they had to be replaced by

permanent political organisations. Subsequent developments showed that the Maoists took the course of reorganising the previous public organisations (after "putting them right")—the trade unions, the YCL, the women's federation. But this took place after the "cultural revolution", while only a few preparatory measures were carried out during its concluding stage. This process could most clearly be seen in the transformation of the *tsaofan* organisations. On their basis, towards the end of the "cultural revolution", so-called "conferences of representatives of revolutionary workers" (Chinese abbreviation—*kungtai*) were established, first at enterprises, and later, at city and even provincial levels. The "officials" of these conferences established contact with foreign trade unions as representatives of the Chinese trade union organisations. However, as admitted even by foreign newsmen sympathetic to the Maoists, the *kungtai* had no trade union functions.²⁴ Protection of the working people's interests was not part of the *kungtai*'s activities. The main efforts of the "conferences" and their committees were directed towards the organisation of the study and propaganda of "Mao Tse-tung's ideas", intensification of labour of the workers (without material incentives) and, to a certain degree, the organisation of workers' leisure.

The Maoist "conferences of representatives of revolutionary workers" were closely linked with the militarised system of management of enterprises. That is why they could not be regarded as class organisations of the Chinese working class. They were imposed on the working class as a form of organisation of support for the Maoist regime. At the same time, the "conferences" were used by the military-bureaucratic dictatorship for the ideological brainwashing of the Chinese workers, for turning them into obedient executors of the main commandments of Maoism, expressed in the following formulas: "Carry on the revolution, speed up the development of production, speed up work, speed up war preparations"; "Those in industry should learn from the Taching oilmen, and those in agriculture, from the large Tachai production team, and the whole country should learn from the People's Liberation Army."

The "conferences of representatives of revolutionary workers" were without a centralised leadership. It will be recalled that in 1973 the *kungtais* were re-named trade union organisations without any essential change in their functions.

The new Young Communist League, which began to be formally reorganised after the end of the "cultural revolution" (i.e., after the Ninth Congress of the CPC), had no direct continuity with the *hungweiping* organisations, which were liquidated in the autumn of 1968. The new YCL organisations began to be set up first of all in places of banishment of "literate youth", i.e., among exiled urban *hungweipings*. This fact testified to the desire of the ruling clique to have an organisational hold on these young people. For a long period after their establishment, the new YCL primary organisations had no territorial committees to supervise their work, and even at individual enterprises they were not united in a YCL committee, but were guided by the "revolutionary committees" some of whose members were made responsible for work with the youth. The YCL was restored in 1973. At the same time organisations of women, of poor people and of lower middle peasants were set up.

In the press reports on the visits of foreign delegations to China during the "cultural revolution" there is mention only of "officials" of organisations of friendship and cultural relations with some countries, or of some organisations of international solidarity. The "officials" were usually people holding several posts in various friendship organisations, but apart from receiving foreign guests their work was never specified. In all probability, they did not work in the organisations proper, but in their central organs, or, more correctly, in their "leading bodies". The latter must not be equated with the administrative body of the organisations. In present-day China the organisations of friendship and cultural relations with foreign countries are far removed from the object of uniting people working in different spheres; they simply create a semblance of public support for various foreign-policy moves of the Chinese leadership.

While casting the principal public organisations out of the life of the country, the "cultural revolution," at the same time,

brought practically the entire population within the scope of organisations of support and ideological brainwashing, called "courses of Mao Tse-tung's thought". These "courses" began mushrooming in the spring of 1972 at various levels, ranging from central institutions to individual streets. In the latter case, the system of "courses of study of Mao Tse-tung's thought" replaced the committees and groups of the population which had existed before the "cultural revolution".

According to a Radio Peking programme of January 29, 1968, more than 240,000 "courses of Mao Tse-tung's thought" functioned in Hopeh Province alone and eight million people had gone through them in 1967. The "graduates" returned to these "courses" from time to time. In some places the entire population had passed through the "courses" several times, and even several dozen times. For instance, each inhabitant of Changte in Honan Province had been to the "courses" more than 20 times, and many, 30 times.

Judging by Chinese radio and press reports, the programme of these "courses" extended far beyond the study of articles and statements by Mao Tse-tung, including as they did "criticism of egoism and revisionism", criticism by one of one's mistakes, study of the latest instructions, and military training.²⁵ *Jenmin Jihpao* said: "Courses of Mao Tse-tung's thought of various kinds must be organised with a clear object, i.e., in the search for a key to the solution of a question. Since the courses have been started, they should be conducted in a way that would enable the solution of questions in a businesslike way."²⁶

Thus, these "courses", first of all, continued the practice of self-denunciation and informing on others, which became characteristic features of the social and political life of China; secondly, they served as a means of popularising the latest instructions of the Maoist group, which had replaced Party directives and legal acts; thirdly, they dealt with questions related to the activities of various enterprises and, therefore, bore a certain resemblance to business conferences; fourthly, the "courses" were one of the links in the system of militarisation of social life.

In this way, public organisations were virtually eliminated

from the political system of the People's Republic of China, and replaced by a system of organisations of support for the Maoist regime and of ideological brainwashing of the masses, organisations playing no independent role whatsoever in organisational and ideological activities.

6. *Military-Bureaucratic Dictatorship*

The system of power and the political regime which was established in China as a result of the "cultural revolution" is termed in Marxist literature as military-bureaucratic dictatorship. This regime is, above all, characterised by the all-round *militarisation of state and social life*, which is not only expressed in the growing number of servicemen working in administrative bodies, though this fact is also a typical feature of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship. In China militarisation was manifested in many aspects of life, including the ruling group's reliance on the army. It was manifested also in the giving of armed training to its administrative personnel, extension of the army system to labour processes, militarisation of education, establishment of a military style of work at state institutions and public organisations, and the special role of the militia and production-construction corps.

Typical of the Maoist regime was the bureaucratic isolation from the masses, total disregard for the desire of the people and accountability to them, the reliance in the carrying out of administration on an extensive body of *kanpu*—professional officials, strictly subordinated and selected through a special procedure. The people were completely barred from shaping the state system and running the country.

The theory and practice of Maoism on the question of government is deeply related to Trotskyism. It will be recalled that Trotsky urged that democracy should be discarded and should be replaced by a "working mechanism", by "concentration of power". The army was his ideal of a state organisation. He wanted the state system to be based on territorial military districts, with the local military bodies being simultaneously in charge of military training, administration, and organisation of the economy on the basis of forced labour, supported in the long run by the military force of the state. The Maoists have, in fact, borrowed Trotsky's military-bureaucratic ideas, which is

not surprising considering the fact that both these theories are based on the petty-bourgeois ideology of "ultra-revolutionarism".

A feature of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship in China was the *regime of personal power*, which, at the end of the "cultural revolution", was even formalised in the CPC Rules adopted in 1969 by the Ninth Congress of the Maoist Party, and in the Draft Constitution of the PRC, which was "approved in the main" by the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, 9th Convocation, in September 1970.

Adopted in the concluding stage of the "cultural revolution", the CPC Rules were, above all, imbued with the desire to safeguard the personal power of Mao Tse-tung from any encroachments on the part of collective Party bodies. The Rules appointed Mao Tse-tung leader of the Party and placed him above all its bodies, while his petty-bourgeois "revolutionary" ideas were proclaimed to be the "theoretical foundation" of the Party, and blasphemously called the Marxism-Leninism of "an epoch when imperialism is moving to a general downfall, and socialism, to victory throughout the world." An article was introduced in the Draft Constitution of 1970 legalising Mao Tse-tung's personal position as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, elected by nobody and accountable to none. Though the CPC Rules of 1969 were later abrogated and the later Constitution of the PRC had no article legalising Mao as Head of State, the facts given above vividly illustrate the anti-democratic political reasoning of the "Great Helmsman" and his closest associates.

The fusion of administrative and Party bodies is another characteristic of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship. The beginnings of this trend were registered even before the "cultural revolution." At that time it was expressed in the fact that one and the same person held both Party and administrative posts. (A plant manager was also first secretary of the plant's Party committee, a university Rector was also the first secretary of the university Party committee, etc.), and in the substitution of administration for political leadership of Party bodies. Following the breaking up of the constitutional state bodies and the statutory bodies of the Party during the period when the "revolutionary committees" began to be set up, Mao Tse-tung's

well-known directive saying that the "new organs of power should effect centralised leadership and reject the duplicate administrative apparatus" was circulated.²⁷ By the "duplicate administrative apparatus" Mao meant the Party bodies. Thus he was opposed to Leninist teaching on the question of government, as well. Lenin objected to state power being identified with Party leadership. He advocated a clear-cut division between Party and state bodies.²⁸ He said: "...It is necessary to delimit much more precisely the functions of the Party (and of its Central Committee) from those of the Soviet government; to increase the responsibility and independence of Soviet officials and of Soviet government institutions, leaving to the Party the general guidance of the activities of all state bodies."²⁹

It should be noted that, in place of the Communist Party of China, smashed in the years of the "cultural revolution", a new political organisation was set up having the same name but a different, Maoist character. The CPC thus ceased to be a political leader of the state and society and became a part of the government system and, at the same time, an instrument of ideological brainwashing of the masses for supporting the Maoist regime.

Another characteristic feature of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship is the *renunciation of mass representative bodies of the type of the Soviets, and renunciation of elections as the principle of formation of state and other leading bodies*. This feature of the period immediately following the "cultural revolution" continued to be typical of China, in spite of the fact that the National People's Congress did assemble for a session after a 10-year interval. Its convocation, however, did not mean the restoration of elected bodies, because in keeping with the law on elections the National People's Congress should have been formed by the local congresses and these had not been convened.

The session of the National People's Congress at the beginning of 1975 simply rubber-stamped the decisions that had been worked out by the Maoist top clique. The session deputies had been appointed by the so-called "democratic consultation", in other words, approved from above following agreement with the local authorities. "Democratic consultations" were extensively applied in the establishment of the "revolutionary

committees" during the "cultural revolution". As for elections, Maoist propaganda had branded them as "one more manifestation of conservatism."

The elimination of the system of representative bodies in China was an additional proof of the Maoists' betrayal of the principles of socialist democracy. The great Lenin taught: "We cannot imagine democracy, even proletarian democracy, without representative institutions..."³⁰ Being at the head of the world's first socialist state, Lenin fostered the representative bodies of a new type—the Soviets of Deputies—engendered by the proletarian revolution. He pointed out that the democratic and socialist nature of workers' and peasants' power is expressed in that "...the supreme state authority is vested in the Soviets, which are made up of representatives of the working people (workers, soldiers and peasants), freely elected and removable at any time by the masses."³¹ Lenin particularly emphasised the significance of elections in the formation of the supreme bodies of state power. He pointed out that "...only the elected are entitled to speak in the language of state legislation."³² Lenin regarded the Soviets as "...an advance in democracy's development which is of world-wide, historic significance."³³

The establishment, in the course of the "cultural revolution", of a mechanism of power without people's representation and elections ran completely counter to socialist ideals, and to Lenin's teaching on the socialist state.

It is characteristic of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship to strive for the creation of a centralised hierarchic apparatus excluding any kind of control except control from above. Therefore, *under the system of military-bureaucratic dictatorship there is no place for either people's control or the procurator's control over legality*. The legal basis on which the activities of government bodies rested had been destroyed during the "cultural revolution" and the subsequent adoption of the new Constitution of the PRC did not change the situation either. China continued to be a state where not a single code of law nor a single law adopted separately was in force.

The policy of the Maoist top clique had always been distinguished by nihilism on questions of law. Here, too, they had borrowed their ideas from the Trotskyites, who claimed

that a proletarian state should be guided "not by general principles that will be good for a long period of time, but by considerations of revolutionary expediency." In essence, the same thing was preached by the advocates of Maoism back in the late 1950s, when they declared that violation of laws was a "normal phenomenon" prompted by the permanent revolution.³⁴

As a result of the "cultural revolution", *mass political organisations were virtually eliminated from the political system of the nation*, while in every socialist state these organisations are an integral part of the working people's power. The subsequent founding of Maoist organisations, seemingly on the pattern of the former trade unions, the Young Communist League and the Women's Federation, changed nothing in the situation which had taken shape at the end of the "cultural revolution" and the political regime remained the same as it had then emerged.

The Maoist mass organisations, which were engaged in the ideological brainwashing of the masses in the spirit of support for the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, had nothing in common with the public organisations existing in the socialist countries.

A certain reduction in the number of servicemen working in Maoist government bodies, carried out in the 1970s did not mean that there had been [a change in China's political regime which remained a military-bureaucratic dictatorship. The fact that some forms of militarisation of state and social life were camouflaged did not mean that the essence of the political system had changed. The military uniforms may be put on or taken off, and the rulers may resort to different methods to conceal the militarisation of the administration, but still everything remains as it was. *Jenmin Jihpao* wrote on October 25, 1975 : "In conformity with the requirements of the revolution, functionaries from among the military are appointed to local posts, and local functionaries will be sent to work in the army. This is our Party tradition."

This shake-up of cadres was understandable. The Maoists continued to regard the army as a "school of Mao Tse-tung's thought", as an ideal instrument for the building of a new

society. They could not remain in power unless they destroyed the democratic institutions. Only the military-bureaucratic methods of leadership and administration, based on the presence of military men in the Party and state apparatus, and accompanied by the extension of army order to economic management, enabled the Maoists to impose on the country their great-power, hegemonistic regime, which completely negated the interests of the Chinese working people.

The military-bureaucratic dictatorship, set up as a result of the "cultural revolution", was an anti-popular regime, dooming the people of China to a dismal lot. Its Maoist political activity and ideology revealed plans for transforming the socio-economic system in a spirit of petty-bourgeois utopian ideas of socialism and spreading its "ideas" to other countries. At the same time, the Maoists were intent on building up the country's military potential for aggressive purposes. In pursuit of this aim, they subjected the working people to a life of privation.

Being anti-popular and actually anti-socialist in nature, the military-bureaucratic dictatorship contradicted the economic basis of the country, which in the principal forms of ownership and in some other elements of production relations was still socialist. The vital interests of the Chinese people, who wanted an improvement of their life, were undermined by the great-power ambitions of the Maoist clique, who proclaimed : "Our objective is the whole world where we shall create a great power." The Maoist dictatorship tried to smooth over the contradictions by whipping up mass hysteria and creating an atmosphere of fear. The nation-wide political and ideological campaigns, which followed one after another in the wake of the "cultural revolution", acquired the character of a definite method of running the state and the society. Political instability became a characteristic feature of political life in China.

Notes

1. In the relations between the Emperor and Hai Jui, one could have an inkling of the relations between Mao Tse-tung and Peng Tehuai.
2. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 9, 1966.
3. *Tsaofans*, who were recruited from among young workers and employees, appeared on the political scene in December 1966.
4. Foreigners living in China saw how groups of teenagers, wearing red bands, took watches away from passers-by, while a nearby policeman simply turned his back on the scene, evidently wishing to avoid being accused of "political backwardness".
5. On May 10, 1969, *Jenmin Jihpao* described the way the son of an executed despotic landlord, Tsao Li-chan, made use of the "cultural revolution" to take revenge on the Communists, and also to commit criminal offences. Other instances of the use of this campaign for counter-revolutionary purposes were cited in *Nanchang Jihpao*, *Chiang-sia Jihpao* and other provincial newspapers in March 1968.
6. Neither of the names was directly mentioned in the press, but references to them were made in a very complicated and euphemistic way. For instance, Liu Shao-chi was called "the most important figure in the Party among those who were following the capitalist road." Liu Shao-chi began to be criticised openly only after the 12th Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee. Teng Hsiao-ping was never mentioned openly, and gradually criticism against him was stopped altogether.
7. For instance, it was claimed that the supporters of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping had quartered and buried alive 170 people at the Peipa farm in the western suburbs of Peking. The falsity of this was exposed by foreign newsmen.
8. *Chienfangchiun Pao*, January 25, 1967.
9. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 3, 1967.
10. This is confirmed by L. Pavolini, an Italian journalist, who is sympathetic to the Maoists. Regarding a *minping*-occupied Shanghai industrial enterprise, he wrote that "there was less need for outside interference of the army and its subsequent presence at that place." (*L'Unita*, June 8, 1971).
11. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, London, 1954, p. 106.
12. See *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 19, 1967. From the end of 1966 up to the appearance of army teams, industrial enterprises were managed by the so-called "production guidance groups" which had replaced the

- former managements dissolved by the *tsaofans*. They ceased to exist with the establishment of the "revolutionary committees" at the enterprises.
13. Such bodies were not set up at all the ministries and departments.
 14. Pai Hsiang-kuo was not the head of the military control committee of that Ministry; the post was held by Li Yung-ye, Chief of the Naval Academy of the People's Liberation Army.
 15. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 9, 1966.
 16. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 30, 1968.
 17. For instance, the newspapers, *Jenmin Jihpao* and *Kwangming Jihpao*, reported on November 1, 1968, that as a result of "revolutionisation" the administrative staff in Yangshan district, Kwangtung Province, had been reduced from 1,126 to 248.
 18. *Chilin Jihpao*, September 18, 1968.
 19. The ratio between the full members of the "revolutionary committees" and the members of their standing committees differed from place to place. For instance, in Tiel district, Heilungkiang Province, 10 out of 19 "revolutionary committee" members were on the standing committee, while in Peking, the corresponding figures were 33 and 97. In spite of the propaganda hullabaloo about the "leading role of the working class" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat", even in the major industrial centres workers did not make up even a quarter of the total number of members of "revolutionary committees". In Shanghai they constituted a little over 20 per cent out of a total of 159 members; in the Peking "Revolutionary Committee," the situation was, roughly, the same.
 20. *Chianghsi Jihpao*, January 21, 1968.
 21. In Maoist jargon this is called *chatui*—"grafting into a team". According to the issue dated October 24, 1969, of *China News Analysis*, a Hong Kong publication, 160,000 functionaries, young people, and persons of uncertain occupations were "grafted" into production teams in Fukien Province alone.
 22. The details about the Linho "May 7 school" were published in *Jenmin Jihpao* (January 5, and October 5, 1968, and August 18, 1969).
 23. The *hungweipings* of the period of the "cultural revolution" must not be confused with later ones who were members of decentralised organisations of youngsters of pre-YCL age.
 24. A story on this subject is given by Luka Pavolini in *L'Unita* (June 20, 1971).
 25. Radio Peking Programme of January 29, 1968.
 26. *Jenmin Jihpao*, November 5, 1969.

27. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 6, 1968.
28. See V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 316.
29. *ibid.*, p. 253.
30. *ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 429.
31. *ibid.*, Vol. 42, p. 100.
32. *ibid.*, Vol. 26, p. 338.
33. *ibid.*, p. 104.
34. *Cheng-fu Yanchiu*, 1958, No. 6, p. 44.

2

Continuation of the Crisis

1. First Steps of the New Regime

The Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China put an end to the "cultural revolution" and marked the beginning of a new stage in China's political and social development and in the evolution of the Maoist policies. During the new stage the Maoist leadership concentrated its efforts on consolidating the results of the military and political *coup d'etat* of 1966-1969 and stabilising the situation. That was its main task in the domestic political arena.

That task determined all the activities of the Chinese leaders, their internal policy directives and slogans after the Congress. Nevertheless the effort to carry out this task, which was fully in line with the documents of the Ninth Congress, ran into serious difficulties. These difficulties stemmed from the complex political and socio-economic situation that had developed towards the end of the "cultural revolution", on the one hand, and, on the other, from the nature of the Congress itself and its decisions which signified a compromise between various groupings.

Despite the dramatic appeal of the Ninth Congress for "unity and cohesion", the country remained divided into warring factions. The inertia of the "cultural revolution" was still making itself felt. Armed clashes between rival political groups were still taking place in at least half of the provinces. These groups had failed to lay down their arms in spite of the

categorical demand from the centre. Large-scale clashes, which often resulted in many casualties, occurred in the provinces of Szechwan, Kwangtung, Kiangsi and, in particular, Shansi, in the summer and autumn of 1969. The feuds of the warring factions were suppressed only when regular armed forces were brought in from the neighbouring provinces. Significantly, local army units had often been involved in the conflicts and therefore proved to be unfit for punitive functions.

There was also a flare-up of conflicts between nationalities in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and several other autonomous districts and regions provoked by Peking's drive to intensify its Great-Han policy. The last remnants of autonomy, curtailed as it was, were destroyed during the "cultural revolution". Mass reprisals and purges actually resulted in the liquidation of skilled personnel among the national minorities. Their customs and traditions came under fire under the pretext of "uprooting of feudal culture". The Ninth Congress put the seal on the removal of non-Chinese nationals from Party and administrative posts. They were replaced by Maoists who were mainly of Han nationality. This policy, which assumed the form of genocide, led to the mounting resistance of the non-Han nationalities.

The "cultural revolution" also resulted in the growth of discontent, unrest and anarchistic moods among various sections of Chinese society, in particular, among the young people. A sharp fall in the living and moral standards gave rise to large-scale stealing, profiteering, bribery and other anti-social activities which, as the Chinese press had perforce to admit, undermined the "socialist foundations."¹ Violations of labour and industrial discipline assumed a mass scale and often reduced to naught the efforts of the authorities to put the economy, disorganised during the "cultural revolution", back on its feet. *Jenmin Jihpao* pointed out on September 12, 1969, that "the vital task is to fight the spirit of cliquishness, anarchism, parochialism, conservatism, opportunism and individualism."

Such phenomena as polycentrism² and "hill-country parochialism,"³ which became particularly intensified during the "cultural revolution", aroused perhaps the greatest concern in

Peking. Among the "military tasks" put by the Ninth Congress on the order of the day, the Maoist press emphasised the need to fight polycentrism. Judging from newspaper pronouncements, it was expressed in the desire of some provincial "revolutionary committees" and local military authorities to gain independence and cut themselves off from the central leadership, and in the tendency to distort central directives and political guidelines or to carry them out tardily. Many regional leaders ignored instructions from the centre and as often as not pursued a policy running counter to the line of the Ninth Congress under the pretext of the need to take "specific local conditions" into consideration and under various other pretexts.⁴

Breakaway tendencies had been mounting even before the "cultural revolution", above all, as a result of the leadership's economic policy to promote self-sufficient, autarkic organisations in the provinces, practically independent of the centre. The isolation of the provinces from the centre went even further during and after the "cultural revolution" because of three main contributing factors. Firstly, internecine strife and other disorders sharply reduced and often completely severed economic, cultural and other ties between the regions and the centre. Secondly, the established structure of Party and administrative power, in particular, the principle of "horizontal and vertical leadership" (*kuai-kuai, tiaotiao lingtao*) had been destroyed. As a result, political power came to be concentrated in the hands of the provincial leaders. Towards the end of the "cultural revolution" all the prerogatives of military and civilian authority were as a rule assumed by one person. And the third factor was economic decentralisation carried out in keeping with the new Maoist policy of preparing for war. As the *Hungchi* magazine pointed out, "the periphery should find methods of building an independent industrial system.... If American imperialism and social-imperialism impose a war on us, we shall have reliable industrial bases, big and small; we shall also have room to manoeuvre, each area will be fighting on its own, and it will be difficult to crush us..."⁵

The problem of polycentrism became particularly acute for the Maoist leadership because it actually boiled down to the reliability of the army as the main support of the new regime

since local power, especially at the provincial level, was in the hands of the respective commanders of the military districts. For instance, reports were leaked to the world press about a mutiny staged by army units in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. It was said that artillery and missile units had to be moved in to crush it. There were also reports that large army units in the province of Yunnan had gone over to the side of the anti-Maoist forces and that fighting had broken out between army units in the area of Suchou in the north of the Kiangsu Province. The battle went on for more than two weeks and ended only when troops specially dispatched from Peking intervened. Other reports spoke of the unrest among the army units and bloody clashes between the military and civilian members of the "revolutionary committees" in several areas of the provinces of Hunan, Chekiang, Kweichow and others. All these events took place in the summer and autumn of 1969, that is, after the Ninth Congress.

Unfortunately, we have no reliable information on the nature of the opposition among the army leaders since they took particular pains to conceal their true political views. Undoubtedly, however, this opposition had also been gaining ground since the Ninth Congress along with the mounting differences between local political groups, including those within the army command. This is confirmed by the numerous stories carried by the Chinese press and radio which very often clamoured about "clanishness among the soldiers" and the "subversive activities of the class enemies in the army units", "their attempts to drive a wedge between the revolutionary committees and the People's Liberation Army of China", etc.

The newspaper *Chechiang Jihpao* observed on June 20, 1969, that "there are small cliques of traitors and spies using all kinds of machinations to spark off differences between the army and the revolutionary committees, between various units within the army itself, and also between the mass organisations and revolutionary committees."

These, in general outline, were the problems and difficulties the Maoist leaders had to overcome to achieve political stability and to bolster up the new regime. They were made even worse by the acute differences within the Maoist ruling clique itself

over the concrete methods of pursuing the political line and directives of the Ninth Party Congress.

Although the keynote of the Congress was the assertion of Maoist policy, the development of events showed that it had failed to end the confrontation between political factions at various levels of the leadership, including its top echelon. While the Congress proclaimed "cohesion and unity" as a condition for "still greater victories", it also urged the delegates to fight in earnest, "criticise and really change"⁶ what Lin Piao had described in his report as "all kinds of right-wing and ultra-'left' erroneous views running counter to Mao Tse-tung's proletarian revolutionary line."⁷

The new policy which the Mao group had initiated brought to life different opposition forces. These included Party, government and military officials who had been subjected to reprisals during the "cultural revolution", among them many of those who adhered to the positions of Marxism-Leninism and the Eighth Congress of the CPC; a considerable section of the intelligentsia and skilled workers whose living standards had declined noticeably as a result of the Maoist drive against the so-called "economism"; and a certain number of realistically-minded functionaries working in various sectors of the economy, who saw from their own experience that they could not accept Mao's adventurist directives. In the meantime stratification took place within the Maoist camp itself because of the power struggle among its various political groupings.

These were the main factors that were shaping political events in China after the "cultural revolution". Therefore, two main lines were to be observed in the leadership's policy. The first was to counteract open and secret opposition to Maoism, and, the other, to end the differences ("factionalism" and "separatism") within the Maoist leadership and work out a platform acceptable to all the forces supporting the new regime. The first line was reflected in Mao's slogan, "struggle of the two roads, two lines", and indicated that the anti-Maoists were "counter-revolutionary elements" or "a handful of class enemies." The other line could be inferred from the programmatic plank of the Ninth Congress of the

CPC, "to seek the cohesion and unity of the three sides", that is, representatives of the "mass revolutionary organisations", Party functionaries and administrative workers and central and local army commands. Here the Mao group was opposed by both the ideological and political adversaries in the CPC and by like-minded Maoists who had at a certain stage become their rivals in the struggle for power.

The government reshuffle approved by the Ninth Congress had failed to give the Mao group a decisive advantage that would secure its undisputed control over the Party, army and government and enable it to pursue the anti-socialist line endorsed by the Congress without any hindrance. It is there that one should seek the basic reason for the dissatisfaction shown by Mao's supporters with the results of the "cultural revolution" and with the shaky compromise which had formed the basis for the Ninth Congress.

These developments make it possible to describe the Maoist leadership's political activities at that stage of relative stabilisation as complex political manoeuvring with elements of compromise and tactical retreat in implementing the tasks and objectives of the anti-socialist line.⁸

Such extremist slogans as "revolt is a just cause", "revolution will write off the guilt", "overthrow everything and question everything", etc., were put out of circulation. They were replaced by appeals for "unity and cohesion" and other slogans of the Ninth Congress, moderate in tone and content. There was a dramatic step-up in the criticism of the "counter-revolutionary elements who had penetrated the ranks of the revolutionary masses and were breaking unity."⁹ The *Hungchi* magazine underlined that "while at the beginning of the 'cultural revolution', revolt was necessary, it is doing damage to ourselves at the present stage."¹⁰ Virtually the next day after the Ninth Congress the Maoist theoretical journal demanded action "to correct some of the comrades who fail to understand fully the content of the political precepts laid down by Chairman Mao and do not make every effort to carry them out....Among them are even such comrades who say, 'It is necessary to act the way the masses do.' This is wrong. This stand is tantamount to giving up the proletariat's leading

role."¹¹ The press called for a struggle on two fronts: against "a handful of class enemies, counter-revolutionary double-dealers", and against "bourgeois factionalism, opportunism and *khvostism*".

The Maoist leaders took a number of emergency repressive and punitive measures to put an end to armed clashes between various political groups, to suppress the young people who had got out of hand, and to curb anti-social phenomena born of the "cultural revolution". These measures were carried out under the slogan of "exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat...with regard to the agents of imperialism, revisionism, reaction, the Kuomintang and counter-revolutionaries engaged in subversion", and also against "thieves, swindlers, assassins, incendiaries, hooligan gangs and other harmful elements, seriously undermining public order."¹²

A most important punitive measure was the *ita sanfan* (struggle against counter-revolutionaries, against embezzlements and thefts, profiteering, luxury and extravagance). The movement gained particular momentum in 1970-71 and reflected the setbacks and difficulties of Maoist policy.

The movement was born of the punitive actions at the end of the "cultural revolution" by the "bodies of the dictatorship" against the "counter-revolutionaries" (anti-Maoist elements) and also against the most dangerous criminals. This time the target of the reprisals were the corrupt elements of the Maoist "revolutionary committees" and also Party workers at financial and trading establishments who had come under the "corrupting influence and subversive activity of the bourgeoisie."¹³ Corruption, thefts and embezzlements were put at par with counter-revolutionary activity. Criminals whose damage to the state was estimated at more than 10,000 yuans were sentenced to death. Executions were carried out in public.

The movement assumed an extremely large scale. Nearly 300 "active counter-revolutionaries" were executed in Kwangchow alone during the February of 1970. They were charged with stealing food and undermining the state economy. Similar trials took place in Peking and in the provinces of Honan, Shansi and Chekiang. The Maoist authorities often resorted to the so-called "meetings of criticism" at which workers and

Party functionaries were asked to reveal, as part of "criticism and self-criticism", facts of theft, corruption, profiteering and smuggling. Besides this, emergency measures were taken against banditry by staging public executions. A story carried by the Peking newspaper *Peiching Kungjen* shows the growth of crime. In an editorial of July 11, 1969, the paper urged "drowning the criminals in the sea of the people's war". The paper regarded the young people "returning from the countryside without permission" as the main source of banditry and hooliganism. It wrote that "a group of students has attacked the revolutionary committee on more than one occasion after its return to Peking."

Peking's political measures were strictly coercive despite the call of the Ninth Congress of the CPC "to extend the range of education and to narrow down the field of struggle."¹⁴ All political and ideological work was aimed at exposing unreliable people and dissenters among working people and Party functionaries, to isolate them and, in the long run, subject them to reprisals or, in other words, to a "class purge". This was precisely the aim of the campaign of "struggle, criticism and changes" sanctioned by Mao Tse-tung personally and endorsed by the Ninth Congress.

All this boiled down to the two tasks put forward by the Congress: first, to "eliminate the disastrous consequences of Liu Shao-chi's counter-revolutionary revisionist line" and, second, to "study and apply Mao Tse-tung's ideas in close link with life." In practice this led to yet another purge of the anti-Maoist elements and the intensification of Maoist ideological pressure. Both measures were conducted with the slogan of "imparting ideological education and education in the spirit of the political line." During the mass meetings of "criticism" people underwent a kind of a check of loyalty to Mao's ideas, line and personality. The purpose of this brainwashing was to put tight ideological blinkers on the Chinese people which would not allow any dissent or departure from Mao's line. A directive article for the new year 1970 emphasised that it was necessary to "push ahead the campaign along the lines of Mao's thought."¹⁵

The growing ideological pressure and other political and

socio-economic measures were to eliminate discontent, apathy and anarchistic moods among workers and intellectuals which often developed into active and passive resistance to the Maoist directives. The new vague term "class enemies" was now extended to include workers, peasants, students, intellectuals and Party functionaries who were expressing the slightest dissatisfaction with the Maoist policy. Workers were included in that category for demanding better living conditions and higher pay, peasants, for refusing to sell grain surplus to the state and to comply with various forms of forced labour, intellectuals, for showing reluctance to go to the countryside with their families for resettlement and a "link-up with poor and lower middle peasants," and party workers, for their "rightist" or "leftist" mistakes in pursuing Mao's line. These mistakes were alleged to stem from the "inability to react promptly to the rapidly changing tactics of the class enemies."¹⁶

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters saw from the experience of the "cultural revolution" that Party and government officials were unreliable in the effort to spread the ideas and directives of Maoist policy. What is more, according to Chou En-lai, between 70 and 80 per cent of them had lost their posts during the "cultural revolution" and "were sent to the 'May 7 schools'"¹⁷ for re-indoctrination in the spirit of Mao's thought.

In a sense all these measures were the continuation of the "cultural revolution" at a time when the domestic political situation was relatively stable.

2. Mao's Strategic Idea

The Ninth Congress of the CPC endorsed the policy of preparing for war as a long-term national programme.¹⁸ Lin Piao's report to the Congress described that policy as Mao Tse-tung's "strategic idea". In its nature and "scale" this idea was equal to such "global" measures of Mao's as the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution". In fact the policy of the country's all-round militarisation logically stemmed from the whole set of Mao's socio-economic, ideological and political concepts.¹⁹ On the other hand, the policy of militarisation was added proof that Maoism had failed both in theory and practice. It had to go to extremes in its attempts to impose on the country petty-

bourgeois, barrack-type socialism, bellicose chauvinism and militarism as a solution of vital social problems.

A closer look at the world situation in which Mao Tse-tung put forward his new policy orienting China to war reveals that it was based on purely domestic considerations and not on the desire to strengthen national security in the face of an external threat. Among the most important reasons were the unsatisfactory state of the economy which had not yet recovered from the excesses of the "cultural revolution"; internal political instability aggravated by dangerous regional trends and differences within the Maoist leadership; and growing discontent and resistance to Maoist policy among the broad sections of the Chinese people.

Under those circumstances Mao Tse-tung and his entourage decided to resort to the chauvinistic slogan of national salvation from an alleged external threat to China.

The armed provocations staged by the Chinese army on the Soviet border timed for the Ninth Congress of the CPC were a rehearsal of Mao's new "strategic idea". They contributed to the whipping up of chauvinistic anti-Soviet hysteria and war psychosis. A nation-wide militarisation campaign was started under the directive of the CPC Central Committee of August 28, 1969, which was an elaboration of the premise of the Ninth Congress on war preparations.²⁰ The Central Committee called on the "revolutionary committees" of the provinces, cities and national areas in the border zones as well as on the personnel of the respective military units to "keep up a state of constant combat readiness alert in order to foil the armed provocations of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism and pre-empt a surprise attack." The directive called for the stepping up of the internal cohesion of the armed forces, ending of armed clashes between hostile groups in the provinces, and taking of measures to protect communications, arms and ammunition dumps. It provided for stringent penalties against "workers, office employees and peasants for abandoning their places of work without permission."

The Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the 9th Convocation held in August and September of 1970 gave fresh impetus to the war preparations. The meeting endorsed

a special report of the Central Committee Military Council on intensifying work in this field.

Militarisation had not only been speeded up but was extended to all facets of life of Chinese society.

In the field of domestic policy the effort to implement Mao's "strategic idea" of preparing for war pursued the following concrete aims in 1969-71 :

First, to achieve political consolidation of society on the basis of Maoism as the "national banner". During the militarist campaign, propaganda hinged on the tenet that Maoism meant national salvation. It was claimed that "the only thing that can save China is Mao Tse-tung's thought", and that "it is the most powerful weapon that can defeat the enemies."²¹ Mao's political opponents were labelled traitors, capitulators, spies or agents of imperialism, revisionism or the Kuomintang, that is, of China's external enemies. (This was what happened to Liu Shao-chi and later to Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao : they were all branded as "traitors to their country" and "agents of foreign powers").

Second, to strengthen the military-bureaucratic dictatorship by whipping up chauvinistic hysteria and artificially creating an emergency situation to suppress the opposition forces. The Maoist authorities stepped up reprisals against all dissidents and all those who were dissatisfied, "those who spread the moods of pacifism, defeatism and capitulation."²² This was done under the pretext of "preparing for war" and "enhancing revolutionary vigilance". The press underlined that "the only way to overcome any difficulties and carry out the campaign of struggle, criticism and changes in earnest is to prepare for war."²³ This established a direct connection between political and ideological campaigns and war preparations. At the same time no effort was spared to brainwash the people in the spirit of militarism, great-power chauvinism and anti-Sovietism. The main propaganda slogans were "subordinate all work to war preparations", "social-imperialism is our most dangerous enemy", "turn 700 million people into 700 million soldiers", "do not fear privation, do not fear death", "the whole country is one military camp", and "it is necessary to pass the test of war."

Third, to mobilise labour and material resources to speed-up

economic growth, in particular, war production. In that period a series of socio-political and military measures were carried out. Militarised forms of labour were introduced in industry and agriculture; universal military training was started and the entire adult population was organised into army-type units (companies, battalions, regiments, etc.) and "militia" detachments subordinated to the army command; the number of draftees was increased and combat training of troops was intensified; large industrial enterprises were moved from coastal areas to the hinterland; the population of towns and villages was mobilised for the construction of fortifications (bomb shelters, trenches and bunkers); strategic food reserves were set up; and a "strategic resettlement" of certain categories of urban dwellers (as a rule, intellectuals, young people and Party workers) to outlying and border areas was carried out.

The campaign for war preparations was accompanied by the tightening of labour discipline, greater intensification of labour and further encroachments on the people's social rights and living standards. According to some reports, the working day in industry had been extended to 10 hours. Peasants were obliged to work for five days a month for "the war preparations fund."

Fourth, the militaristic campaign unleashed by the chauvinistic circles of the Chinese leadership was also called upon to serve as a means of diverting the working people's attention from burning social and economic problems, and their increasing difficulties and privations.

Since the war preparations were coercive and caused a further decline in living standards, they gave rise to mounting discontent and unrest among various sections of the working people and aggravated the contradictions of the Maoist regime. This was evident, among other things, from the anonymous press attacks that were being levelled with growing frequency against the "harmful, petty-bourgeois elements wallowing in egoism, anarchism and individualism," and against those "who put their own interests above those of the state" and "who consider that war is an army affair and of no concern to the people."²⁴

The implementation of Mao's new "strategic idea"

consolidated the system of military government and control over the country which had developed as a result of the "cultural revolution."

3. *Maoist Central Government Bodies*

The Maoist political leadership formalised by the Ninth Congress of the CPC was a multi-tier hierarchy ensuring Mao Tse-tung's absolute power. The Party Rules adopted by the Congress pronounced Mao Tse-tung to be the "leader" and his "ideas" the "theoretical foundation" of the CPC. The Mao personality cult had reached its highest point by the time the Congress was convened. What had contributed to strengthening the absolutist, autocratic power was the elimination of the system of Vice-Chairmen of the Party Central Committee. The new Rules appointed Lin Biao as Mao's only "successor" called upon to "carry on his work".

A leading place in the Maoist hierarchy was occupied by the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, Mao's "shadow cabinet", as it were. During the "cultural revolution" the Council was headed by Mao Tse-tung personally and it directed the activities of the "support for the left" groups which had first been engaged in the destruction of the Party and state system and which later set up the "revolutionary committees" and imposed a system of military control over the country. The Military Council's political influence became even greater after Mao launched his strategic policy of preparing for war and carrying out the country's total militarisation. Although the Military Council was not mentioned among the Party's statutory bodies, its actual role in deciding on the key issues of domestic and foreign policies had become much more important and influential than that of the Central Committee's Political Bureau and China's State Council.

The so-called "Chairman Mao's proletarian headquarters" which had directed the "cultural revolution", ceased to exist after the Ninth Congress. In the new power structure its functions were relegated to the statutory Standing Committee of the Central Committee's Political Bureau, consisting of the five members of the former "proletarian headquarters."²⁵ This committee and its working group, the Political Bureau, had

taken all power into their hands, bypassing the Central Committee and the government bodies. The Central Committee formed by the Ninth Congress did not become the main body in the Maoist political structure, nor could it become such. The new Rules had seriously curtailed its rights and powers by depriving it of such important institutions as the Secretariat and the Control and Auditing Commissions. The Rules said nothing about the holding of its plenary meetings. For instance, there were only two such meetings between the Ninth and 10th Congresses. According to the Rules, Party Congresses were to meet only once in three years whereas earlier they were held every year. At the same time the Rules stipulated that the Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau had the right to "set up efficient, compact, operative bodies to simultaneously run current affairs of the Party, government and the army,"²⁶ bypassing the Central Committee. (And the Maoist leadership made wide use of this "right", setting up various bodies to supervise political purges and ideological indoctrination. And it is significant that this provision of the Ninth Congress was incorporated into the new Rules adopted by the 10th Congress.)

The State Council of the People's Republic of China emerged from the "cultural revolution" weakened both politically and organisationally and virtually paralysed by the direct control of the army. What had largely helped it to survive and escape total destruction was the influence and prestige of the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, who had been able to consolidate his position in the new political leadership. According to Chou En-lai, when the "revolutionary committee" came into being, local authorities were given powers to decide on many matters which had formerly been within the competence of the State Council.²⁷ Some of its important functions, such as the management of various branches of the war industry, were transferred to the Central Committee Military Council and other military departments.

The new tasks facing the Chinese leaders after the "cultural revolution" at a time of relative stabilisation of the regime demanded that the government system which had earlier exercised mostly repressive and punitive functions should be

reorganised in order to solve the urgent problems of economic and cultural development. First, the economic management structure and its main coordinating body, the State Council, had to be put right.

Since the autumn of 1969 the leadership began taking steps to restore some of the State Council's departments. There were only 12 ministries and committees (out of the 49 before the "cultural revolution") functioning within the State Council by the middle of 1971. This was an outcome of the "reorganisation, putting right and reduction" of the central administrative and managerial system. The new State Council was deprived of such of its important bodies as the State Planning Committee, the State Economic Committee and the Committee for Industrial Construction, to mention only some. The functions of the two former ministries of culture and education were transferred to the group for the affairs of the "cultural revolution." The Council's industrial departments were either basically reshaped or merged.

The effort to restore the State Council was seriously hampered by the shortage of experienced administrative and managerial personnel, most of whom had been subjected to reprisals or public denunciations, and by the acute struggle among the political groups for key posts in the reorganised government of the People's Republic of China.

The formation of the central administrative and managerial system is linked with the second round of rehabilitations of Party workers dismissed during the "cultural revolution". The first round took place in 1967-68 when local government bodies were set up. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the *kanpu* of the lower and middle administrative echelons were "released" in those days. A considerable part of them were incorporated into the "revolutionary committees". Now those exonerated included a number of the State Council's leading officials (ministers, deputies, heads of departments and sections and other prominent employees) and also administrative personnel of the lower and middle echelons and a considerable part of technical experts.²⁸

Although the Maoist leadership had somewhat moderated its personnel policy after the "cultural revolution", which

was dictated by the needs of production, and particularly military production, it was strictly selective in its rehabilitation work. Under the directives of the Ninth Congress, this measure was supposed to affect only "good people" who, although "guilty of the capitalist-roaders' mistakes", had managed to enhance their political awareness and "have been understood and pardoned by the masses", in other words, had gone through the "May 7 schools". Those exonerated were put in lower positions as a rule. For example, when the initial stage in the formation of the new State Council had been completed by the autumn of 1970, only 20 per cent of its leading officials—ministers, chairmen of state committees, heads of departments and their deputies—were people who had been rehabilitated. But, on the whole, two-thirds of government posts were filled by newcomers. Most of them were military men, former members of the military control groups in the State Council's ministries and departments (out of the 12 ministers and chairmen of the state committees appointed during 1970 and the first half of 1971, there were eight high-ranking officers who also headed either the respective military control committees or "revolutionary committees"). This information, limited as it is,²⁹ makes it possible to define two main tendencies during the organisational reshuffle of the State Council. First, curtailment of the functions of the PRC government and its transformation into a secondary body of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship with limited rights and powers. Second, intensification of militarisation of the state machinery in order to use it as an instrument in war preparations and in carrying out Peking's great-power chauvinistic programme in the world arena.

It is noteworthy that the Maoist leaders carried out all their militarisation and other measures under cover of the slogans of the Ninth CPC Congress. These slogans called for "revolutionisation of government", struggle against "bureaucratic filth and duplication in management" and "inflated staffs", and for "compact and efficient" government bodies. In fact, however, the reorganisation of the state machinery accompanied by personnel changes had nothing in common with genuine revolutionisation or struggle against bureaucracy

the way Lenin saw it. Lenin believed that hundreds of thousands of working people should be drawn into running the affairs of the socialist state directly and that they should be trained in the "art of government."

The Maoist "anti-bureaucratic experiment"³⁰ ended in the ousting of government officials who did not suit the new regime. They were replaced mostly by obedient military and *hungweiping* or *tsaofan* personnel, and also former *kanpu*, indoctrinated in the spirit of Maoism. Yet such personnel changes failed to clear the government of "bureaucratic filth". Nor could they have done so, since what the Maoists had in mind was a political purge and not improvement of the government machinery. (It must be said though that the Chinese administrative machinery did have a tendency towards inflating its staff and did need some reorganisation).

The ambitious schemes of the Maoists allegedly aimed at "removing duplication" and "reducing and simplifying the government machinery" proved ineffective. For example, though the staff of the State Council had been reduced considerably in view of its new subordinate role within the Maoist political system, it began to swell very soon. The number of ministries increased to 18 already by 1972, while the number of employees nearly doubled.

The new structure of local government was not satisfactory, either. "The revolutionary committees", which were called upon to implement Mao's "innovatory" idea of the merging of Party, state and military power under the leadership of the army, to simplify the system, to make it less costly, and to remove duplication, had not made it either simpler or less costly. Although military and administrative powers were merged in the "revolutionary committees" and duplication was thus partially avoided, it made the government system much more complex. Prior to the "cultural revolution" the 1954 Constitution provided for a three-tier structure of the people's committees: provincial committees, regional (city) and district (village communes) people's committees. The replacement of the people's committees by the "revolutionary committees" brought about a five-tier local government system. "Revolutionary committees" of areas and of large production

teams, having their own administrative staff of fulltime workers, were set up.

The Maoist appeals to "simplify government and make it less costly" did not extend to the large network of the military control bodies subordinated to the army but financed by the respective "revolutionary committees". Nor did they affect the network of "courses of study of Mao Tse-tung's thought" with their full-time "theoreticians", lecturers, propagandists and agitators. There were more than 10,000 such courses in Peking alone in 1970 with the training period lasting from one to twelve months.³¹

The new political system and the ways of its development were outlined in principle by the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Convocation in September 1970. The meeting also approved the draft of the new Constitution which was to replace the Constitution of 1954. This was the first attempt to legalise the results of the military and political coup launched by the Mao group under cover of the "cultural revolution."³²

The meeting endorsed the line of the Ninth Congress aimed at the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship and at adjusting it to the needs of the Maoist leaders' petty-bourgeois nationalist policy.

4. *Rectifying the Party—Maoist-style*

The setting up of the Maoist Party is one of the most complex and contradictory processes in China's political development after the "cultural revolution".

Officially the campaign to "rectify and build the CPC" was started by the directive of the Party's Central Committee of November 1967 on the "restoration of the Party's organisational activities in units where revolutionary committees have been set up." The directive also envisaged the convocation of the Ninth Party Congress "the following year", that is, 1968. Yet the Maoist attempt to start "party-building" from below was an apparent failure. The "revolutionary committees" were involved in the internecine strife of the local political groups and proved incapable of carrying out such a complex task at that stage, in particular, in the absence of any clear-cut

instructions from the centre. In fact the Maoists were able to begin forming the new local Party organisations only after the Ninth Congress of the CPC when its central leading bodies were formed and clashes between the warring factions in the provinces were put an end to.

Thus the rectification and the building of the Party was delayed for a long time because of political instability in the periphery and the differences within the "alliance of the three sides" in the selection of the leadership of the Party committees. But besides these objective reasons the delay seems to have occurred also because of the Maoist leaders' deliberate policy. Mao Tse-tung and his supporters went slowly and unhurriedly about what would seem to have been an urgent matter of forming the Party's lower echelon. These tactics enabled them to carry out the political and ideological work they needed to conduct yet another purge, to bolster up the "revolutionary committees" and to use them to establish proper control over the formation of the Party.

The campaign to set up local Party bodies was accompanied by an intensive brainwashing of the future members in accordance with the slogan "first ideological, then organisational rectification," which was to secure the complete and undisputed domination of Maoism in the new Party. The policy-making articles in the Chinese propaganda media called for "building our Party in keeping with Chairman Mao's great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat". Anyone joining the Party had to "check his thoughts and deeds against the instructions of Chairman Mao and the provisions of the new Rules...to reshape his outlook wholly."³³ The Maoist magazine *Hungchi* carried an article written by an army propaganda squad which declared that the formation of the Party was "a great cause since it consolidates the results of the cultural revolution and speeds up war preparations."³⁴

What deserves special mention is a series of statements in the Chinese propaganda media timed for the centenary of the birth of Lenin, the centenary of the Paris Commune and the 50th anniversary of the CPC. These statements figured prominently in the set of ideological measures aimed at consolidating

Maoism as the theoretical doctrine and political programme of the new Party. All those "programmatically" outbursts reflected the Maoists' intention to substantiate the claims to the role of the only ideological and political successor to Marxism-Leninism and the ideals of the Paris Commune, thereby perpetuating Maoism, paving the way, both ideologically and politically, for legalising the Maoist regime through the adoption of a Constitution, securing its recognition in the world arena, justifying the violence and destruction of the period of the "cultural revolution", and laying a theoretical basis for the anti-socialist policy of preparing for war and whipping up national chauvinism and anti-Sovietism.

The "ideological rectification of the Party" also included the so-called "mass campaigns of criticism" and of "uprooting" all kinds of "bourgeois and revisionist theories", including the six "absurd theories" of Liu Shao-chi,³⁵ and "all types of erroneous right-wing and ultra-left views running counter to Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary line" in party-building. According to *Hungchi*, the aim of the campaigns was to "attain unity of views, unity of political principles, unity of planning, unity of command, and unity of action with the help of Mao Tse-tung's thought."³⁶

What is important to note is that while the criticism of Liu Shao-chi's "revisionist views" was conducted in line with the directives of the Ninth Party Congress the campaign "to uproot right-wing and particularly ultra-left erroneous views" had not been envisaged either by the Congress or the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Convocation. These new ideological directives reflected the acute internal political struggle arising from the problems of building a new Party. According to the Chinese press, "the question is in whose hands power will fall. This is what the struggle is about."³⁷ There were three main political forces fighting for influence in the emerging Party organisations, in particular, in its leading bodies: the army, the mass organisations (*hungweipings* and *tsaofans*), and veteran Party functionaries who were now gaining strength after several rehabilitation campaigns.

It was the members of the "mass organisations" who became the main target of criticism from the centre which was more like a snap of the whip. The press accused them of "trying to compete with the Party for the leading role." *Hungchi* gave them a stern warning by saying that "no one can hope that he will be included into the committee automatically only because of his services during the cultural revolution."³⁸ The magazine also underlined in this connection that "...the relations between the Party, on the one hand, and government bodies and mass organisations, on the other, are relations between the leader and those whom he leads."³⁹

Thus what the Maoist centre was really driving at was to step up its ideological and political control over the formation of the new local Party organisations. And in the struggle between the local political groups for influence in the emerging Party organisations and their leading bodies it gave clear and unequivocal preference to army representatives in the "alliance of the three sides."

The Maoist party-building came at the closing stage of the establishment of the new political system and was characterised by several distinctive features.

To begin with, in keeping with the official directives of the Central Committee of the Maoist Party⁴⁰ "the revolutionary committees" were put in charge of the entire ideological, organisational and political work in setting up new Party organisations. They were headed either by members of the local military commands or the militia subordinated to the army. One of the reasons as to why the "revolutionary committees" were selected as the "basis" of the new Party structure was that in the prevailing conditions they were the key elements of the military control system and the only organisations capable of ensuring the implementation of the centre's policy and directives.

The procedure of the formation of Party organisations established by the Maoist Central Committee also gave obvious advantages to the military, the heads of the respective "revolutionary committees", who sponsored special "groups for rectification and building of the Party." In accordance with the directives from the centre, the groups included members

of the "army brigades for the propaganda of Mao Tse-tung's thought" and functionaries from the Party bodies that were to be "rectified" (their number was fixed by the "revolutionary committees"). The "groups for rectification" were headed by the leaders of the local "revolutionary committees." The formation of provincial Party bodies and the preparation for and the holding of provincial Party congresses was the task of the "revolutionary committees" which appointed for this purpose "Party nucleus groups" of the leaders of provincial "revolutionary committees" and also, as a rule, of local military commanders.

The centre also issued directives formulating the basic principles of relations between the "revolutionary committees" and the emerging Party committees, obliging the former "to comply with the resolutions of the Party committees." However, it was also stipulated that the two bodies should have a joint staff and leadership ("most of the members of the revolutionary committees are also members of the Party committees"). Judging by Chinese press reports, the new Party organisations included between two-thirds and three-quarters of the members of the "revolutionary committees."⁴² The proportion was even higher in the provinces where 130 out of the 158 leading members of the new provincial Party committees or nearly 83 per cent retained their top posts in the "revolutionary committees". Significantly, nearly all of the first secretaries of the new Party committees remained chairmen of the "revolutionary committees" (with the exception of the Kwangtung Province).

Therefore the transfer of the "centre of power" from the "revolutionary committees" to the new Party committees was only formal and meant no basic change. Moreover, the concentration of power in the hands of one person or a small group of persons in fact further increased the power of the military, especially, at the provincial level. For example, high-ranking officers, commanders or political commissars of the provincial and other big military districts made up 60 per cent (94 out of 158) of the leaders of the new provincial Party committees. The dominant position of the military can be explained not only by their numerical superiority but also by the "weight" of their posts. Military commanders became first secretaries of

20 provincial Party committees while in the remaining nine, where civilians occupied the posts of first secretaries, they were the second-in-command, and also made up the backbone of the standing committees, the supreme bodies of the Party committees⁴³

On the whole, the direct result of military control over the "restoration" of the Party was the army's further penetration into the Maoist political structure, in particular, the tightening of its grip on the lower and medium echelons of Party leadership.

The process of "rectification" of the Party carried out under the Maoist principle of "removing everything worthless and absorbing everything new" brought about major changes in Party membership. As for the leadership, it had been practically fully replaced, particularly in the provinces.

The "rectification" of the Party was first of all aimed at changing the Party's qualitative composition and its leading bodies from top to bottom. The result of the mass "purge of the class ranks and the class front" was that the Communists who had fallen victim to repression during the "cultural revolution" and labelled "capitalist roaders", "counter-revolutionaries" and "supporters of Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line"⁴⁴ were actually left outside the new Party. In their social composition they represented the most skilled section of the working class, the vast majority of the intelligentsia and middle peasants (the so-called upper middle peasants).

Besides this, the Party was also "renovated" through the admission of the activists of the "cultural revolution". According to some reports, "fresh blood" (military men and *hungweipings* and *tsaofans* loyal to Mao Tse-tung) made up about 40 per cent of the new Party.⁴⁵ This trend of the Maoists' cadre policy seems especially significant. By bringing people who had made their careers during the "cultural revolution" into the new Party, the Maoists wished to build a reliable political support for the regime, on the one hand, and prevent the revival of healthy forces within the Party, on the other. In the long run it did not matter much as to which social group the so-called "successors of the cause of the proletarian revolution" came from, so long as they had proved to be orthodox

Maoists and the obedient servants of the Maoist clique. Thus, the social principle was replaced by the Maoist yardstick of the "three loyalties". Significantly, the Chinese press gave no information on the social composition of the Party bodies that had been "rectified".

Official figures in the Chinese press revealed only the changes that had been made in the middle (provincial) echelon of the new Party leadership. It turned out that the new provincial Party bodies had almost been completely reorganised: out of the 303 leading members of the former Party committees only 35 (a little more than 11 per cent) were included in the new ones. And only three out of 29 first secretaries had retained their posts.⁴⁶ It is significant that nearly half of the new Party leaders in the provinces had been members of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Convocation. This fact confirms the Maoists' intention which was obvious even at the time of the setting up of the "revolutionary committees" to strengthen their control over the provinces to counter the mounting regional and polycentrist tendencies. And it is also apparent that while selecting personnel for the leading echelons of the new provincial Party committees the persons in power in Peking sought to prevent the expansion of the local elites, which were enjoying practically unlimited power in the provinces.

Another distinctive feature of Party building was that the composition of the new Party's leading bodies in the provinces revealed a growing tendency towards the erosion of the "alliance of three sides" envisaged in the 1969 Party Rules as the political foundation of the Maoist regime. The main contributing factor was the steady expansion of the army's positions within the "alliance" with the result that the military had practically ousted the representatives of the "mass organisations" from the government bodies. They made up about 60 per cent of the leading members in the provincial Party committees, while Party functionaries accounted for a little more than 30 per cent and representatives of the "mass organisations", for less than five per cent.⁴⁷ For example, a number of activists who had risen on the wave of the "cultural revolution" to the posts of chairmen of several provincial "revolutionary committees" had not been "elected" members of the leadership of the provincial

Party committees.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, some of the CPC old-timers victimised during the "cultural revolution" were brought into the leadership of the Party organisations in several provinces.⁴⁹

What was remarkable about this tendency was the modification of the Maoist tenet of the "alliance of three sides" in forming the Party and government bodies, which Peking propaganda had gradually begun to interpret as "the combination of the older, middle and younger generations in the leadership."⁵⁰ This evolution of one of Mao's key directives, dating back to the "cultural revolution", showed a major change in the balance of forces within the Maoist camp in favour of the emerging coalition of military and Party workers to the detriment of the "mass organisations".

The new, "rectified" Party, built on the Maoist ideological and political platform and connected with the mechanism of power, should be regarded as indicating a certain stabilisation of the regime of military-bureaucratic dictatorship, mechanism used as an additional lever in the management of society.

It should be pointed out, however, that the new Party, set up and controlled by the army, has been drawn into the Maoist political system only as a "party cover" and an appendage to the personal power regime. This Party has been cut off from the working people since its birth and has been built on the anti-democratic principles of bureaucratic centralism. And though it functions under the name of the Communist Party of China, in fact it serves the factional, great-power nationalistic interests of China's military-bureaucratic ruling clique. The CPC as it is constituted today is acting contrary to the objective needs of China's development along the socialist road and is, therefore, unable to act as the leading and guiding force of Chinese society.

5. *Growing Contradictions within the Party*

The process of stabilisation that was set in after the "cultural revolution" was rather unstable and contradictory. On the one hand, there were the decisions of the Ninth Congress calling for steps to "consolidate and multiply" the results of the military and political coup to carry through the "revolution

in the superstructure", to implement an economic programme similar to the "great leap forward", and to intensify the ideological and political campaign as part of the campaign of "struggle, criticism and change". On the other, there was the objective need for the normalisation of national economic and cultural life, and this clashed with the Maoist subjectivist and voluntarist doctrine of management of social and economic processes.

What was the way out? The Ninth Congress had failed to advance any programme for the country's social and economic development. It had confined itself to repeating Mao's abstract promises like "make revolution, stimulate production", "build socialism under the principle of more, faster, better and more economically", "agriculture is the basis of the economy while industry is its leading force", etc.

Since Maoism had proved to be a failure once again, it became necessary to bring it closer to real life without discrediting the "Great Helmsman". To this end the Chinese leaders resorted to a series of new tactical manoeuvres affecting a wide range of social, economic, ideological and political problems.

The economy, seriously damaged by the excesses of the "cultural revolution", was the main object of these manoeuvres.

During the "cultural revolution" political, military and administrative methods completely outweighed economic methods, and planning, cost accounting, profitability and quality were neglected. At the factories skilled personnel was replaced either by illiterate activists or military men. The economic principles of management, especially, the principle of material incentives, were declared to be "black revisionist concepts". Industry was the hardest hit and one of the indirect proofs of this is the absence of any statistics about its actual state.

Since the country's resources were exhausted by military and other non-productive expenditures, the Chinese leaders were unable to launch civilian industrial construction on a large scale or to undertake a complete technical overhaul of backward agriculture. In the meantime rapid population growth

and a shortage of essential goods were creating tension, which compelled the leadership to take a number of urgent measures to increase commodity production. The principle of material incentives discredited during the "cultural revolution" was reinstated. Besides this, the leadership began to pay greater attention to the development of crafts and small enterprises. The level of industrial production had been restored by the end of 1969 and, according to the Chinese press, this was achieved through the expansion of enterprises and local industries. There is no doubt that under the present circumstances in China the development of small and handicraft industries is both necessary and justified. These industries require no major investments and their development leads to greater money circulation. But this also means that China will continue to lag behind the advanced industrialised countries.⁵¹

The "cultural revolution" had brought about a sharp decline in China's economic growth and, as a result, there was no material base for the leadership's mounting hegemonistic claims. There was a disparity between the Maoist great-power policy and the national economic potential. That was one of the main reasons for the political instability and crisis of the Maoist regime. Naturally enough, the leadership was concerned about the economic situation. It realised that the only way to ensure progress was to build a large-scale modern industry. However, the equipment at most of the factories was obsolete and needed replacement and the enterprises themselves were in need of modernisation. In these conditions industry was not in a position to ensure the necessary rate of growth of military and economic potential. As a result, the Chinese leaders had to resort to large-scale imports of industrial plant.

Facts show that while continuing their anti-Soviet policy, the Maoist leaders intend to solve economic problems by drawing closer to major capitalist countries, including the United States and Japan, and cooperating with them. But to turn this possibility into reality Peking will undoubtedly have to make far-reaching concessions in its foreign policy, in particular, to step up its anti-Soviet drive and actually abandon its ultra-revolutionary strategy. Since China's export resources are limited, it can develop economic ties with major imperialist

powers on a big scale only if it gets considerable credits from them.

Of course, there is no denying the fact that even limited economic contacts with big capitalist countries can yield positive results and speed up the rate of industrial growth since China will concentrate on importing industrial plant. But there is no doubt either that the capitalist countries will continue to limit their exports of the most valuable, especially, unique equipment, instruments and devices, rare metals, etc., to China. And since China is directing its most valuable goods and a greater part of its export resources to the capitalist countries, it has had to curtail its trade with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries regardless of the political situation which has developed since the end of the "cultural revolution".

However, trade with the socialist countries is much more profitable for China than that with the capitalist countries. The experience of China's trade prior to the '60s shows that manufactured goods accounted for about half of China's exports to the socialist countries. Moreover, 25 per cent of the exports consisted of consumer goods and other items which did not sell on other markets (including vegetables, fruit, etc). This structure of the Chinese exports was highly profitable for the country and helped to expand the variety and volume of export goods. And, consequently, the present state of China's foreign trade is additional evidence that the anti-Soviet and anti-socialist policy of the Maoist leaders runs counter to the basic interests of the nation. Despite their efforts to poison the minds of the Chinese people with anti-Sovietism, the Peking leaders have been compelled by circumstances to turn to the Soviet Union for purchases of industrial and other important equipment.

It is apparent, therefore, that it was the objective factors, both internal and external, that forced the Peking leaders to change their methods of economic management and reconsider their attitude towards material incentives. They were compelled to make wider use of rational economic methods and rely on technical experts and skilled executive personnel. The changes which began during the final stage of the "cultural

revolution", regardless of the subjective intentions of the Maoists, led to the restoration of some methods of economic management practised before the "great leap forward" and, later, during the so-called "rectification." The course of events had proved that it was impossible to run the economy by arbitrary methods. The popular Maoist slogan "politics is the commanding force" disappeared from the press for tactical reasons. Furthermore, the Chinese press had increasingly begun to stress the need for paying more attention to matters of economic policy, centralised planning and other economic problems. Every now and then the press reminded the people of the current five-year plan and the need to carry it out. All-China conferences were held to discuss questions connected with the increasing of production in various industries. Cost accounting was declared to be "an important method of running socialist enterprises."

Changes in economic policy were accompanied by large-scale rehabilitations of experts and skilled workers experienced in managing industrial enterprises. The Peking daily *Jenmin Jihpao* underlined that "veteran workers with an experience of 10 and 20 years of running enterprises are the Party's treasure. They should be used widely and given support."⁵³

Besides reinstating old-timers, the Chinese leaders began to organise the training of technical personnel by sending workers to evening courses. All these measures were intended to repair, to some extent at least, the damage inflicted by the "cultural revolution", one of the results of which was that Chinese industry was short of 350,000 engineers and an even greater number of technicians.

Agriculture was less affected by the "cultural revolution", although here, too, subsidiary crafts had been condemned as a "return to capitalism". Yet the tendency to re-introduce more rational methods of farming with the use of material incentives also began to develop in agriculture after the "cultural revolution". The Chinese press concentrated on the criticism of the "left" wing deviation which was described as the "spread of income-levelling in distribution within teams and communes," "the drive to introduce a higher degree of property centralisation in the communes and prevent the use of subsidiary plots

in possession of the members of the communes", etc. The *Hungchi* magazine insisted that "at this stage it is necessary to continue the policy of three-tier property in the village communes with the team as the basis, the policy of from each according to his ability, to each according to his work, to introduce distribution according to work, and also to allow the members of the communes to keep private plots, and subsidiary household economics yielding a small amount of produce, on condition that the development of collective farming gets priority."⁵¹

The papers began to recommend an increase in the incomes of the commune members at farms which had achieved production growth, provided all the obligations to the state were fulfilled.

More attention began to be paid to modernisation of agriculture, in particular, the construction of canals, the utilisation of chemical fertilisers and mechanisation.

But village industries were still considered to be the basis for the modernisation of agriculture. The papers began to write about the need for government assistance to agriculture, particularly, about giving it credits. Since the effort to raise agriculture to a level which would make it possible to give up food rationing in the foreseeable future called for large investments, the leadership was compelled to undertake large-scale land improvement and reclamation measures and other projects mapped out even before the "cultural revolution". At the same time the leaders continued to emphasise Mao's principle of "reliance on one's own forces" which implied increasing production without government subsidies.

When the "cultural revolution" was drawing to a close, it became apparent that the basis of Mao's personality cult had to be altered. The Mao cult had become the source of mounting discontent throughout the country and was also in the way of the Peking leaders' great-power hegemonistic manoeuvres in the world arena. Exposures on questions of principles made by the world communist movement had also dealt a serious blow to Maoism. All this compelled the Maoists to moderate the personality cult, at least outwardly. The Chinese press ceased to describe Mao's ideas as "the summit of Marxism" and began to use a more flexible formula, speaking of the

"creative development of Marxism", which was more suitable in the new situation.

Political miscalculations and economic difficulties undermined the people's faith in the infallibility of the "leader", and the correctness of his ideas. The prestige of Maoism was also undermined among the Maoist splinter groups in various countries. This trend of events could not but cause alarm in Peking and force it to change its tactics in the ideological sphere and replace discredited Maoist dogmas and directives with others, more flexible and up-to-date ones. The main feature of Peking's propaganda activities after the "cultural revolution" was the attempt to use Marxism-Leninism as a cover-up for a facelift of the worn-out facade of Maoism. It is also worth noting that Peking propaganda was trying to make Maoism more attractive and acceptable to the capitalist world. The press now began to tone down the most odious appeals and slogans of the "cultural revolution". Nothing was left of the rebellious *hungweiping* spirit. However, the Maoists did not ignore their main objective—to instil Great-Han nationalism and chauvinism in the minds of the Chinese people.

Crisis phenomena were also building up on the domestic political scene. The effort to set up a new political system was running into increasing difficulties. Having destroyed the former Communist Party of China and openly relied on the army to support the regime, the Maoists had limited their political potentialities to a considerable extent, since the army was unable to run the national economy or the country as a whole for a long time. As for the new Party, built as an appendage to the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, it did not possess the qualities of a mass political organisation vital for "single leadership" in all state and public affairs. Moreover, its "rectification" was far from complete in view of the intensified struggle among the political groups for influence in the local Party bodies.⁵⁵

As army representatives continued to penetrate into every sphere of public and political life, the government and Party system, there was increasing opposition from other political forces and groups at different levels of Maoist leadership from top to bottom. For example, there emerged a group of influential

Party and government officials who occupied important posts in the new government bodies following the "rehabilitation" of the old cadres. Representatives of the "mass organisations", who had been ousted from the "revolutionary committees", began to worm their way-back to power, supported by the extremist wing in the Peking leadership. In the meantime the anti-Maoist opposition was also raising its head. It regarded the forced tactical manoeuvring of the Maoist leaders in the economic sphere as providing a possibility of returning to a more reasonable course in domestic and foreign affairs.

Such were the latent antagonisms within the Maoist regime set up as a result of the coup. The situation required an assessment of the political results of the "cultural revolution," of the economic policy of Maoism, and of the line the country should follow.

And it is in this light that one should consider the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Convocation, which took place in the resort town of Lushan in Kiangsi Province in late August and early September 1970.⁵⁶ Its proceedings reflected serious differences among the Maoist leaders on urgent problems of domestic and foreign policies, which developed into an acute internecine strife, bringing about the downfall of such prominent leaders as Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao.

Like all similar measures of the Maoist leaders, the meeting had two faces. One was official and was reflected in the communique; the other was concealed from the Chinese and the world public.

According to the communique, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters had managed to uphold the "gains" of the "cultural revolution". The meeting reaffirmed, although not so categorically as the Ninth Party Congress, the basic Maoist political and economic precepts. Special emphasis was laid on the need for stepping up "preparations for war". But since the communique gave extraordinarily great space to economic matters, this showed that the Maoists were concerned about the state of the economy. For the first time after many years a Plenary Meeting of the Maoist Party Central Committee discussed a State Council report on economic affairs and urged the nation to "fulfil and

exceed the targets of the 1970 economic plan". At the same time it was clear that the Chinese leaders had been unable to arrive at an agreement on a number of economic problems, except on the need for the intensification of the the *sanfan* movement (struggle against counter-revolutionaries, against corruption, thefts, profiteering and waste). The movement was directly linked with the "rectification and building of the Party" which was called upon to uproot corruption among the leading members of the new organisation.

The official communique differed from the previous documents of this type by its extremely restrained tone and vague wording. Read between the lines, this indicated that a compromise had been arrived at after an acute struggle. And subsequent developments fully confirmed this view.

6. September '71 Crisis : Causes and Content

The dramatic events of the summer and autumn of 1971, which resulted in the ousting of a number of prominent leaders, including Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta, were the most vivid and concrete manifestation of the mounting crisis of Maoism and its failure as a doctrine and practical policy.

Peking's official propaganda tried to impose a deliberately falsified version of the 1971 political crisis on public opinion inside and outside China. According to this version, outlined by Chou En-lai at the 10th Party Congress, Lin Piao had attempted an abortive "counter-revolutionary coup" at the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Convocation, and, on September 8, 1971, had staged an armed counter-revolutionary coup, attempting to assassinate Mao Tse-tung and set up his own Central Committee. The plot having failed, on September 23 he allegedly took a plane to the Soviet Union and was killed in a crash on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. Lin Piao and a handful of his "incorrigible accomplices" were accused of trying to "usurp supreme power in the Party and the state, change the line of the Ninth Congress entirely, basically reverse the Party's main line and policy for the entire historical period of socialism, turn the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of China into a revisionist and fascist party, undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat

and restore capitalism." In the world arena, it was said, Lin Piao and his accomplices wanted to "surrender to Soviet revisionist social-imperialism in order to fight against China, against communism, and against the revolution." A similar version was contained in a number of "Secret Documents of the CPC Central Committee" which had somehow fallen into the hands of Kuomintang intelligence and were published in Taiwan long before the 10th Congress.⁵⁷

Thus, Peking tried to reduce the "September crisis" to the notorious "struggle of the two lines" within the Party, which according to Mao Tse-tung was an objective law governing the class struggle in China. Peking's intention was to utilise the concept of "the class struggle" to cover up the deep causes and sources of the most acute political conflict that had affected the very foundations of the new Maoist regime born of the "cultural revolution".

Contrary to the official Maoist version, the "September crisis", no matter how sudden it might seem, had been "programmed" by the Ninth Congress of the CPC and the entire course of China's subsequent political development, conditioned by several objective factors: the acute socio-economic problems; the leadership's inability to solve them on the platform of Maoism; the instability of the regime of military-bureaucratic dictatorship as a direct consequence of the "cultural revolution"; the weakness of the Maoist Party, incapable of fulfilling its role of society's leading force; and the feebleness and compromising character of the ruling clique torn asunder by factional strife inevitably breeding more and more differences.

Many foreign Sinologists are inclined to see in the "September crisis" merely a power struggle between various groups in the Peking leadership. This one-sided and superficial view actually supports the Maoist conception of "struggle between two lines". A Marxist-Leninist analysis, however, reveals deeply rooted, class sources both of the "September crisis" and the problems of China's development at the present stage.

In its class essence the "September crisis" reflected the sharpening social antagonisms inherent in the Maoist regime, and the growing discontent of the broad sections of the people with Peking's anti-socialist policy both inside the country and

in the world arena. The aim of the reshuffles and political purges, launched by Peking after the "September crisis", was to contain the dissatisfaction, on the one hand, and to ensure conditions for the bolstering up of the Maoist regime on the other.

There are several points that should be examined, for they give an idea about what lay behind the September 1971 flare-up of political differences within the Peking ruling clique.

The connection between the "September crisis," or the "Lin Piao affair", and the Maoist's political manoeuvres inside and outside the country seems obvious. Their intention was to invigorate Maoism and bring it into line with the new conditions requiring a certain amount of political and economic stabilisation, and to restore the international prestige of Maoism which had been weakened by the "cultural revolution".

Significantly, the Maoist press, heaping numerous charges on Lin Piao, alleged that the anti-Maoist opposition had intended to change the "Party's main line". In his report to the 10th Congress, Chou En-lai claimed that Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta "were against continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" because they believed that "the main task after the Ninth Congress was to boost production."

There are many facts which point to the mounting differences within the Chinese leadership over economic policy, Party and military building and international orientation.

It is significant that Lin Piao's disappearance coincided with a sharp turn in Peking's foreign policy towards drawing closer to the United States. The *New York Times* observed that "there can now be little doubt that within China the decision to receive the American President helped to set the stage for the still-mysterious political explosion that transformed Chinese Defence Minister Lin Piao from 'Comrade Mao's close comrade-in-arms' into an unperson who may even be dead."⁵⁸

It is worth noting that throughout 1971 the Peking press repeatedly countered Lin Piao's statements that the main task was to fight on two fronts—"against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism"—by the "new" tenet concerning the need to draw a distinction between the "main enemy" (the Soviet

Union) and "the secondary one" (the United States).

The Mao group, adhering to great-power hegemonistic positions and to rabid anti-Sovietism, began to re-orient China's foreign policy and to seek a speedy rapprochement with American imperialism. There is reason to believe that there were serious opponents of this line, among them some top military leaders. Anyhow, it was the removal of Lin Piao and other military leaders from the Central Committee's Political Bureau that had cleared the way for Nixon's visit to China and it was then that the idea of rapprochement with the United States got the upper hand in the ruling clique.

The truth about the dramatic events of September 1971 remains one of the most closely guarded secrets of the Chungnanhai. We can only cite a few facts, throwing light on some of the circumstances connected with the disappearance of Chen Po-ta, Lin Piao and other victims of the "September crisis."

Chen Po-ta, member of the Political Bureau of the Maoist Party's Central Committee, and head of the group for affairs of the "cultural revolution", ceased to make public appearances in Peking from August onwards. Some light on the reasons for his "sudden" disappearance and the subsequent sharp criticism levelled against him at the Lushan Plenary Meeting is thrown by Mao Tse-tung's memorandum of August 31, 1970, to the meeting, attacking the "theory of men of genius" and ascribing its authorship to "our brilliant theoretician" Chen Po-ta. Curiously, Chen Po-ta was the only target of criticism in Mao's note. As for Lin Piao, there was only favourable mention of him. "I exchanged views with Comrade Lin Piao," Mao wrote, "and we both fully agree that..." (emphasis added). This contradicts Peking's official version alleging that Lin Piao had staged an "abortive counter-revolutionary coup at the Second Plenary Meeting". Facts show that Mao Tse-tung and his supporters dealt with their political opponents one by one and it was only afterwards that they lumped them all together under the sobriquet "Lin-Chen clique".

The notorious "theory of men of genius" was only a pretext for "purging" Chen Po-ta, one of Mao's closest associates

from old times who had shared his views. And although many things are still not clear about the "Chen Po-ta case", it can definitely be said that his doom was sealed by the end of the "cultural revolution". The man who had organised and carried out the rampages of the *hungweipings* himself fell victim to the power struggle within the Maoist ruling clique.

It is also likely that from the point of view of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Ching the aged theoretician of "Mao Tse-tung's thought" had outlived his usefulness and could be disposed of to placate other members of their group whose support was more important for Mao than Chen Po-ta's "personal loyalty". Later Chen Po-ta was connected with the "Lin Piao case" and described as the latter's supporter although there are no facts to confirm this charge. The charges against Chen Po-ta made by Chou En-lai at the 10th Congress of the CPC sounded completely unfounded. The claim that Chen Po-ta was removed after it had become clear that he was a Trotskyite sounds even less credible. True, the Executive of the Communist International had denounced Chen Po-ta for his Trotskyite views back in the 30s. But this fact was well-known to all the leaders of the CPC Central Committee, including Mao Tse-tung and, all the more so, Chou En-lai, who had represented the Communist Party of China in the Executive of the Communist International in those days. But although the Comintern had denounced Chen Po-ta's views, this had not prevented Mao Tse-tung from appointing him political secretary and giving him the role of a leading Party theoretician.

Lin Piao made his last public appearance on June 26, 1971. But even on September 12, 1971, the day before his officially announced death, *Jenmin Jihpao* made this observation: "Comrade Lin Piao has always held high the banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas, firmly carried out and defended Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, and has always been a brilliant example for the whole Party, the army and the people."

The plot against Lin Piao and his supporters had been prepared thoroughly and over a long time. It was no simple matter for Lin's opponents to bring down the omnipotent Defence Minister and Mao's only successor. For example, in the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee formed by the

Ninth Congress, seven out of its 25 members were Lin's men. Estimates show that "Lin Piao's men", that is, people from the Fourth Field Army (which Lin had commanded during the 1946-49 civil war) made up 40 per cent of China's military elite by the time of the "September crisis". They constituted about 20 per cent of the members of the Central Committee, and they also held firm positions in the State Council and the "revolutionary" and Party committees in the provinces.

The danger that the Lin Piao faction might capture all power had long been worrying his main rivals in the struggle for domination in the top government bodies, including a group of high-ranking Party and government officials headed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai and the "left" Maoist group led by Chiang Ching. Some of the leading military officers in the provinces also resented Lin Piao's growing power since they felt their interests were affected.

The differences in the Peking leadership became aggravated when preparations got under way after the Ninth Congress for the holding of the session of the National People's Congress. At the Lushan Plenary Meeting the struggle flared up around the draft of a new Constitution and around personnel problems stemming from the need to form a new government (the government's term of office had expired a long time before) and the leading government bodies. The meeting also had to decide on the new Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

The military group proposed that Lin Piao should be elected Chairman of the Republic at the next session of the National People's Congress. His supporters intended to take over a number of other key government posts. This caused extreme anxiety both among Chou En-lai's supporters and among those rallying around Chiang Ching, Mao's wife. They were afraid that because of Mao's advanced age Lin Piao and his supporters might in course of time remove the "leftists" from the scene altogether, precisely in the same manner as the army had removed the *hungweipings*—the basis of mass support for the "left" extremists—from the cities.

According to Mao Tse-tung, the Lushan Plenary Meeting

had "defended Vice-Chairman Lin."⁵⁹ Acting in a round-about way, Mao launched a number of far-reaching, treacherous manoeuvres to isolate his "successor". As Mao himself put it, he "threw in stones", in other words, tried to influence the participants in the meeting *post factum* to make them accept his view, "mixed in sand", that is, introduced his own people into the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, and "mined the corners", which meant the reorganisation of the Peking military district, Lin Piao's stronghold. At the same time he asserted that the question of Lin Piao had still to be decided upon and hinted that "Lin can still be saved", but presented his differences with him as "a stage in the struggle of two lines within the CPC". These facts show that Mao Tse-tung had been preparing for a long time to remove Lin Piao from the scene.

Lin Piao disappeared from the political scene on September 13, 1971. The other members of the Political Bureau who were removed together with him were: Lin's wife E Chun; chief of his personal office Huang Yung-shen, Chief of the Army General Staff; Huang's deputies, Commander of the Air Force Wu-Fa-hsian, First Political Commissar of the Navy Li Tso-peng, Chief of the Army Logistical Service Chiu Huei-tso, and also Li Hsue-feng, alternate member of the Political Bureau. As a result, the Maoist Party's Political Bureau lost nearly one-third of its members and became virtually paralysed. The Central Committee was also partially incapacitated by purges. More than 30,000 army commanders were subjected to reprisals in connection with the "Lin Piao case".

It is practically certain, therefore, that there was in fact no "Lin Piao plot" but that Lin Piao himself had fallen another victim to political intrigues staged by the Peking rulers.

The "September crisis" had serious political consequences for the Maoist regime. This is evident from the fact that for a long time the Maoist press avoided mentioning Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao by name and simply called for the exposure of the "shady deals" of some "political swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi-type".

The ouster of Chen Po-ta, who had been considered to be the

theoretician of Maoism for a long time, and Lin Piao, who had been "Mao's most faithful disciple and closest associate", gave rise to unrest among Maoist functionaries and added to the instability in the Party and the country. It became even more apparent that the Peking clique was a temporary bloc of rival factions with Mao Tse-tung at the head.

The "September crisis" exposed the political doings of the Peking leaders in a most unseemly light. It revealed that the leading group of the Maoist Party was formed on a clan basis, that it did not consist of Communists cemented by identical views. There could be no talk of genuine cohesion in an atmosphere of struggle for power, suspicion and intrigue although the "Great Helmsman" had himself repeatedly called for it.

Maoist propaganda claimed that "the Lin Piao anti-Party group consisted only of a handful of people isolated from the Party, the army and the people of the whole country." If this was so, then why was Lin Piao's removal described as the "greatest victory since the Ninth Congress", and as a "body blow to the internal and external enemies?" If this was so, then why was it hammered in that "criticism of Lin Piao...is a matter of top priority for the whole Party and the whole people?"

There can be only one answer to these questions. Under cover of criticism against Lin Piao as the official target in the "struggle of the two lines", the Maoist leaders were seeking to deal summarily with all who opposed their political line.

NOTES

1. *Jenmin Jihpao*, June 18, 1969.
2. In his report to the Ninth Congress Lin Piao stressed the need to fight the theory of "many centres", i.e., "absence of a centre" (*Documents of the Ninth Congress of the CPC*, Peking, 1969, p. 43, Russian edition).
3. Hill-country parochialism (*shantou chui*) is a specifically Chinese phenomenon dating back to the history of the "liberated areas" of the 30s and 40s when some of the local, mainly military leaders of the CPC often displayed obstinacy and refused to obey the centre.

The "liberated areas" were chiefly in hill country (for example, Tsing-kiangshan, etc.); hence the term "hill-country parochialism".

4. *Jenmin Jihpao*, June 20, July 13, and September 18, 1969.
5. *Hungchi*, No. 10, p. 1969, 18.
6. See *Documents of the Ninth Congress of the CPC*, p. 40.
7. *ibid.*, p. 43.
8. It should be pointed out that Mao's political tactics had always been one of "advance and retreat", "tides and ebbs", "relaxation and tension". One of the latest examples was Mao's tactical retreat (not defeat) following the collapse of the "great leap forward". The "cultural revolution" also had enough "zigzags" and "relapses". (See *Documents of the Ninth Congress of the CPC*, p. 35. Evidently, this reflected traditional thinking rooted in ancient Chinese philosophy. The idea of "relaxation and tension" was developed even in the times of the 'Ichin'.
9. *Jenmin Jihpao*, June 9, 1969.
10. *Hungchi*, No. 7, 1969, p. 19.
11. *Hungchi*, No. 5, 1969, p. 27.
12. *Hungchi* No. 4, 1970, p. 28.
13. See *Jenmin Jihpao*, *Hungchi*, and *Chefanchun Pao* of December 31, 1969. The movement in question did not differ from the *sanfan* and *ufan* campaigns (struggle against three and five evils) that took place in the early 1950s. At that time the Chinese press was of course correct when it wrote about the "corrupting influence of the bourgeoisie".
14. See *Documents of the Ninth Congress of the CPC*, p. 51.
15. *Jenmin Jihpao*, *Hungchi*, *Chienfangchiun Pao*, December 31, 1969.
16. *Tachung Jihpao*, February 20, 1970.
17. Chou En-lai's Conversation with Edgar Snow, *Epoca*, February 23, 1971.
18. The strategic and programmatic nature of the policy of preparing for war was confirmed by Peking's subsequent documents, e.g. the decisions of the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Convocation (August-September, 1970), the 10th Congress of the CPC (August 1973), and the first session of the National People's Congress of the Fourth Convocation (January 1975).
19. The policy of militarisation was directly linked with the Maoist interpretation of the questions of war, peace and revolution. One of the main "theoretical" promises advanced by the Ninth Congress was the idea that another world war was inevitable and logical.

It is also apparent that Mao's militarist ideas were akin to Trotsky's well-known premises. Trotsky considered the army an "ideal of state organisation" and urged the militarisation of government and economic management on the basis of forced labour.

20. The document was never published in China. We have only the version given by the Taiwan magazine *Chungkung Yanchiu* for 1970. The authenticity of the document is confirmed by a comparison of some of its provisions with open press materials of the time. Although the directive of the CPC Central Committee of August 28, 1969, formally concerned border areas only, it carried as much national importance as the directive of July 23, 1969.
21. See *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 30, 1969, January 24, 1970; *Peiching Jihpao*, October 17, 1969.
22. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 24, 1970.
23. *Sinkiang Jihpao*, January 18, 1970.
24. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 20, 1970, and May 4, 1971.
25. Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta, Chou En-lai, and Kang Shen.
26. *Documents of the Ninth Congress of the CPC*, p. 112.
27. *Epoca*, February 28, 1971.
28. There were reports in the Hongkong press in February 1970 about a meeting held by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in late January that year. It discussed the state of the government system. Acting on Chou En-lai's initiative, the meeting decided to exonerate a group of old workers of the State Council because the administrative and economic offices had resumed their normal activities both in the centre and in the provinces. A number of exonerated functionaries from the former people's and Party committees had also re-appeared in nearly all the provincial revolutionary committees at that time.
29. This is based on the Chinese national press of 1970-71.
30. The view that the "cultural revolution" was directed against bureaucracy is widespread among bourgeois Sinologists (to say nothing of such open advocates of Maoism as the Trotskyites I. Deutscher and Jh. Petkoff). The American Sinologist G. Fairbank claims that Mao Tse-tung launched the "cultural revolution" to oppose bureaucratic trends and revisionism within the CPC.
31. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 21, 1970.
32. For an analysis of the 1970 draft Constitution, see Chapter VI of this book.
33. See *Jenmin Jihpao*, *Hungchi*, and *Chienfangchiun Pao*, December 31, 1969.

34. *Hungchi*, No. 1, 1970.
35. These were the "theories" attributed to Liu Shao-chi: "the fading of the class struggle" the theory of the "obedient tool" (a Communist is regarded as an obedient tool of somebody's will), the theory of "backwardness of the masses," of "entering the Party for the sake of a high post," of "peace inside the Party," and of "merging of public and individual interests (or "sacrificing a little advantage for a big one").
36. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1970, p. 27.
37. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 6, 1970.
38. *Hungchi*, No. 1, 1970, p. 38.
39. *Hungchi* No. 1, 1970, p. 39.
40. See the article on "Rectification of the Party Organisation and Party-Building in the Peking Printing Shop of the Hsinhua News Agency" in *Jenmin Jihpao*, December 16, 1969. The shop's experience was supposed to be a "model" to be followed by the whole country.
41. *Jenmin Jihpao*, December 16, 1969.
42. *Jenmin Jihpao*, 1969-70.
43. *Chungko Talu Yanchiu*, Taipei, 1974, No. 77, pp. 2-9.
44. According to information available, the number of those who had fallen victim to repression was about five million. See, for example, *A Dangerous Course*, 5th Edition, Moscow, 1974, p. 150 (in Russian).
45. *Chunghua Yuehpao*, Taipei, 1974, No. 4.
46. Wei Kuo-ching of the Kwangsi-Chuang autonomous region, Liu Tzu-hou of the Hopei Province and Liu Haien-chuan of the Honan Province.
47. *Chungkuo Talu Yanchiu*, Taipei, 1974, No. 77, p. 5.
48. We mean Liu Ko-pin of the Shansi Province, Wang Hsiao-yueh of Shantung, Li Tsai-han of Kweichow, Pan Fu-shen of Heilung-kiang and Li Hsueh-fen, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, who was not "elected" to the Party Committee of the Hopei Province.
49. For example, Pai Ju-ping, Chang Ping-hua, Chia Ting-hsien, and Tuan Chun-ji, who became either secretaries or deputy secretaries of the Party committees in Shantung, Hunan, Kweichow and Szechwan.
50. This principle, in its new interpretation, was mentioned for the first time in a policy-making article in *Jenmin Jihpao* of January 30, 1971.
51. China's population is seven times that of Japan, while as regards national income China considerably lags behind the latter. In 1971 Japan's national income was 215 thousand million US dollars while

- China's amounted to between 100 and 110 thousand million US dollars.
52. *Hungchi*, No. 2, 1972.
 53. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 6, 1972.
 54. *Hungchi*, No. 13, 1971.
 55. Judging by Chinese press reports, by mid-1971 the Maoists had been able to set up Party committees only in 70 to 80 per cent of the regions, cities, factories and communes.
 56. By a curious coincidence a Central Committee Plenary Meeting had been held in Lushan exactly 11 years earlier at which Mao Tse-tung had denounced Marshal Peng Te-huai and other prominent leaders for their criticism of the "great leap forward" and the "communi-sation" of the villages.
 57. See "Chungfa" (Letter of Advice from the Centre), No. 4 of January 13, 1972, published in the Hongkong magazine *Chanwang*, No. 252, August 1, 1972, and describing the Lin Piao plot. Also, "Chungfa" No. 12, August 17, 1972, outlining Mao's pronouncements during his inspection tour of the country in August and September of 1971, published in full for the first time in the Hongkong *Hsingtao Jihpao* of August 10 and 11, 1972.
 58. *The New York Times*, January 10, 1972, p. 33.
 59. "Chungfa", No. 12, March 17, 1972.

3

September '71 Crisis and After

September 1971 marked the beginning of two years of manoeuvring and change within the Maoist military-bureaucratic regime. The dramatic and sudden disappearance of Mao's heir-apparent, Lin Piao, together with a group of influential army officers, administrators and politicians marked something more than a change of priorities in domestic and foreign policy. It also signified an inevitable period of adaptation for the entire Maoist set-up in its manipulation of society and for its political and ideological machine whose job was to brainwash the people in the spirit of Maoism.

1. Eliminating the Opposition

To this day Peking conceals facts which could provide an adequate explanation of the disappearance of Lin Piao and a number of other officials from the Central Committee's Political Bureau in September 1971. Confidential documents circulated later that year within the Party and military establishment described Lin Piao as a careerist, conspirator and traitor. The documents stated that Lin Piao's "counter-revolutionary conspiracy to destroy the Party has been quashed". They also spoke of the end of the "Lin-Chen counter-revolutionary and revisionist line", Lin and Chen standing for Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. However, the Chinese press never referred to the two deposed leaders by name till the 10th CPC Congress in August 1973. They continued to be called the "swindlers of the Liu

Shao-chi type". This kind of camouflage is typical of Chinese internal politics. The Chinese man-in-the-street has no difficulty in understanding the real meaning of official jargon having witnessed for decades the power struggle within the country's top echelon and numerous political and ideological campaigns. Incidentally, the term "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" indicated official unwillingness to permit a frank discussion of the "September crisis" in the Party and the country and of the major political aspects relating to the "cultural revolution" and the Ninth Congress. The hue and cry over the "swindlers of the Liu type" and subsequent events demonstrated that in the final analysis the split within Chinese leadership had been caused by deep-rooted political differences which had accumulated during the preceding stage of the country's political development. Since Lin Piao's disappearance from the scene did little to resolve the difficulties, the Maoists intensified their attacks on the victims of the "September crisis" throughout the years following it. The struggle within the Chinese leadership continued.

Mao Tse-tung got rid of Lin Piao and his supporters by relying on a temporary alliance of the rival factions without consulting the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This major act of arbitrary rule affected the relations between the Maoist regime and its main support, the army. Consequently, Mao and his supporters had to do a lot of manoeuvring before they were able to obtain the endorsement of the "whole Party". In fact, the hullabaloo over the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" and the ideological campaign against the opposition constituted a prelude to the 10th Congress. A detailed analysis of the campaign is important if one is to obtain a better understanding of the Chinese scene on the eve of the 10th Congress.

The problem of the army and the need to clamp down all overt and covert opponents within the military and political establishment constituted the most serious problem facing the Maoists in 1972-1973. After 1971 the army still continued to be the main support of the military-bureaucratic regime. Therefore the aim of the Maoists was to make the army even more subservient to their dictatorship. This could not be achieved by a simple replacement of military personnel within

the political system. Consequently, the need for realigning the army ideologically and politically was more urgent than the need for purging certain elements among its personnel.

Some China watchers trace vague references to the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" back to July 1971.¹ However, the term did not gain wide currency until early November, i.e., immediately after the "September crisis" of 1971. It was officially dropped from the communique on the 10th Congress issued on September 1, 1973, since it openly mentioned Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta by name. Thus, the campaign lasted from November 1971 to August 1973. As it gathered momentum, Chinese propaganda disclosed that the "swindlers" were not a handful of conspirators, and that the anti-Maoist views and actions they were allegedly responsible for had broad support in China.

An analysis of the political charges levelled by the Chinese press against the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" in 1972-1973 is sufficient to reveal the broad social and political basis of this phenomenon. In the first place, the "swindlers" were charged with having conspired to seize power with a view to "altering Mao Tse-tung's main line and policies" and undermining his dictatorship. Three serious political charges were formulated in *Hungchi*, No. 5, 1972. The "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" were charged with an attempt to reject the goals of Maoism and Maoist internal policy, an attempt to change the established regime and undermine Mao Tse-tung's military-bureaucratic dictatorship. What sort of methods had they employed to achieve their goals? The Chinese press mentioned several methods. The "swindlers" wanted to "corrupt and recruit our cadres through rotten bourgeois methods of work and a bourgeois way of life;"² they "preached peace and unity within the Party and attacked inner-party struggle"; their aim was to "create counter-revolutionary public opinion for the purpose of overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat"; they confused contradiction between us and our enemies with contradictions within the people"; their principle was to "strike wholesale to defend a handful"; they "confused class boundaries"; they "condoned the tastes of certain individuals, praised one another, enticed people into joining them and

recruited them"; by "preaching pseudo-Marxism they deceived the people... and hampered the study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought."

"Either from the left or from the right, the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type interfered with and frustrated concrete work and the concrete policies of our Party."³

They spread "theories concerning some 'men of genius, and 'prophets' and practiced a middle-class style of work"; "they attacked the revolution pretending to attack Tsinh Shi-huan" "the swindlers of the Liu type set up a bourgeois headquarters and tried to split our Party."⁴

Such were the methods allegedly used by Lin Piao and his supporters as outlined in many articles of the Chinese national magazine and reprinted by all the newspapers in hundreds of thousands of copies and broadcast over the radio. The *Hungchi* editorial on the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China explained that the struggle against the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" was, in effect, "a struggle for unswerving adherence to Chairman Mao's line which meant that the concept of classes and class struggle should not be ignored".⁵ In other words, the main charge levelled against the opposition was deviation from or opposition to the Maoist method of resolving problems of internal policy by whipping up tension in the country and clamping down on opponents under the guise of waging a "class struggle." In 1971 Chinese newspapers shed little light on the methods Lin Piao had employed in his struggle against Mao. They confined themselves to generalities, such as "from the right and from the 'left', Lin Piao and his supporters undermined the Party's policies and disrupted the alliance of the three sides—the state, the collective and the individual."⁶

Details began to emerge towards the end of 1972 when the papers accused "swindlers of the Liu type" of having opposed the line adopted by the Party's Ninth Congress. ("In matters of policy they opposed the line formulated by the Ninth Congress in an attempt to change the Party's general line, in matters of organisation they rallied supporters by practising sectarianism.")⁷

According to the press, the "swindlers of the Liu type"

were splitting the Communist Party by "anarchism and servility". "Servility" was revealed in their insistence on "blind obedience". "From the right the 'swindlers' divorced the implementation of the political line from the need to obey Party discipline." Their "anarchism" manifested itself in their calls to "question and reject everything" and defy "organised discipline and Party leadership."⁸ This meant, in effect, that the army, no longer under the control of the Communist Party, had now ceased blindly following the Maoists themselves. Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and a group of deposed leaders were accused of having allowed mob violence and militarisation to run riot over the country at the time of the "cultural revolution".

The value of Maoist "theorising" was strikingly revealed in the course of the campaign of criticism of "theory of talents and men of genius" (*tientsai lun*) which the Maoists mounted after September 1971. They claimed that Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao "glorified Mao Tse-tung using unseemly methods" and described his "thoughts" as "the epitom of Marxism". In this way, they said, the two "separated" them from Marxism, doomed them to stagnation, belittled them and undermined their prestige and Mao's authority. They "glorified" Mao in a bid to seize power. Maoist newspapers wrote that "Mao is a man of genius" but only to the extent to which he gave expression to the aspirations of the people, "the true makers of history", and his "thoughts" represented a "development of Marxism", represented "modern Marxism" which should be developed further.

The main aim of the exposure of ever growing "crimes of the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" was to glorify Mao as a "Marxist" and a "popular leader" against the background of the "pseudo-Marxism" of Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao. However, criticism of the "theory of talents and men of genius" was fraught with the danger of exposing Mao Tse-tung and undermining his prestige. Consequently, the Peking leadership thought it wise to tone it down in October 1972.

It was not until March 1973 (one-and-a-half years after the beginning of the campaign) that the Mao Tse-tung group was able to classify the charges and incorporate them into a revived

campaign of "criticism of revisionism and rectification of style." This was done in the March issue of *Hungchi*. On the political plane the Chinese people were asked to criticise the swindlers of the Liu type who in their struggle against the leadership of Chairman Mao from "ultra-left positions and positions of right-wing opportunism" had opposed Chairman Mao's line and had gone so far as "to attempt to usurp power and restore capitalism". On the theoretical plane the "swindlers of the Liu type" were to be criticised for spreading "the idealistic theory of apriorism, the bourgeois theory of humanitarianism and reactionary idealistic materialism", and also for "criminal actions to subvert the mass movement to study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought". On the organisational plane the "swindlers" were to be criticised for pushing to top positions people who were close to them and who engaged in "hill-country parochialism and sectarianism in a bid to seize power." In terms of criticism of style of work the "swindlers" were to be attacked for having engaged in "counter-revolutionary double dealing" on a large scale.⁹

It is likely that the programmatic articles in *Hungchi* were based on a secret and more detailed document which was circulated in February 1973. Already then local radio stations were broadcasting materials identical with that published in *Hungchi*'s March issue. Apparently it was one of a series of secret documents circulated by the Central Committee in 1972 and 1973 under the heading "Measures to Overcome the Aftermath of the Counter-revolutionary Coup by Lin Piao's Anti-Party Group". Most of these documents found their way into newspapers in Hongkong and Taiwan, including the final report presented to the Party Congress by the Central Committee's special committee appointed to investigate the "Lin Piao case."¹⁰

The provincial media were more outspoken in reporting Lin Piao's methods than the national press. For example, the Party committee of an army unit in Lanchow gave a description of "some counter-revolutionary methods used" by the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type". The main method was "working under a red banner against red times". This found expression in the following: modification and absolutisation

of misinterpreted theoretical precepts; attempts to "sell Liu Shao-chi's black theoretical merchandise" to mislead the masses; rejection of the concept of pre-eminence of practical experience and the concept of the masses as the makers of history with the purpose of seizing power and restoring capitalism; distortion of slogans; departure from the Party line and rejection of its leadership; attempts to seize power; subversive activity from leftist and rightist positions; opposition to Chairman Mao's policy with regard to the army.¹¹

These charges can be summarised as follows: certain "swindlers" had (a) taken Mao's "directives" to absurd lengths by "misinterpreting" them, (b) made use of Liu Shao-chi's report to the first session of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party and opposed the methods of the "cultural revolution", (c) "distorted" Mao's slogans and undermined Mao's line from "leftist and rightist positions", and (d) opposed Mao's policies in the army.

Since Lin Piao and his supporters could not have possibly been successful if they had been a small group of conspirators or, as described by press, a "miserable handful of people", but would have required wide-ranging measures involving the intervention of the official military, state and propaganda machinery, the campaign to criticise them indicated either massive opposition to the Maoists, notably their internal measures, or a deliberate attempt by the Mao clique to ascribe broad anti-Maoist actions to them.

From the start the Maoists described Lin Piao and his supporters as "putschists, class enemies, and national traitors" so as to smooth over the gravity of the differences between them and Mao's line, and make the charges against them more credible. Finally, *Hungchi* clarified that the activities of Lin Piao and his supporters were "a concentrated reflection of the interests of deposed Chinese landlords and capitalists and the interests of international imperialism and social-imperialism aspiring for restoration."¹² Since no evidence of Lin Piao's ties with the "imperialists" and "Soviet revisionists" was available, Lin Piao and his supporters began to be attacked from "class" positions—Lin Piao was called a "landlord" and his brother a "hangman". A few peasants were produced

who insisted that they "had suffered enough misery at the hand of the Lin house". Besides, Lin Piao began to be criticised as a military leader.

The charges against the "swindlers of the Liu type" in the sphere of social policy were no less significant. The Maoists attached great importance to the country's young people and their attitude to Maoism. The Maoist propagandists found it increasingly difficult to explain to the young people why it was necessary to deport large numbers of urban youth to peripheral regions or preserve outdated social formulas after 24 years of the Republic, such as "priority of social background over abilities." It was for good reason that the "swindlers of the Liu type" were so severely criticised when they objected to "educated young people being dispatched to mountains and villages". This was one of the earliest charges in the propaganda campaign on the subject of youth (late 1971) when it was claimed that even people from working-class backgrounds tended to lose "proletarian ideology" under the influence of the "revisionist line in education" and, therefore, had to be "re-educated by poor peasants and peasants from the lower middle class". Any attempt on the victim's part to object on the ground that he had already almost been "re-educated" was promptly punished as "refusal to recognise the need for a long relationship between the educated youth and the workers and peasants."¹³

However, the papers admitted that some sections of the young people were questioning the correctness of Mao's line: "the poison of the views spread by the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type has not been expurgated", "young people's ideology may show signs of instability,"¹⁴ "some young people have been influenced by the absurd idea of the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type to question and reject everything; they do not observe organisational discipline."¹⁵ The latter remark was an attempt to put the blame for the *hungweiping* violence at the door of the anti-Maoists. Actually it was a variant of the charge of "anarchism in production."¹⁶ This meant that the damage caused to China's bureaucratic set-up and economy was due to the "anarchism" of Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. A radio broadcast said that the "swindlers of the Liu type" had

distorted the purity of the *hungweiping* movement.¹⁷ The obvious aim of the charges was "to save the face" of the *hungweiping* movement and create an alibi for its excesses for which Mao was personally responsible.

The "swindlers of the Liu type" also came under attack for placing "emphasis on social origin". The aim of the propaganda attacks was to convince "educated young people with less than good social backgrounds", who had suffered all types of humiliation after being deported to border areas, that the military and Mao's enemies were responsible for their dire fate. Calls were issued for placing greater political trust in the young people who had publicly dissociated themselves from their parents (in Maoist phraseology "those who boldly drew a demarcation line between themselves and their reactionary families"). Some, for instance, were elected to some YCL bodies.¹⁸ Every attempt was made to convince the young people with professional backgrounds and those coming from the families of "five black categories" that Lin Piao and his supporters were responsible for their misery, that the "swindlers" had no regard for such qualities in young people as consciousness, loyalty to Mao, etc. All they wanted to know was their "social background". Although promises of leniency to such youngsters were made, the correctness of the Maoist campaign to banish youth to the countryside was not even questioned. Lin Piao was vehemently attacked for his view that banishment meant "re-education through labour" (*laokaitiao* — forced labour). At the same time the Maoists went ahead with their policy of setting one section of the young people against another. For instance, they pitted peasant youngsters against the children of professional people and army officers ("...in their desire to humiliate the children of the poor and of the lower middle class 'the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type' insisted that only their own children were intelligent").¹⁹

In an attempt to direct the pent-up discontent of the young people against the deposed political opponents and their remaining supporters, Maoist propaganda blamed the "swindlers" even for measures which had been implemented for many years, such as "moving young people to villages without due

provision being made for them".

The whole campaign of criticism of "crimes committed by the swindlers of the Liu type" against youth suggests that early in 1972 the Mao group was busy brainwashing the young people ideologically and politically in preparation for setting up the Maoist YCL and other youth organisations. This became especially evident from materials published in the Chinese press in June 1972.

One objective of the campaign against the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" was to enlist the support of women by encouraging them to take a more active part in politics and to work better. January 1972 marked the beginning of a campaign of criticism of "arrogant attitudes towards women's role in revolution and production". Meetings and seminars were organised throughout the country to condemn "swindlers of the Liu type" for their "theories" of "women's backwardness" and "women's illiteracy". The campaign took a new turn when the "theory of women's uselessness" came under attack. It was insisted that "women should receive equal pay for equal work with men". Measures were taken to enhance what the Maoists regarded as women's insufficient labour activity and insufficient political awareness. Women were encouraged to join the rural militia. Late in 1972 the focus of the campaign was shifted to women cadres of the Party.

All these measures were intended to broaden the social base of the regime by organising a women's mass movement. The Maoists were especially active in building a women's movement in 1973, and the work continued till the 10th Congress. One of the aims was to strengthen the representation of the radical Maoists at the 10th Congress and undermine the positions of the army's representatives in the leadership.

The campaign against "swindlers of the Liu type" did not affect the artistic intelligentsia and had only a marginal effect on technical personnel. Party committees organised a series of short-term courses for the latter for the study of Mao's thoughts on the intelligentsia and for criticising "swindlers of the Liu type" for their theory of "experts being leaders in every sphere of life". It was pointed out that, depending on their political behaviour, specialists should play a prominent role

irrespective of their social origin. Significantly, attempts were made to curry favour with the technical intelligentsia. To this end the courses focused attention on "Chairman Mao's directives on the need to make the widest possible use of the intelligentsia, which he had put forward at the Party conference on propaganda." Those attending the courses also studied quotations from Marxism-Leninism concerning, "the need for the proletariat to unite with its allies."²⁰ Most likely the objective of the radical Maoists was to neutralise the intelligentsia and enlist its support in the struggle to enlarge the sphere of Maoist influence.

The nationalities policy of the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" also came under attack. They were charged with "Great-Han chauvinism and narrow local nationalism". But in this sphere criticism was reduced to the minimum because Peking was afraid of a real exposure of the anti-socialist nationalities policy of the Mao group. Therefore the criticism was confined to the charge that Lin Biao and his supporters did not consider it important to train Party workers from among the non-Chinese nationalities thus damaging the cause of "unity" between the Chinese and non-Chinese people.

If the "swindlers of the Liu type" had been accused of "criminal activity" within the armed forces and "distortion" of their role in domestic policy, it could have had most serious implications for China. But such a thing would have been possible only if Mao Tse-tung and his supporters had abandoned their policy of militarisation and dissociated themselves from the "cultural revolution". They would then have been able to hold Lin Biao and his men wholly responsible for the atrocities of the "cultural revolution", the smashing of the Communist Party, the militarisation of the administrative apparatus and the establishment of the military-bureaucratic regime. But this course of action was out of question since Maoism regards the army as the decisive force for the achievement of its hegemonistic and chauvinistic goals.

Throughout the entire ideological campaign the Maoists never dared to question the correctness of Mao's concept of "three supports and two military participations", a concept which had led to the establishment of the military-bureaucratic

regime in 1967 and which had received official recognition at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, since this would have meant another destruction of the administrative machinery and was fraught with an economic upheaval. Maoist propaganda thus busied itself with minor questions, such as winning influence in the army, and disregarded the more general question of militarisation of Chinese life. It did not hold the "swindlers of the Liu type" responsible for the establishment of military control and a military-bureaucratic political regime in China, but accused them of opposing Mao Tse-tung's power over the army. This was the most striking feature of the campaign against the "swindlers" in the army.

Peking displayed an extremely cautious attitude towards the army throughout the campaign. The first charge against the "swindlers of the Liu type" was made in January 1972 when they were accused of subverting the principle of "three and eight" in the army²¹ and undermining the "unity of the army and the people". This sweeping charge actually meant that they had disobeyed Mao Tse-tung and had failed to follow his political precepts.

By mid-1972 the emphasis began to be laid on the need to improve the combat preparedness of the armed forces, something which had been ignored by the "swindlers of the Liu type". Lin Piao and his supporters were accused of undermining the combat might of the army.²²

The propaganda campaign to "educate the masses in the spirit of the line" (Mao's line) and criticise Lin Piao as a military leader, which had been started in January 1971, was given a new impetus in July 1972 and progressively intensified thereafter. In an article entitled "Consistent Education in the Spirit of the Correct Line of the Party" (*Hungchi*, No. 7, 1972) Mao Tse-tung was portrayed as an infallible military strategist, who had throughout the Chinese revolution corrected the mistakes of "swindlers of the Liu type".

Subsequent materials in the press (about the Liaocheng military operation and others) exposed Lin Piao for his rightist tendencies" and hailed Mao as an advocate of military training, an invincible strategist and the founder of the Chinese Red Army. It is especially important to expose Maoist

falsifications about the part played by the Liaocheng (Liaosi-Mukden) operation,²³ as well as the Maoist interpretation of the role of the Manchurian revolutionary base and the social and economic transformations introduced on its territory in 1945-1949, as also about the evaluation of Soviet assistance to the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people.²⁴

The Maoists launched a new campaign of distortion of historical facts when *Hungchi* (No. 8, 1972) printed the article "Studying the Work Entitled 'The Course of the Liaocheng Military Operation.'" The aim of the campaign was to influence the remaining healthy elements within the Communist Party and the army. The 24th anniversary of the Liaocheng operation was the pretext for the publication of the article in *Hungchi*, which ascribed the success of this major battle entirely to Mao Tse-tung who allegedly "had taken personal charge" of the operation and had "supervised it from the beginning to the end."²⁵

The author of the article cited two telegrams from Mao Tse-tung to Lin Piao. Obviously, control of the "whole operation from the beginning to the end" would have required something more than two telegrams, especially considering the inadequate character of communications facilities at that time. Incidentally, it is doubtful whether Mao was the author of both telegrams since it was Chu Teh who was the Commander-in-Chief of all the revolutionary armed forces then.

The *Hungchi* article contrasts Mao Tse-tung's "correct line" in the Liaocheng operation with the "rightist opportunist line of the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" (i.e., Lin Piao) whose main mistake, according to the article, was the "failure to realise that Kuomintang reaction could be defeated within a short period of time". Here *Hungchi* went hopelessly astray — even in early 1949 Mao Tse-tung himself had believed that "the war with Chiang Kai-shek would go on for another two or three years."

By playing up what the journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party called "struggle between two military lines throughout the Liaocheng operation including the preparatory phase", it called into question the political loyalty of a large number of commanding officers who had taken part

in the Liaocheng operation. It is worth noting that 1972 saw the beginning of a long-term political campaign to discredit the commanding officers of the Manchurian revolutionary base. For example, the role of the revolutionary armies was distorted in the article, "Concerning the Booklet entitled 'Lin Piao During the Liberation War in the North-East'" (*Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974). The booklet printed in over there million copies in Phoudzian Province in early 1971 had been circulated in a number of provinces and cities.

The article claimed that Mao Tse-tung had organised and led the war of liberation in the north-east while Lin Piao had contributed nothing to Manchuria's liberation in 1946-1949. Moreover, he had made a lot of mistakes, "overestimated the enemy's strength", while his tactical concepts "were a lot of rubbish."²⁶ According to *Hungchi*, Mao Tse-tung "was personally responsible for the alignment of forces", took personal command of the troops involved in the Liaocheng offensive and "supplied them with timely and concrete directives". Ignoring the true facts, the article said that in the period beginning with the preparations for the Liaocheng operation to its completion Mao Tse-tung had sent "scores of telegrams to Manchuria in which he gave many timely and concrete directives."²⁷

The press alleged that Mao Tse-tung not only "took personal charge" of the operation but had made "advance preparations" for it. That this assertion is absurd can be seen from the following. It took more than a year—from the middle of 1947 to the autumn of 1948 — to create the conditions and to complete all necessary preparations for such a major offensive as the Liaocheng operation. At that time Yen-an was in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung was hiding in remote areas of Northern China and, obviously, could not have taken any active part in the preparations for the Liaocheng operation in Manchuria.

While ascribing the success of the Liaocheng operation solely to Mao Tse-tung's "personnel leadership" and his "concrete and timely directives", Maoist propaganda reduced the role of the commanders who had actually directed the operation merely to the execution of the "leader's" instructions.

That image helped the Maoists to deal with the dissident and veteran revolutionaries during the later massive ideological campaigns in China when a large number of regional military leaders, who had been active in the armed struggle against the Kuomintang, came under attack.

The question of the Manchurian revolutionary base took on new political overtones in the summer of 1974 when the Maoist leadership launched a new nation-wide campaign to discredit its command. Under the pretext of criticism of "Lin Piao's military line" the Maoists succeeded in distorting the entire course of the liberation struggle, including the military operations in Manchuria, and particularly the battle of Liaocheng and the battle of Peking and Tienkiang.

The political campaign to discredit Lin Piao together with the Party organisations and military and civilian personnel of the Manchurian revolutionary base had a number of aims. Firstly, to minimise the role of the Manchurian revolutionary base and to inflate the role of Mao Tse-tung during the final stages of the Chinese people's struggle for liberation. Secondly, to belittle the role of the Soviet Union and its armed forces in the strengthening of the Manchurian base, the Chinese revolution's main strategic stronghold in 1945-1949.

The high prestige of the Manchurian revolutionary base stems not only from its military successes, but also from the social and economic transformations carried out there through extensive use of Soviet experience which was a school of socialism for the Chinese people and their Communist Party. Party organisations in Manchuria relied on the support of the strong working class formed on the basis of advanced industry. At the time when Soviet troops were stationed in Manchuria, Chinese personnel, especially in Port Arthur and Dalny, was trained in socialist economic methods. Manchuria was, in fact, a testing ground of socialism, and its experience was widely used in the first decade of the People's Republic of China.

Soviet assistance in the strengthening of the Manchurian revolutionary base was another demonstration of internationalism on the part of the Soviet Union and its Communist Party. The true Chinese Communists were fully aware of the

significance of Soviet assistance which was rendered in difficult conditions and which provided the basis for the decisive battles that brought victory to the Chinese people. That was why Mao Tse-tung and his group in the course of numerous campaigns unleashed repression against a large number of internationalists, members of the Communist Party, who had participated in the battles of Manchuria. The Maoists' policy of discrediting the role of the Manchurian base and its cadres was pursued during the struggle against the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" (1972-1973), during subsequent campaigns such as the campaign of criticism of "Lin Piao's military line" (1973-1975) and the campaign of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius (1974-75). The Maoists continued to pursue this policy, thereby revealing the essence of the political and ideological struggle irrespective of the names under which it is conducted.

But to get back to the years 1972-1973. As the political and ideological indoctrination of the armed forces continued, the study of the resolution of the Kutien Conference was resumed and the "swindlers of the Liu type" began to be criticised for their alleged attempts to put military affairs above politics. The campaign for raising the level of military training continued throughout the ideological struggle against the "swindlers". It continued after the 10th Congress because it diverted the attention of the military from the Maoists' political machinations.

Mid-1972 saw a revival of the 1958-65 campaign for what Mao regarded as "democratic methods of work in the People's Army". The "swindlers of the Liu type" were criticised for their view that "trifles of everyday life can cause no great harm". The idea was to set officers against men. The commanding officers were criticised for their "haughty manners" and the need for a respectful attitude to common soldiers was emphasised. A number of reports for August 1972 contained information on a campaign in the People's Army against the "swindlers of the Liu type" who "undermined revolutionary unity" between commanders and soldiers and between the armed forces and the population.

The campaign against the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi

type" was accompanied by a tendency towards enhancing the role of the people's militia. Lin Piao and his supporters were accused of "undermining work with the people's militia" and "neglecting" Mao Tse-tung's teaching about the people's war. Subsequently local authorities began to criticise some mysteriously procured concrete remarks of Lin Piao concerning the people's militia ("the people's militia has outlived its time", "there are enough people's militia detachments", etc.). Under cover of criticism of these remarks people's militia detachments were reformed and strengthened and increasingly subordinated to the Party apparatus.

The conclusion to be drawn from the 1971-1973 campaign against the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" is that although it was directed against the military faction of Lin Piao, which had acquired a major role in the country's power structure during the "cultural revolution", its aim was not to undermine the positions of the army as the mainstay of the Maoist military-bureaucratic regime, but to crush all opposition to the Maoists. In this context some of the charges appear to have been made as part of cover-up measures.

What conclusions can be drawn from the various aspects of the political campaign against the "swindlers of the Liu type"? Why was Lin Piao never mentioned by name during the two years and the label "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" used instead? The absurdity of this label is obvious considering that Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi occupied two diametrically opposite positions during the "cultural revolution". The Peking leadership had its own personal and political reasons in resorting to this kind of impersonal "criticism" of its new opponent. The Maoists were not ready for an open discussion. They were afraid of such a discussion and were anxious to prevent the real background and true causes of the "September crisis" from being known.

Lin Piao's opposition to Mao Tse-tung was only a superficial expression of widespread popular discontent intensified by the "cultural revolution". It was manifested in the passivity of Party workers whom the Maoists criticised for their "cowardice, indolence and inactivity"; in the so-called decentralist

tendency and unwillingness to toe "Mao's line"; in the cautious, wait-and-see tactics of army commanders; in the growing localist and separatist tendencies; in the greater autonomy of local administrations from the central government; and in ferment among the working class, the peasantry and the youth.

Another reason why the Maoists used the phrase "the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" was their desire to spread the absurd idea about the existence of a "Lin-Chen" clique. It is a fact, however, that Lin Piao headed the military faction of the Chinese leadership, while Chen Po-ta was a leading member of the faction of Maoist left radicals until mid-1970, which included people who were closest to Mao—Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan. The history of the "cultural revolution" reveals an acute struggle between these two factions. Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao represented two different political points of view. By lumping them together and branding them with clichés from the arsenal of the current "class struggle", and identifying them with the "damned" Liu Shao-chi, the Maoists attempted to camouflage the real motives behind their campaign against the "swindlers of the Liu type".

In the course of the 1972-1973 campaign Mao Tse-tung and his supporters tried to dissociate themselves from the more extreme and adventurist slogans of the "cultural revolution". However, they were not willing to abandon their anti-socialist policies. Peking newspapers wrote about the "consolidation of the results of the cultural revolution". The Maoists explained the new zigzag in "Mao's line" as being the result of the struggle against Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. According to newspapers, "Chairman Mao's line and political directives cannot be implemented without criticism of the 'swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type'."

It is a well-known fact that Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta were the ideological mouthpieces of the "cultural revolution" and immediate executors of Mao's directives. Consequently, if the victims of the "September crisis" had been mentioned by name immediately, Mao Tse-tung would have been exposed as one who was shamelessly covering up his tracks and not wanting a discussion on the question of the crisis of the "cultural revolution". Policy questions would have been raised. This

would also have made it absolutely clear that the Maoists had dissociated themselves from their own practices of the "cultural revolution" period. Branding it as a "leftist" deviation they used the same methods which they had used in condemning "Liu Shao-chi's rotten revisionist merchandise". Mao and his supporters labelled Lin Piao and Liu Shao-chi "class enemies" so as to make them responsible for the failure of Mao's line and accused them of "rightist" or "leftist" deviations. Another aim was to disguise the obvious fact that Mao Tse-tung had been able to get rid of Liu Shao-chi with the help of Lin Piao, by playing on the feeling of dislike between the two men. While attaching false tags to their opponents, the Maoists were anxious to avoid everything that could touch off revelations about the metamorphosis of "Mao's line".

Mao Tse-tung could not admit that the discontent and resistance to his policies, including Lin Piao's opposition, stemmed from the "cultural revolution", which had exposed the Maoist regime as a one-man dictatorship. He could not admit that the situation had also been caused by such aspects of his policies as anti-Sovietism, hostile attitude towards the international communist movement, repression under the guise of "class struggle", his growing personality cult, war preparations and militarisation of society, and exploitation of the people under cover of demagogic slogans. The widespread popular dissatisfaction with the Maoist regime and its policies resulted from the fact that the Maoists had not offered the people a realistic programme for a better future. Signs of discontent were also evident among Party and government workers.

Lastly, the phrase "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" reflected a new round of power struggle within the Chinese leadership. In 1973 the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" began to be referred to as "ultra rightists", which meant that at that time the winners in the power struggle had come up against the resistance of political forces other than Lin Piao's supporters, which were labelled "ultra rightists".

2. *On the Succession Front*

The 1971 "September crisis" and subsequent measures taken by the Maoists on matters of internal policy revealed the

existence of a crisis of Maoism in the ideological, political, social, organisational, military and other spheres. It reflected the inherent ills and weaknesses of the Maoist regime, the results of its practice of manoeuvring between various political forces and social strata and of its policy of whipping up conflict within the Party and society. For these were the factors that formed the basis for the Maoist regime, and not its ideological and political authority. While attempts were being made to overcome the crisis new antagonisms flared up between the various factions in the Maoist leadership.

The dominant feature of the period between 1970 and 1971 was the rise of Chou En-lai against the background of the gradually subsiding excesses of the "cultural revolution". When the new Party committees emerged and became a challenge to the system of military control, Chou En-lai was able to come out against Lin Piao's faction. Being aware of the new balance of forces, Mao Tse-tung gave his support to Chou En-lai. The year 1972 saw a growing struggle between the Maoists of the radical left (Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Hang Hung-wen and others) and Chou En-lai's supporters for supreme power and for the nomination of Mao's successor.

The documents on the "Lin Piao affair", which appeared in 1972, suggest that they were the work of Maoist left radicals and also that this group was in confrontation with the faction of Lin Piao. Anxious to prevent further growth in the power of the military, Mao gave his support to the left radicals. The removal of the powerful military faction was a primary condition for the rise of the coming group of leaders, including Chiang Ching, with whom Mao associated the solution of the problem of "transfer of power". Rivalry between the factions of Chiang Ching and Chou En-lai, between their supporters in the country and military groups, formed the centre of the struggle.

Press reports and facts that have become known reveal that in 1972 and 1973 Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan acted as a separate group with no less power than Chou En-lai's. At the end of 1972 the former faction within the Central Committee was in charge of Party building, management of Party affairs, ideological work, propaganda and

agitation and the Party's international ties. But it had traditionally weak positions in the army and in the grass-roots Party organisations.

When the need to remove Lin Piao's supporters lost its urgency (according to some reports, the Peking rulers had got rid of many of Lin Piao's supporters in the army as early as in March 1972 when a total of 34,000 people fell victim to reprisals), the faction of Maoist left radicals nevertheless continued to fan the "class struggle" and intensify attacks against the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" in the course of the campaign to "criticise revisionism, and rectify style". For example, the editorial in the New Year issue of *Jenmin Jihpao* (January, 1, 1973), which is traditionally considered to be a programmatic document and is usually published in China's three semi-official newspapers, mentioned three political campaigns that were being conducted simultaneously—"criticism of revisionism and rectification of style," study of selected excerpts from the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung, and criticism of the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type". The article emphasised that of the three campaigns "criticism of revisionism and rectification of style" was the more important and added: "In the criticism of revisionism and rectification of style first comes criticism of revisionism, and only then rectification of style."

The Chinese reader, trained to see his way through Maoist phraseology, immediately realised that a new purge among Party workers considered to be "revisionist" was imminent and that it would be followed by ideological brainwashing in the course of another Maoist "re-education" drive. The term "revisionist" was presumably applied to Communists who held internationalist views and favoured the utilisation of socialist, or more exactly Soviet, experience in the building of the new society.

At the beginning of 1973 the Maoists regarded the campaign of "criticism of revisionism and rectification of style" as important and as defining Mao Tse-tung's long-term objectives (which *Jenmin Jihpao* termed "strategic courses")—"prepare for war and misery in the name of the people" and "unite" in

accordance with "the line of the Communist Party's Ninth Congress".

This led to a complete turn-about in the terminology applied to those against whom the frenzied propaganda campaign was directed. One and a half years after the removal of Lin Piao the "swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type" began to be called "ultra right-wingers", a complete reversal from the term "ultra left-wingers" used formerly. It was obvious that forces other than Lin's supporters had now become the main target of propaganda attacks.

Internal policy documents pertaining to 1973 which had made their way into the world press provided convincing evidence of the bitter antagonism between the Maoists of the radical left and the supporters of Chou En-lai. For example, a propaganda article ("Our Study of Chou En-lai") published by the Shanghai Trade Union Council in the magazine *Hsuehsi Yu Pinan* of September 2, 1973, said "...with Lin Piao dead only recently, some persons are already scrambling for power. Their motive force is political intrigue. They believe that their having been with the Party for several decades gives them the right to choose the successor to Chairman Mao from their own group."²⁸

The Taiwan newspaper *Chunyang Jihpao* was the first to publish the document on February 23, 1974, after it had changed a number of hands. Later it was reprinted by other newspapers. In August 1973 Peking's national newspapers launched what was to become a campaign of virtually undisguised attacks on Chou En-lai in the form of criticism of modern "Confucians".

The Maoists described the glaring departures from their positions to be an evolution of "Mao's thought" and consistent implementation of his "line" and the decisions of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party. It will be recalled that the decisions of the Ninth Congress and the most important speeches had never been published in full and were hardly known to the public which enabled Mao Tse-tung and others to manipulate them easily for propaganda purposes. For example, Lin Piao's report delivered on April 1, 1969, and endorsed by the Congress on April 14, glossed over many of

the directives put forward at the time of the "cultural revolution". In other words, the Congress documents were formulated in such a way that while being a ready-made declaration of the Maoist radical left (and that was the true spirit of the Congress) they left room for other interpretations. Subsequently the Maoists repeatedly took advantage of this useful loophole.

A distinguishing feature of the ideological and political manoeuvring of the Maoist leadership was that no matter how far the Maoists went in changing the platform and directives of the Ninth Congress, they could not ignore the spirit of its decisions altogether. In fact, the less China's policies were determined by the Congress programme, the more the Maoists lauded the Congress. This was only natural, for otherwise the futility of the "cultural revolution" from the social, political and historical viewpoints would have been revealed, and the authority of the Maoist leadership among the Chinese people and in the international arena would have been jeopardized. In 1971-1973 the Ninth Congress was important to the Maoists since at that time it was the only nation-wide Party forum which had formally, on behalf of the Party, rescinded the decisions of the Eighth Congress envisaging the development of the Communist Party along the lines of scientific socialism and internationalism. Besides, the Ninth Congress had laid the groundwork for a new party, a party with "Mao's thought" as its ideological basis, "Mao's line" as its political orientation and Mao's personality cult as its organisational foundation.

Since the Maoists were only looking for new effective methods to promote their old great-power hegemonistic course, they did not have to change the strategic directives formulated by the Congress. In foreign policy the directive was to intensify the split in the world communist and working-class movement and to wage a relentless struggle against the Soviet Union and its Communist Party (this directive remained unchanged although there were modifications in the Maoists' subversive tactics within the world communist movement). In domestic policy the primary directive was Mao's "strategic course"—"need to prepare for war and natural calamities in the name of the people" (this policy was launched in 1965). It is worth

noting that the Ninth Congress incorporated, as it were, the "great leap forward", imposed on the Party as Mao's "general line" in May 1958, and the concept of Mao's "strategic course", thus placing "the building of a socialist society" in China on a war footing.

Mao's principal economic maxim—"agriculture is the basis of the economy and industry is its leading force"—was likewise geared to the policy of war preparations.

Facts show that when the Maoists demanded "the implementation of the decisions and directives of the Ninth Congress", their main idea was to set up a war-oriented economy on the basis of Mao's three concepts mentioned above, and, specifically, to create conditions for a "war of indefinite duration". This meant the laying of stocks of food supplies in every region.

The line of the Ninth Congress also meant the implementation of the Maoist doctrine of "class struggle" and "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat". In subsequent years this doctrine was used to justify the need for the "cultural revolution". This was one of Mao Tse-tung's favourite postulates since it justified his dictatorial methods and the obvious instability in the country.

Finally, the glorification of "Mao's thought" at the Ninth Congress was designed to cover up the forced departure from the line of the "cultural revolution" and the Congress and the intense internal struggle accompanying it. To emphasize the official line in order to conceal the struggle around it is a standard practice in China.

In essence, Peking had to change its policy because, due to a number of internal and external factors, the Maoists had failed to achieve their objectives inside and outside the country on the basis of their policy of extreme adventurism under slogans of leftist revolutionism. One of these factors was the outstanding role of the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow. The meeting had demonstrated to the Maoists that the leading world force of our day had remained united on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and would continue to be the main obstacle in the way of their schemes. By 1972 the Maoists had realised

that their hopes for a split in the world communist movement and for the success of their anti-Soviet tactics in it had not materialised. Obviously, certain policy changes were essential, which explains why foreign policy became the object of such acute differences at a time when the power struggle was mounting. Besides, the exposure of Maoism by the Communists of all countries prompted Mao Tse-tung and his entourage to make their policies more flexible and intensify their parasitism on Marxism.

China's extremist foreign policy at the time of the "cultural revolution" had led to the country's unprecedented international isolation, notably among the countries of the Third World. Peking was forced to rebuild its relations with these and other capitalist countries in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, which had received only passing mention in Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Congress, but which Peking had to bring to the fore within four years of the Congress. In fact, at the beginning of 1970 *Jenmin Jihpao* was already describing peaceful coexistence as China's "main policy."²⁹

Peking's claim to the role of a "world arbiter" and that it was conducting a "special game" within the framework of Soviet-American relations had proved to be illusory. Nor could it have been otherwise, considering the real balance of international forces. Mao Tse-tung was left with no room for choice except to make overtures to the United States. In Chinese propaganda the Soviet Union replaced the United States as China's enemy No. 1. It should be noted that Peking's rapprochement with the United States revealed its limited possibilities in international affairs; it was Peking which came to Washington cap in hand and not the other way round.

The events of the last few years following the "September crisis" indicate that although the Chinese leaders had enough reasons for differences, including different interpretations of the "course", the "crisis" had been caused by only some of them which can be gleaned from the charges brought against Lin Piao during period after September 1971. The most serious charge was opposition to "Chairman Mao's foreign-policy line", whereas before 1971 his "crimes" had been mainly of an organisational character ("conspiracy").

There were good reasons for this. The Maoist extremists had held back the country's progress for at least a decade. Besides, it had become clear that China could no longer develop on the basis of the Maoist formula of "reliance on one's own forces". On the one hand, China could not hope to revive industry, launch a broad programme of capital construction and modernise science and technology without normalising relations with other countries and having access to world resources. On the other, all hopes that "self-reliance" would lead to China's emergence as an independent, "third" factor in world politics had proved illusory. Having severed its relations with the socialist community, Peking was compelled to seek trade avenues with major capitalist powers which also began to provide for the needs of China's war industry.

For a time foreign policy questions became the focus of political strategy and the object of acute differences. When Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai emerged victorious from the power struggle, they resolved the differences by reaffirming China's orientation towards the capitalist world, stepping up anti-Soviet policies and accelerating rapprochement with the United States. Lin Piao had apparently insisted on a different course of action which can be seen from the following facts. Judging by news comments, before he made his last public appearance on June 3, 1971, Lin Piao had advocated equal opposition to American imperialism and "Soviet revisionism". Since this was the line which had been adopted at the Ninth Congress, it may well be that he expressed his disagreement with Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy by committing himself to the letter of the Congress decisions.

This fact is important for an understanding of the political struggle after September 1971. It also gives a clue to an understanding of the balance of forces in the Chinese leadership, and the Party and government apparatus. It showed that the struggle for power did not rule out the prospect that healthy forces might have won in China. For example, available information indicates that Mao's and Chou En-lai's foreign policy activities had aroused sharp differences in Peking.

Purges dominated the Chinese scene for a number of years after September 1971. The Peking leadership, it seemed, had

decided to subject all Party workers to another ideological "screening", through the "criticism of revisionism", and remove "doubtful elements" from all levels of leadership. The year 1972 marked the end of the relatively calm period during which "Mao's line" was simply opposed to the "line of the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type", and when that was done mainly to pacify the army. Now came the time when "education in the spirit of the line" and "criticism of revisionism" were to be developed into a relentless campaign to "rectify style", i.e., a campaign of purges.

Foreign newspaper commentators noted at the time, and with good reason, that the Maoists would take a long time to purge the supporters of deposed Political Bureau members from all Party organisations, including grass-roots organisations. The campaign of purges initiated immediately after September 1971 was only the beginning of what was to become a campaign of repression in the central bodies of government and in the armed forces. The newspaper *Heilungkiang Jihpao* wrote on January 8, 1972, that all leading workers in all government agencies would be screened. In actual fact, however, the Maoist leadership had to resort to wait-and-see tactics after encountering serious resistance in the provinces.

For several years the situation remained tense. The struggle continued, although there were few outward manifestations of this. The secret resistance to the Maoist dictatorship was expressed in the passive rejection of the Maoist course, in the dissatisfaction with the regime and in what was criticised as "anarchism". Nobody could predict the outcome of the struggle or the future of the Maoist course. For the moment at any rate the original causes of the struggle were still there. No solution had been found to pressing problems in the ideological, political, economic, organisational, foreign-political and cultural fields. Stagnation had set in in some major areas of life, such as culture and education. There was no solution to major social problems. One of these was the problem of the young people, and the fact that every third or fourth inhabitant of China was a man or woman under 25 made it even more urgent. It could be said that young people in Maoist China "saw no way out".

Nor had cadre questions been settled, which could be seen from the drastic changes in the Maoists' cadre policy throughout 1972. Immediately after the "September crisis" the Maoist regime emphasised the need to "release and rehabilitate" veteran cadres on whom it would be possible to rely in restoring the Party system. The rehabilitation policy received full prominence in a *Jenmin Jihpao* article of January 1, 1972 but soon after that, in April, the Maoists were already busy nursing "young cadres". Chinese propaganda had stopped eulogising veteran workers as "the Party's golden stock" or mentioned them in an ambiguous way. This change indicated Mao Tse-tung's intention to assign leadership to people who were indebted to him for their promotion, and who would therefore toe his line.

Questions of personnel had been in the centre of the struggle for a long time, reflecting the power struggle in the Chinese Communist Party leadership. The Central Committee was itself going through a crisis. Many of its members had been removed from the political scene soon after the Ninth Congress and in September 1971 nearly half of the Political Bureau members had disappeared. Although formally the Central Committee had 279 full and alternate members, there is reason to believe that the Maoist leadership relied on a much smaller number in decision-making. According to some press reports, for example, the decision on the all-important question of "denouncing Chen Po-ta" was taken by the so-called conference of 99 in April 1971.

Maoist policies after the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party provided no solutions to the country's problems. On the contrary they widened the gap between dogmas and what the country really needed. Since the Maoists had no positive programme they had to rely on violence, intimidation and purges to hold power and to prop up the dictatorial regime. Their position was made more difficult by the fact that the power struggle continued even after the removal of Lin Piao and that it was necessary to urgently strengthen the ideological, political and organisational foundations of Maoism which had been undermined by the "September crisis" of 1971. There was also the need to strengthen the Party's leading bodies. Such were

the problems to be tackled by the Party's 10th Congress.

5. 10th CPC Congress—A New Phase in Struggle for Power

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China which was held in Peking between August 24 and 28, 1973, was not a regular Congress because it was actually called before five years had elapsed since the holding of the previous Congress, as stipulated in Party Rules. It was the first Communist Party Congress in the history of the People's Republic of China to be held in strict secrecy. No reports on its preparations or on its proceedings were published. After it had ended the papers carried a brief communique, the Central Committee's political report delivered by Chou En-lai, Wang Hung-wen's report on changes in the Party Rules and the text of the new Rules, and a report on the composition of the Party's leading bodies (the Central Committee, the Political bureau and Standing Committee, the Party Chairman and his deputies).

According to the communique, the Congress was attended by 1,249 delegates "elected through democratic consultations", which meant that they were handpicked and brainwashed Maoist activists. Although the communique spoke of a growth in membership (it said that the CPC had 28 million members) the Party was represented at the 10th Congress by a considerably smaller number of delegates than at the Ninth Congress (1,512 delegates). The unusually short duration of the Congress (five days) can probably be explained by a desire to prevent an extensive debate on the controversial aspects of Chinese politics.

The 10th Congress reaffirmed the Chinese leadership's strategic course in domestic and foreign policy which was outlined at the Party's previous Congress in 1969. The documents of the 10th Congress reflected all the major concepts of Mao Tse-tung which formed the ideological and political platform of the Communist Party of China.

At the same time the Congress was unable to equip the Party with any well-reasoned programme of national development. The Congress documents contained the familiar Mao postulates, such as the theory of "continuing the revolution under

the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Maoist version of the Trotskyite theory of permanent revolution), the concepts of "two types of contradictions in a socialist society", of "the struggle between two roads, two lines" and a number of other worn-out dogmas.

The growing ideological and theoretical degeneration of Maoism largely explains why the Peking theorists had to more and more resort to Marxist terminology in order to camouflage Mao's "thought" in Marxist guise.

As can be seen from the materials of the 10th Congress published in the press, it concentrated its attention on questions of internal policy. They were keynoted by Chou En-lai's progress report, the main part of which dealt with the "line of the Ninth Congress". This glance back on the "line of the Ninth Congress", based mainly on the so-called "general line of the Party", suggests the angle from which the discussions at the 10th Congress should be viewed. The concept of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" was the "theoretical" foundation of the "general line". The Congress documents tried to pass off this concept as Mao Tse-tung's "discovery" of the laws of social development under socialism and as a creative development of Marxism-Leninism.

In Maoist practice the "general line of the Party" was carried out by means of a number of "specific lines" aimed at whipping up antagonisms within the Party and the country. The concepts of "growing class struggle" and "struggle between two roads and two lines" were used as a pretext for orienting the Party towards endless internal struggle. (Recall the "cultural revolution" when all opponents of the "general line", i.e., Maoist policies, were persecuted and suppressed). The 10th Congress made an attempt to legalise and impose on the Party and the people the practices of the "cultural revolution". It should be specially noted that the keynote of the 10th Congress was glorification of the "cultural revolution" and confirmation of all its leftist slogans and concepts. Moreover, the new Party Rules adopted by the Congress described it as "the great political revolution... which will be repeated many times." This appraisal showed that the leaders who had come to power at

the time of the "cultural revolution" had consolidated their positions.

In analysing the "general line of the Party" it is important to note that both the Ninth and 10th Congresses had openly revised the thesis adopted by the Eighth Congress in 1956 stating that "the question of what will emerge victorious in China—socialism or capitalism—has already been answered." The progress report to the 10th Congress made it clear that "the struggle between the two lines in the Party will continue for a long time to come. It will recur ten, twenty, thirty times". Chou En-lai supported this thesis by the example of the Communist Party of China "which has intensified its serious struggle between the two lines ten times over the past half-century."³⁰

The domestic policy guidelines of the Party were also formulated in the spirit of the "general line": "adhere to the Party's general line and policy throughout the historical period of socialism, firmly continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, unite all forces that can be united, and work to develop our country into a powerful socialist state so as to make a greater contribution to the cause of mankind."

The question of the "Lin Piao anti-Party group" was likewise treated in the materials of the 10th Congress in the light of the historical inevitability of internal political struggle. The very fact that the Congress had raised the matter pointed to serious differences and strife among the Maoist leadership and in the Party in general.

For all the absurdity of the charges levelled against Lin Piao, he was put in the same rank as Mao Tse-tung's former political opponents—from Chen Tu-hsiu to Liu Shao-chi (the latter was even regarded as the most dangerous of the lot). It is clear, therefore, that an anti-Maoist opposition had always existed in the Communist Party of China.

Judging from the Congress materials, the opposition of Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta had put the Maoist leadership in a very difficult situation compelling it to launch a two-year campaign of "criticism of the swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type". Although Maoist propaganda had played up "the defeat of Lin Piao's anti-Party group", the 10th Congress stated once again

that "priority should be given to the movement to criticise Lin Piao and rectify style", and that "Lin Piao should be cited as a negative example as much as possible." The scope and orientation of the campaign suggested that by using Lin Piao as the official target in the struggle between the "two lines" the Maoists were, in fact, directing their attacks against political opponents who were in any way committed to the platform of the Party's Eighth Congress (it was not accidental that Lin Piao was associated with such political opponents of Maoism as Kao Kang, Peng Te-huai and Liu Shao-chi). This was implied in Chou En-lai's report accusing Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta of having "opposed the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" by insisting that after the Ninth Congress priority should be given to industrial development. Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta, who were also mentioned in this connection, were accused of "squeezing" into the resolution of the Eighth Congress "their absurd revisionist theory" that the main contradiction in the country was that between the advanced socialist system and outdated productive forces, and not the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Although the Maoist Congress proclaimed the "total defeat of Lin Piao's revisionist and counter-revolutionary conspiracy" and adopted appropriate resolutions, there is reason to believe that the Maoists were far from certain that their version of Lin Piao's case was believed by many rank-and-file Party workers.

Like the previous Congress the 10th Congress bypassed the pressing problems of China's social, economic and cultural development by confining itself to a mere repetition of some of Mao's "commandments" put forward since the time of the "great leap" and incorporated in the documents of the Ninth Congress. These included: "three red banners" ("the great leap forward", "the village commune" and the need to build socialism on the principle of "faster, better and more economical"); "agriculture—the basis of the economy, and industry—the leading force"; "reliance on one's own forces"; "learn from Taching and Tachai"; "elevate proletarian politics to commanding positions". These directives (Chou En-lai's report set out about 15 of them) came under the general policy of "prepare for war and natural calamities". This general policy line was given more prominence

in Chou En-lai's report than in Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Party Congress. Chou En-lai's call for economic planning meant a call for the maximum mobilisation of the country's material resources to speed up militarisation. It did not signify a return to planned economic development. The Maoists' pragmatic manoeuvring in the field of economic management was as a forced search for more rational methods of stimulating economic activity which remained geared to Peking's strategic goals. This meant that a crisis situation, capable of erupting in a new outbreak of internal struggle, still continued to exist in China.

The foreign-policy programme of the 10th Congress revealed a stronger tendency towards right-wing nationalism and relentless struggle against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. In this the continuity of policy between the Ninth and 10th Congresses was obvious. Chou En-lai said in his report that "our Party and Government are firmly implementing the foreign policy formulated by the Ninth Congress".

In his report Chou En-lai made a revealing evaluation of the current stage in world development. By applying Lenin's definition of imperialism as "the eve of the proletarian social revolution" to the current stage, Chou eliminated the basic difference between our times and the era prior to the victory of the October Socialist Revolution and the emergence of the world socialist system. His idea was to exclude the Great October Socialist Revolution and the world socialist system from the world revolutionary process and to demonstrate that the Chinese revolution had ushered in the era of "proletarian revolution". It was also an attempt to justify theoretically the fact that the Peking leadership had abandoned socialist construction.

The 10th Congress demonstrated that there was a change in the official attitude to questions of war, peace and revolution. Being conscious of the growing tendency towards relaxation in international relations, the Maoists this time circumvented the Ninth Congress formula about the inevitability of a new world war. The report quoted Mao Tse-tung's statement of May 20, 1970: "The danger of a new world war still exists, and the peoples of all countries should prepare for it. But the dominant trend in the world today is revolution."

At the same time it was noted that war was the best road to revolution since "the process of international relaxation is a transitory and superficial development, and colossal upheavals will continue."

Peking made a radical change in its position on the question of China's global enemies. Although the documents of the 10th Congress did not fail to mention the United States and the Soviet Union as China's major enemies, neither the report, nor the new Party Rules contained the thesis that American imperialism was "the worst enemy of the whole world" or that China "has clearly dissociated herself from it" (these formulas were current at the Ninth Congress). Moreover, Chou En-lai noted "some progress" in Sino-American relations.

Instead of real opposition to imperialism and its aggressive policies and ideology, the Congress confined itself to calling for a struggle against American hegemony, and actually basing its foreign policy on open hostility towards the Soviet Union as the main enemy. The Maoists abandoned the slogan of struggle on two fronts, which was mentioned in the decisions of the Ninth Congress, spearheading their foreign-policy activities against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. At the same time they began looking for support from the most reactionary imperialist circles. Attempts were made to convince the outside world that China was faced with "a threat from the north". There was talk about the danger of the policy of international relaxation and the need for a tough line in dealing with the Soviet Union. In line with the documents of the 10th Congress, the Maoists intended to continue to sabotage the settlement of the border dispute with the Soviet Union although Chou En-lai did state in his report that "disputes on matters of principle between China and the Soviet Union should not hamper normalisation of bilateral relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."

Changes in the Party Rules, which had been approved at the Ninth Congress only four years ago, occupied a special place in the proceedings of the 10th Congress. A report on these changes was made on August 24, 1973, by Wang Hung-wen, one of the newly-elected Deputy Chairmen of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of China. The report stated that the question of revision of Party Rules had been discussed at a working meeting of the Central Committee in May 1973 "in accordance with the directives of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Party's Central Committee". It also stated that the new Rules "were drafted in line with Chairman Mao's concrete proposals on changes in the Party's Rules." At the same time the report tried to create an impression that the new Rules were the result of a "broad exchange of opinion among Party members and the mass of the people."

In essence, the new Rules did not differ from those adopted by the Ninth Congress. They placed the same emphasis on a perpetuation of the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung as the theoretical foundation of the Party, and consolidated the principal aspects of the Maoist political course as the long-term programme of the Communist Party of China.

"Perpetuation" of Maoism was expressed in the new Rules by the formula "Marxism-Leninism—Mao Tse-tung's thought," thereby meaning that Maoism was a logical development of Marxism-Leninism. A desire to "perpetuate" Maoism could also be seen from the fact that the new Rules contained Mao Tse-tung's dictums, formulated by him in articles and speeches, and also his "latest directives" which were given vast coverage by the information media in China in later years. Mao Tse-tung's authorship was emphasised by political phraseology which was typical of Mao's style ("go against the tide without fear", "bright prospects but a thorny road", etc.) It is worth noting that the phrases and definitions contained in the previous Rules and ascribed to Lin Biao were carefully deleted from the text of the new Rules.

The Rules did not set the task of the building of socialism in China, but spoke of an abstract need "for the victory of socialism over capitalism". The Rules proclaimed "struggle against the hegemony of the two super-powers—the United States and the Soviet Union", as the main long-term objective of the Communist Party of China. It was emphasised that "to that end the Party should firmly unite with truly Marxist-Leninist Parties and organisations throughout the world, with the proletariat and oppressed peoples and nations". The mention of proletarian

internationalism in this connection was intended to disguise Peking's desire for the formation of a bloc with widely different forces, including the most reactionary forces and aggressive blocs of modern imperialism, for a struggle against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

The new Rules oriented the Communist Party and the people of China towards preparation for war, justifying it by "the threat of aggression from imperialism and social-imperialism", in other words, from the Soviet Union. Thus the new Rules once more elevated Mao Tse-tung's hegemonistic, social-chauvinistic and anti-Soviet aspirations to the level of major programmatic objectives of the Communist Party.

As far as the Party's domestic policy was concerned, it was almost wholly confined to problems of unceasing political struggle in the Party and the country. Special emphasis was laid on the continuity of the "cultural revolution".

The Rules were aimed at the legalisation of Maoist methods of political struggle used in the "cultural revolution" and in subsequent years. This could be seen from a number of new provisions incorporated into the Rules, such as "go against the tide without fear", "make a correct assessment and resolve differences between us and our enemies", and others used to "justify" Maoist suppression of all dissent in the past, present and future.

The Rules were also aimed at the consolidation of the ideological, political and organisational positions of the new forces which had risen to Party leadership during the "cultural revolution". This is borne out by such stipulations as "train millions of people capable of advancing the cause of the proletarian revolution", "there must be absolutely no place for revenge and suppression of criticism." Wang Hung-wen's report apparently deliberately toned down the significance of the changes introduced in the new Rules. It only mentioned some changes in the structure and content of the "general programme" and a few amendments in other chapters (the paragraph about Lin Piao was the only deletion mentioned).

The programmatic part of the new Rules did not postulate "Mao Tse-tung's thought" as the epitome of Marxism-Leninism. Neither did it refer to Mao Tse-tung as the leader of

the Chinese Communist Party or spoke of a successor to the "leader". Wang Hung-wen only commented on the deletion concerning Lin Piao.

Some statements were specially introduced to create an impression that the Communist Party was playing a leading role in the country's government and political institutions and that it had a collective leadership.

The Chinese leaders, it seems, were compelled to reckon with the deteriorating political situation at home and with the sad lessons of their ideological and political struggle against the international communist movement. Apparently they were conscious of the criticism by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist Parties of the documents of the Ninth Congress. The most significant organisational changes introduced by the Rules included the restoration of the office of Deputy Party Chairmen introduced by the Eighth Congress and a new wording of the article concerning the duties of Party members. Under the new Rules all Party members were duty bound to "criticise revisionism", which meant, in fact, an active struggle against the political opponents of Maoism at home and abroad, that is, the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist Parties, the socialist community and the international communist movement.

Although the Rules paid lip-service to the principle of democratic centralism, in fact, they rejected it, belittling the role of the Party's national conventions and the Party's Central Committee as the Party's supreme collective authority. Nothing was said about the procedure of convening Party Congresses or of the powers of the national convention. The Rules did not say how often the Central Committee should meet in plenary sessions. The Rules gave supreme authority over the Party, the government and the armed forces to the Chairman of the Central Committee, his deputies and the Standing Committee of the Central Committee's Political Bureau, that is, to the inner circle of the Maoist top Party echelon. The special and actually uncontrolled position of the Party Chairman and his deputies was reinforced by the fact that the Rules provided for no control bodies within the Party. All the major provisions of the new Rules ensured the Party's role

as an instrument for the implementation of Mao Tse-tung's "thought" and hegemonistic great-power policies.

Major changes were introduced by the 10th Congress in the composition of the Party's Central Committee. The number of full and alternate members was increased by 40 (319 against the 279 elected at the Ninth Congress). The new Central Committee included 111 newly-elected members ("new blood") or about 35 per cent of the total number of Central Committee members. Among them were former Political Bureau members elected at the Eighth Congress : Teng Hsiao-ping, Tan Chen-lin and Li Ching-chuan; former alternate Political Bureau member Ulanfu and, Wang Chia-hsiang, Secretary of the Central Committee elected at the Eighth Congress. The fact that most of these people remained outside the Political Bureau after the 10th Congress, although undoubtedly they had more experience in politics and government than other Central Committee members, showed that the Maoist leadership wanted to utilise their prestige as "respected representatives of the Old Guard".

The First Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held after the 10th Congress introduced significant changes in the composition of the Party's leading bodies. The meeting elected five deputy Party chairmen (there was one deputy chairman after the Ninth Congress). This meant that the question of a successor to Mao Tse-tung was now closed. The Political Bureau's Standing Committee was broadened to include nine members instead of five, while the number of the new Political Bureau members remained the same as at the Ninth Congress (21 full and four alternate members).

The 10th Congress of the Maoist Party thus reflected significant changes in the balance of forces within the Chinese leadership and indicated a new compromise between the rival factions. The composition of the leadership formed by the 10th Congress demonstrated the growing influence of the nationalist wing reared in the spirit of Mao's chauvinist ideas and the "cultural revolution".

However, subsequent events proved that the new balance of forces was unstable. The position of the military men, who had retained real power in the provinces was one of the major

factors contributing to this situation. The rival support of the factions within the Chinese leadership were competing for the military while trying to limit its power in the local "revolutionary committees" and Party organisations.

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China revealed that the Party was in a state of a serious crisis. The petty-bourgeois and nationalistic programme it adopted further undermined the socialist foundations of the Chinese economy and further jeopardised the socialist gains of the people of China.

Despite the calls for unity issued by the Congress the Party's central and local organisations were still split into rival factions. The "general line" of the Party approved and legalised by the new Rules meant an indefinite continuation of the struggle in the Party. The political situation in the country remained unstable.

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China was held under nationalistic and anti-Soviet slogans. It demonstrated the break of the Chinese leadership with the world communist movement and the socialist community. It also demonstrated that the leaders of the Communist Party of China were determined to continue to pursue their policy of outright anti-Sovietism and opposition to the idea of international relaxation.

In his speech in Tashkent on September 24, 1973, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, made it clear that "such a position adds nothing to China's international prestige or to confidence in it on the part of other countries, and from the view point of the common interests of peace, socialism, and the liberation struggle of the peoples, it is regretful and harmful."

NOTES

1. A Soviet writer on Chinese affairs, V. Fetov, notes that "a programmatic article on the 50th anniversary of the CPC which appeared on the eve of the 'September crisis' already contained detailed statements concerning 'swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type'." (*Problemy Dalnego*

- Vostoka*, No. 1, 1973, p. 188).
2. *Hungchi* No 1, 1972, p. 33. This includes "privileges not subject to limitations imposed by Party discipline and state legislation", etc.
 3. *Hungchi*, Nos 1,2,3,5,6, 1972.
 4. *Hungchi*, Nos 7-8, 1972.
 5. *Hungchi*, No. 10, 1972.
 6. *Hungchi*.
 7. *Hungchi*, No. 11, 1972, p. 14.
 8. *Hungchi*, pp. 7-8.
 9. *Hungchi*, No. 3, 1973.
 10. See *Chungkuo Tala Yanchiu*, No. 69, January 1974.
 11. Radio Hansu, September 2, 1972.
 12. *Hungchi*, No. 3, 1973.
 13. *Hungchi*, No. 1, 1972, p. 85.
 14. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1972, p. 87.
 15. *Hungchi*, No. 8, 1972, p. 63.
 16. "Under the influence of the anarchist ideology spread by the 'swindlers of the Liu Shao-chi type' some people could not distinguish revisionist 'control' and 'suppression' from a rational system of order." (*Hungchi*, No. 8, 1972, p. 65)
 17. "... 'the swindlers of the Liu type' preached revisionism, corrupted the youth and slandered and undermined the *hungweiping* movement." (Radio Urumchi, April 3, 1972)
 18. Radio Peking, June 6, 1972.
 19. Radio Dairen, December 2, 1972.
 20. Radio Peking, August 16, 1972. The quotation is an apparent reference to Mao Tse-tung's speech of March 1957.
 21. The principle "three and eight", reportedly formulated by Mao in 1937, means "three disciplinary rules and memoranda containing eight points". The first rule is "subordination to the superior" (i.e., Commander-in-Chief Mao Tse-tung).
 22. "...They blabbed that military training was not important, that there was no need for a special study of military hardware until the time came, etc." (*Hungchi* No. 5, 1972, p. 32)
 23. The Liaochang operation (September 12-November 12, 1948) led to the disengagement of the Kuomintang troops in northern and north-eastern China and liberation of parts of Manchuria.

24. A detailed analysis of the contribution of the Manchurian base to the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the significance of Soviet assistance is given by a Soviet writer on Chinese affairs, O. Borisov, in his article "The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base" (*Problems of the Far East*, No. 3, 1975, pp. 27-44) and in his monograph of the same title (Moscow, 1975). The authors of this book have drawn on some of the facts and comments contained in Borisov's articles.
25. *Hungchi*, No. 8, 1972.
26. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974.
27. *Hungchi*.
28. Quoted from *Chang wang*, No. 291, March 16, 1974, p. 3.
29. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 1, 1970.
30. On the eve of the Congress this subject was very much present in the pages of papers and magazines which were trying to demonstrate the inevitability of inter-Party struggle and justify (under cover of the campaign of criticism of revisionism and rectification of style) the persecution of those who did not share Mao Tse-tung's views, especially the internationalist elements in the Party leadership, represented by Chu Chiu-po, Wang Ming, Kao Kang, Peng Te-huai and others.

4

Campaign of "Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius"

1. Aims of the Campaign

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China did not advance any constructive programme for the development of Chinese society. The bombastic propagandistic phrases about "the splendid situation in the country" and about "the great victories won under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line" could not hide the fact that Mao Tse-tung's "special" course was objectively inconsistent with and hostile to the socialist aspirations of the Chinese working people.

The 10th Congress of the CPC signified a new stage in the general political crisis experienced by China since the beginning of the "cultural revolution". During this stage, the Chinese leadership concentrated on stabilising and reinforcing the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, and crushing those forces which opposed Maoism and upheld in one form or another the socialist perspective of China's advance.

The establishment of the Maoist regime proceeded in conditions of a sharp and intense struggle both within the Maoist camp and between the Maoists and the forces opposing the regime. This struggle took the form of repeated political and ideological campaigns, which, under the Maoist regime, became a style of political guidance of society and the very condition for the existence of the regime itself. In the course of these campaigns, the Maoist directives in the social, political and

economic fields were translated into life. The population was subjected to ideological brainwashing, and non-conformists were suppressed. A sharp internecine struggle was going on between the rival Maoist groups for power.

Such an all-out campaign was launched by the Maoists following the 10th Congress of the CPC. It proceeded under the slogan of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". As emphasised in a *Jenmin Jihpao* editorial, the campaign was "personally led by Chairman Mao."¹

Criticism of Confucianism and the defence of "Legism",* started before the 10th Congress of the CPC, developed into a mass political and ideological campaign which involved all the social strata and age groups of the population. It was proclaimed by the Maoist propaganda agencies as the "main big cause of the entire Party, the entire army, and the people of the entire country."² In the course of this campaign, the Maoist leadership tried to resolve immediate issues with the help of historical parallels and allegories, and with reference to the history, ideology, and culture of ancient and medieval China.

The political developments in China in the decade preceding the campaign had revealed the inability of the Peking leadership to achieve a steady advance of Chinese society on the ideological foundations of Maoism. Organisationally, politically and ideologically "Mao Tse-tung's thought" proved to be hostile to the socialist aspirations of the Chinese people. This was indirectly admitted even by former associates of the "Great Helmsman". During the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" the propaganda agencies published a statement of the former official "successor to Chairman Mao", Lin Piao, that "the time of Mao Tse-tung's thought was over."³ The fact that people who had earlier actively fostered "Mao Tse-tung's thought" had ultimately arrived at the conclusion that its days were over, was highly significant.

However, in the new campaign, the Maoist leadership set before the nation the task of planting Maoism organisationally, politically and ideologically forever in China. Maoism in this campaign proved hostile even to such a kindred teaching as

* "Legism" was the ideology of "Legists" of ancient China who advocated highly centralised rule (*translator's note*).

the teaching of Confucius. "Mao Tse-tung's thought" was to hold supreme sway over the minds of the Chinese people. For this reason, the propaganda agencies urged that "the temple of Confucius should be pulled down". In effect, this meant nothing but a call for the building of a "temple of Mao Tse-tung's thought".

In view of the not-too-distant departure of Mao Tse-tung from the political scene, the problem of succession to power arose in all its sharpness. The "Chairman" was deeply concerned over the fact that Maoism should be unswervingly followed after his death. All his hopes were pinned on the "leftist group" in the Peking leadership, which had come to the fore and gained strength through the efforts of the "Great Helmsman" during the "cultural revolution". That was why the Shanghai leaders, Wang Hung-wen, Yao Wen-yuan, Chang Chun-chiao, and Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, were at the head of the campaign from the very outset. That was also why during the campaign there was an intense popularisation of the idea of "promotion of young functionaries from among the activists who have come to the fore during the great cultural revolution."⁴

The failure of the "great leap forward" in 1958, and the economic dislocation caused by public disturbances and the rampage of the *hungweipings* during the "cultural revolution" had taught the Maoists nothing. In the campaign of "criticism against Lin Piao and Confucius" the Peking leadership popularised the economic "line of Chairman Mao" as follows: "policy is the commanding force" and "snatch at the revolution and stimulate production". This was an arbitrary method of economic management. Bonuses, material incentives, concern for production—all this was proclaimed to be "a revisionist line in the running of enterprises". An editorial in *Jenmin Jihpao* said that "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius should be turned into a mighty incentive of spring field-work as well as of work in other sectors."⁵ In fact, the Maoists called for the intensification of administrative methods of compulsion for the sake of satisfying their hegemonistic ambitions.

One of the ways of attaining the aims of the campaign was to whip up war hysteria and anti-Sovietism. Practice had proved

that it was impossible to solve China's vital problems on the ideological basis of Maoism. Therefore, everything that was Soviet aroused the deep hatred of the Maoists. This was the reason why the Maoists published all kinds of slanderous insinuations about "meetings having been held in Moscow in honour of Confucius",⁶ the sole aim being to discredit the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Chinese working people.

On the other hand, the deepening of contradictions within the Maoist regime, its inability to improve the living standards of the working people, the spontaneous manifestations of the sympathy of the people of China towards the Soviet Union, and the utilisation by the majority of the leaders of the lower and middle echelons of Soviet methods of economic management caused the Maoists to worry about their future. In the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", the theoreticians in Chungnanhai—the residence of the "Great Helmsman"—were all out to convince the Chinese people of the "aggressive" intentions of the USSR. Day after day, the Maoist propaganda agencies urged the people "to prepare for war" and "to be always ready to repulse a surprise attack by the Soviet revisionists."⁷

The moulding of the "new man", of the "rust-proof cog of Chairman Mao" occupied a prominent place in the campaign. The propaganda agencies urged that, in the education of the youth, attention should be paid only to their being "well-grounded in politics", and not "to the quality of education."⁸ Such an approach to the education of the younger generation was not accidental: in order to "implement the line of Chairman Mao", one had to be, in the words of *Kwangming Jihpao*, "a revolutionary fool of the Lei Feng type."⁹ This could be done only on the basis of "Mao Tse-tung's thought".

Intensifying "the struggle against Confucianism" and for the defence of "Legism" during the campaign, the Maoist theorists were thoroughly revising the entire history of China with the aim of creating a new conception of the "national destiny" of China. It was based on the idea of the exclusive, everlasting, and world-wide historical significance of the Chinese nation. In keeping with this premise, any actions, even the most barbarous, for instance, the rule of such despotic emperors

as Chin Shih-huan and Hun Wu-ti, was to be praised and glorified.

One of the results of the "cultural revolution" had been the growing influence of the army in the country. However, the strengthening of the army and the combined of discharge political, administrative and government functions by the military had resulted in the emergence of centrifugal trends in China. Regionalism had become especially widespread among the local military commands after the removal of Lin Piao. The old army cadres were naturally worried over what would happen to them during the purge of "Lin Piao's supporters". On the other hand, the Maoist line of "self-reliance", as mentioned earlier, had created economic preconditions for intensified regionalism. During the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", the Peking leadership endeavoured to tighten the control of the central bodies over those in the provinces. Along with the widespread criticism of the "individual princes", the Maoists proceeded to promote at a rapid pace new functionaries from amongst the *hungweipings* and *tsaofans*, called up for army service in the previous years. The vigorous attempts in the course of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" to renew the army all the way up to divisional level with promoted activists of the "cultural revolution" testified to the obvious intentions of the Maoists to build up a solid and devoted core in the army, which continued to be the main pillar of the regime.

One of the major tasks, which the campaign was supposed to accomplish, was to overcome the widespread negative attitude towards the "cultural revolution". In February 1974, the magazine *Hungchi* urged that, by means of the struggle for criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, deliver a decisive counter-blow at slander and attacks against the great "cultural revolution."¹⁰ That same month, *Jenmin Jihpao* lamented that a sharp struggle was still going on over the question of the attitude towards the "cultural revolution", "either to reinforce and develop the great achievements of this revolution or to fight and negate it."¹¹

The justification of the "cultural revolution" during the campaign was closely bound with another, no less important, task

of the campaign namely, the suppression of anti-Mao sentiments in the Party and state apparatus, in the army, at enterprises, in offices, and among various strata of the population. Broadly speaking, the main targets of the campaign were the Chinese people and the main aim was the stamping out of their striving for a better life. For this purpose, use was made of the "case of Lin Piao" and the alleged political platform of the former Defence Minister and his "supporters". A study of this platform, as given in Chinese press, convinces one that the crux of the matter was the struggle of the Maoists against the socialist aspirations of the Chinese people. "The struggle between us (i.e., the supporters of Mao's 'line'—*Authors*) and the anti-Party group of Lin Piao is a struggle on the question of negation or affirmation of the great proletarian cultural revolution," said *Jenmin Jihpao* in 1974.¹²

The Maoist propaganda agencies were, thus, forced to admit that the campaign reflected a sharp conflict between two trends in Chinese society—Maoist and anti-Maoist—manifested in the spontaneous resistance of the masses, including a part of the cadres.

2. *Distorting the Past to Serve the Present*

The mass political and ideological campaign, which began in China in August 1973 under the slogan of "criticism of Confucius", was a specific Maoist version of associating political thinking of the past with the struggle for power among the Maoist groups in the Peking leadership and with the struggle against anti-Maoist sentiments in China. The fact that the attitude towards the political teachings of olden times and their contemporary assessment came into the spotlight at this stage of political struggle in China was not accidental. On the one hand, it showed the tremendous role played by political and ideological traditions of the past in the Chinese political system, and, on the other, the deepening crisis of the ideology of Maoism, which at that stage was increasingly drawing upon arguments from the realm of purely Chinese traditional political thinking, no longer sticking only to speculating on Marxist political theory.

Despite all efforts of the Maoists, the campaign from the very outset failed to take on a scientific character. The Maoists sought to give the "criticism of Confucius" the semblance of scientific polemics on questions of the philosophy, history and culture of ancient and medieval China. Articles were contributed by eminent philosophers, such as Yang Yung-kuo and Peng Yu-lan, but the nature and the content of the campaign left no doubt whatsoever that, under the guise of a "scientific" discussion, the struggle within the Party was continuing, embracing all spheres of the Chinese leadership and affecting all problems of the nation. The Peking propaganda agencies themselves emphasised that "in its real sense, the criticism of Confucius is a political struggle,"¹³ a struggle "between the revolutionary masses and the anti-party group of Lin Piao,"¹⁴ a struggle that was "being waged on the principle of 'either they beat us or we beat them',"¹⁵ and "in which Chairman Mao has taken over personal leadership and is pointing out the way."¹⁶ In other words, science had clearly nothing to do with this entire matter.

The narrow utilitarian nature of the campaign was most clearly seen in the following tasks of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", as enumerated in an editorial in the *Jenmin Jihpao* of February 20, 1974 : (a) "To level criticism at such crimes of the anti-party group of Lin Piao as negation of the cultural revolution, and negation of Chairman Mao's basic theory and main practice in the field of the socialist revolution and socialist construction"; (b) "To criticise all their attempts to revive everything revisionist"; (c) "To criticise their attacks against the new phenomena which emerged during the cultural revolution (what was meant here was the banishment of youth to permanent settlement in far-off areas, the deportation of high-ranking functionaries who disagreed with Maoism to unguarded camps, the so-called "May 7 schools" for "re-education", etc.—*Authors*)"; (d) "To subject to criticism the attempts of the anti-party group of Lin Piao to capitulate to the Soviet revisionists."¹⁷

One may ask : why did the Peking propaganda agencies have to go way back to antiquity, dig up the philosophical legacy of Confucius, "reject things of old for the sake of those

of the present", and "overthrow the temple of Confucius?" In order to answer this question, it is necessary to make a short digression into history.

The teaching of Confucius appeared in a highly complicated and, in many respects, a turning period in the development of ancient Chinese society in the 6th-5th centuries B.C., when China consisted of a large number of small principalities warring among themselves. It was an era of the decline of the rule of the hereditary aristocracy, a period of fragmentation, of internecine wars between the independent princes, and the resistance of the well-to-do, free members of the community, merchants, landowners, and of slaves against the domination of the hereditary aristocracy. The extremely rigid and hierarchical nature of family ties from top to bottom imparted specific features to the process of the transformation of tribal administrative bodies into state bodies, and contributed to the very early elevation and, to a greater degree, of independence and domination of state authority in relation to society.

Contrary to Maoist propaganda statements during the campaign, the teaching of Confucius must be examined in close connection with "Legism", because both schools exerted an influence on one another, and, in the long run, a synthesis of their main propositions took place in canonised Confucianism.

Both Confucius and the "Legists" were ideologists of the emerging system of a bureaucratic state administration, but represented two different trends in its development—a moderate and conservative trend, and a radical and despotic trend.

Confucianism favoured the building of a new state apparatus with reliance on the ethical and cultural traditions of the patriarchal and tribal system, and with emphasis on moral and ethical methods of social control.

The "Legists" (for instance, Shang Yang) endeavoured to create and consolidate a centralised state on the basis of the principles that : "a slow-witted and ignorant nation constitutes a great force," and "a weak nation makes up a strong state". In their struggle against the features of the patriarchal and tribal system, which prevented total control, the "Legists" pushed to the forefront the punitive function of the state, defined through a system of administrative injunctions and

laws (*fa*). It is clear, therefore, why the Peking propaganda agencies vociferously talked about the "irreconcilability" of Confucianism and "Legism", and about the "need for fighting the philosophy of reverence for Confucianism and the negation of 'Legism'."¹⁸ The apologia for "Legism" advanced by the Peking ideologists had several practical aims. First, by justifying the "Legist" emperor Chin Shih-huang, who had ordered Confucian books to be burnt and 460 Confucian scientists to be buried alive, and by describing this as "revolutionary criticism of an old culture and the rooting out of reactionary forces within political power."¹⁹ the Maoists tried to substantiate the inevitability of the excesses of the "cultural revolution" of 1966-1969, when books were burnt and when the *hungweipings* had destroyed cultural relics everywhere, and the need for a new "cultural revolution". Secondly, the connection between Chin Shih-huang and Mao Tse-tung is obvious. It is common knowledge that at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Eighth Convocation, in 1958, Mao Tse-tung had praised the despotic emperor, Chin Shih-huang. Broad use was made of this during the campaign.²⁰ Vindication of Chin Shih-huang meant vindication of the atrocities of the "cultural revolution". And the "Great Helmsman", who had unleashed it, was vindicated and glorified. Thirdly, the Maoists invoked "Legism" to substantiate their notorious "thesis" about the Chinese people, who allegedly were like a "clean sheet of paper". The Maoists needed a "slow-witted and ignorant people" in order to conduct from time to time purges like the one that was going on and, in this way, to divert attention from the urgent problems of improvement of the living standards of the Chinese people. By exaggerating the differences between Confucianism and "Legism", the Peking propagandists were trying to find a justification for their anti-Leninist political line.

The Maoists ignored the fact that "Legism" was not at all a really progressive alternative to Confucianism, as they wanted to prove. In no way did "Legism" "accord with the interests of the working people,"²¹ as was proclaimed by Maoist propaganda. It expressed the interests of the emergent state bureaucracy. What united the teachings of Confucius and the "Legists" was that both substantiated the domination of the

bureaucratic elite, which demanded absolute submission of the entire people. That was why a synthesis of Confucianism and Legism in canonised Confucianism was natural. The latest ideological campaign of the Maoists showed that closest of all to the "orthodox" Maoists were the "Legist" features of canonised Confucianism, and even the "Legist" teaching in its "pure" form, when it was still opposed to the teaching of Confucius in the epoch of "warring kingdoms". The Maoists openly adopted the reactionary aspects of the ideology of "Legism" in their struggle for power, reviving in this way the old despotic teaching under the guise of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung".

In contraposing the teaching of Confucius to that of the "Legists", the Maoists deliberately distorted their concrete historical content and close interconnection.

The main concept of the teaching of Confucius was that of *jen* (humaneness, love of mankind). Its full meaning was concretised in a whole number of principles connected with it, which meant a manifestation of *jen* in one situation or another : *hsiao* (filial respect), *chung* (loyalty to the emperor), *i* (duty), *hsin* (faithfulness, sincerity), *jen* (love of mankind), *shu* (forgiveness), or in such a principle as "do not do unto others what you would not like to be done unto you". It is quite clear that these principles were of the nature of primitive humanism, and bore the imprint of ancient Chinese society. The way for a man to achieve *jen* was to follow *li* (ceremony, etiquette)—the whole complex of moral and ethical principles and traditional rules established by the forefathers and the wise rulers of antiquity. These were not only legal customs in a modern sense, but also ceremonial rites, etiquette, and outward forms of human conduct.

Confucius was of the opinion that "a man must not look, listen, talk and act in defiance of *li*." These principles were supposed to cement the ruling aristocracy, regulate its relations, reinforce imperial rule of the type of the slave-owning system in the Western Chou, and substantiate the ideological dominance of the slave-owners under the aegis of the emperor. The main idea running through Confucianism was that of submissiveness. It was an idea of non-resistance to exploitation and oppression,

and forbiddance of "encroachments upon power". It should be emphasised here that the dogmas of Confucius were supposed to be spread and asserted among the ruling class in order to strengthen its rule. The attitude of Confucianism to the ordinary people was highly contemptuous and reactionary. It was typical of Confucius, as an ideologist of the aristocracy, in general, to despise the ordinary people and to hold work in contempt. He regarded as predestined the existence of common-folk and noblemen, and demanded that one should resign himself to his fate and should submit to his sovereign. The idea of submissiveness from top to bottom was one of the principal canons of Confucianism: elder brothers had to be respected by the younger ones, subjects had to be obedient to their rulers. The same direction was followed by another idea of Confucius, that of "correcting names", i.e., everyone was supposed to occupy the place assigned to him by God. The calls of Confucius for the "restoration of ritual", "the golden mean", "condescension", etc., were likewise solely aimed at consolidating the rule of the aristocracy.

Instead of making a class, Marxist-Leninist analysis of the teaching of Confucius, the Maoist propagandists resorted to a mere negation of the canons of Confucianism in line with the requirements of internal political struggle. But, at the same time, they were unable to disclose the essence of the teaching of Confucius, to show the truly reactionary character of his idea of a state system.

This reactionary character consisted in Confucius' teaching on the preservation of retrograde relations of rule—subordination in conditions of an emerging bureaucratic state system. Confucius saw a guarantee of stability and effectiveness of this system in transplanting into it the most patriarchal form of subordination, that of seniority in the family. This made a person more submissive and prevented his development as an individual and the gaining of further freedom. The common people were like junior members of a family who had to obey the senior members. Confucius observed that an obedient person in the family was seldom disobedient to the rulers.

Confucius' principle of "humaneness" stemmed precisely from the lack of rights of the people and was aimed

at fostering submissiveness and obedience to the rulers. Confucius' hope of ensuring a "good government" was pinned on good and wise rulers and high officials who would recognise his teaching and exercise self-restraint and would not mistreat the people and neglect their interests.

The bureaucratic state system replaced the patriarchal and tribal institutions and developed on the basis of their anti-democratic traditions. Its principles were mechanical subordination of the people and hierarchical centralisation. Confucius claimed that "a people should be forced to keep to the given course, but must not be told the reason why. The ordinary people must not discuss matters of government." Such was Confucius' contemptuous opinion of the ethical values of the ordinary people and the ability of the common people to understand "humaneness".

Confucianism, with its conservative humanism, ideologically disarmed the people in the struggle for the democratisation of the state system. It naturally turned into the ideological foundation of a developed system of manipulation of an individual and the masses as a whole, and an uncritical perception of views of the political leadership. Maoism adopted this reactionary tradition.

The Mao personality cult was built on the foundation of the centuries-old Confucian tradition. Confucius first glorified Wen Wang (the first legendary Emperor of the Chou Dynasty, 12th-3rd centuries B.C.). Later it was Confucius who was glorified. And now what was being witnessed was the glorification of the "Great Helmsman", of "Chairman Mao, the reddest sun". This had roots in the presentation of Confucius as the "wisest man", whose orders must be obeyed by the rulers on earth, and under the "radiant beams" of whose ideas life would prosper on earth.

The cult of Mao and the cult of Confucius were united by a common ideological principle of dogmatism and subjectivism. Take, for instance, one of the forms of propaganda of "Mao-Tse-tung's thought", which consisted in the mass learning by rote of quotations from the "works of Chairman Mao". Did this not remind one of the medieval learning by rote of Confucius' famous "Four Books"? Like Confucianism, the dogmatism

of Mao Tse-tung stamped out living thought in China, and turned people into "obedient oxen" of "Chairman Mao". The deification of "Chairman Mao" and worship of his "omnipotent thought" served, on the one hand, as the main support of the Maoist group in the pursuit of its policy of stupefying the people, of fostering in them loyalism and thoughtless uncritical subordination, and, on the other, as "justification" for the annihilation of millions of peoples suspected of being disloyal to the authorities.

In the course of nearly two millenia, Confucianism was the only philosophical and ethical basis which determined social consciousness in China. Therefore, it can be said in all confidence that without Confucianism it is impossible to understand the traditional mentality and psychology of the Chinese nation.

The learning by heart, cultivated by the feudal lords, of Confucius' dogmas from generation to generation because a national tradition. For this reason, Chinese upbringing and education were traditionally Confucian, and owing to this every Chinese to some extent or the other was and still remains a Confucianist. Naturally, this does not mean that he is familiar with all Confucian dogmas. It only means that he interprets Confucius' instructions as traditions handed down to him by his forefathers.

Confucianism exerted an extraordinary influence on a whole number of trends of social thought in China. It had also left an imprint on the shaping of the world outlook of Mao Tse-tung. The "Great Helmsman" was a product of a backward, semi-feudal China. He was brought up in a well-to do *kulak* family. The small-proprietor environment and ideology, moods and attitudes were incomparably closer to him than the proletarian ideology. Like many people of his generation, Mao Tse-tung had received an education which was traditional for the period and consisted in the learning by rote of Confucius' "Four Books". Throughout his whole life, Mao had worshipped Confucius. He had "befittingly" visited the grave of Confucius back in 1919 at the height of the "May 4 movement" which "overthrew the temple of Confucius". The propaganda agencies credited Mao Tse-tung with all the "successes" of this movement! It is amazing how "forgetful" the

Peking ideologists could be !

In fact, in Mao Tse-tung one could see a traditional Chinese thinker acting, however, in the 20th century, and, for this reason, adopting (naturally, in a re-shaped fashion) those elements of contemporary theoretical thought, which he needed and could somehow understand.

Eye-witnesses had noted that Mao Tse-tung's handbooks were a complete collection of Chinese encyclopaedias, old treatises, and Chinese literature of antiquity. They were the source of his wisdom, and especially the works of Confucius, whom he frequently quoted. The only spiritual interests that existed for him were Chinese culture and Chinese history. The culture of old China was a subject of particular esteem; Mao had never doubted its absolute superiority over any other culture.

That is precisely why, as *Pravda* observed editorially, Maoism "constitutes a reactionary, utopian and petty-bourgeois conception, which on a theoretical plane is an eclectic mixture of the most diverse outlooks containing elements of Confucianism, anarchism, Trotskyism and petty-bourgeois nationalism. Mao adopted the most conservative aspects of the philosophy of Confucianism, and especially the preaching of the spirit of submissiveness, the glorification of authoritarian power, and the cult of the supreme ruler."

As was observed by Academician A.M. Rumyantsev, "Maoism would not have prevailed in China (even for a time) had it not leaned upon the millennia-old traditions of submissiveness to power, to its bureaucratic apparatus, and especially to Great-Han chauvinism," i.e., on all that which for centuries Confucianism had fostered among the people and which Maoism was using in the latest campaign.

Mao frequently and unconditionally relied on old Chinese sources, and, first of all, on the Confucian canonical books. For instance, in his work, *On New Democracy*, so intensively studied during the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" Mao had quoted a well-known supporter of Confucius, Chu Hsi, who had said that "people must be governed on the basis of human principles". Vera Golubnichy, a prominent American Sinologist, found that 22 per cent of all the quotations in the four-volume collection of the works of Mao

Tse-tung had been borrowed from Confucius and neo-Confucians,²³ whereas those from the works of Marx and Engels accounted for only about four per cent. It should be pointed out here that Mao Tse-tung made use of the classics of Marxism-Leninism in the traditional Confucian manner, i.e., snatching isolated words and phrases out of context, without grasping the essence of the Marxist-Leninist teaching.

When formulating his "thought," Mao not only followed the concrete content of old Chinese traditions, but also tried to dress them up in the traditional Confucian form of quotations: "three things you must do and three things you must not", "three things that must be carried out in three revolutionary movements", etc.

One of the basic conceptions of Mao borrowed from Confucian canons was the leading role of ideas and politics in society, which found expression in the widely-known thesis that "politics is the commanding force". Many theses of Confucianism were incorporated in Mao's social "thought", for instance, the propagation of asceticism and self-sacrifice and the condemnation of "egoism" and "economism" as material stimuli. Naturally, Maoism did not object to the Confucian cult of a "strong man", by whose will the people, like the mythical Yu Kung, "move mountains".

In the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", the Maoists conducted a broad offensive against the vital interests of the working people. They popularised the slogan: "politics is the commanding force," which constituted a form of administrative compulsion of the working people. In February 1974, *Jenmin Jihpao* published a "revolutionary wallposter of the workers of the Tienchin rug mill", which proclaimed material incentives to be "erroneous from the standpoint of Chairman Mao's course."²⁴ The renunciation by the Maoists of the principle of material incentive to some extent went back to the neo-Confucian theory of Chu Hsi (11th century) even though this philosopher was being attacked by the propagandists along with Confucius. Chu Hsi demanded that a man should curb his desire for material benefits. He saw an earnest of success here in the strict education of the people in the Confucian spirit. And the same thing was demanded by the Maoist propaganda

agencies which stressed that "the great cultural revolution and the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius are a powerful motive force of socialist production,"²⁴ and "that in order to engage successfully in production, it is necessary, first of all, to grasp the fight of the two lines."²⁵

Thus, in "Mao Tse-tung's thought" there was a good deal of what had been borrowed from "old man Confucius", as the Chinese philosopher of antiquity was called by the propagandists. For instance, the "Great Helmsman" had found in Confucianism "evidence" of "Sinicized Marxism". A collection of articles by Kuo Mo-jo, published in 1950, included an allegorical one under the title, "Laughter in the Underground". It was written in the twenties, and the heading then was: "A Visit by Marx to the Temple of Confucius". The article was reprinted with the obvious knowledge of Mao Tse-tung. Confucius was presented here as a noble and wise man of antiquity, whereas Marx was portrayed as a "whiskered crayfish talking in a bird's language". The reader was told that, during the conversation of the two sages, Marx had offered nothing new. All he had said and written had long ago been expressed by Confucius. The following words were attributed to Marx: "I never expected that I already had such an esteemed like-minded friend way out in the Far East nearly 2,000 years ago. Our views are absolutely identical."

A critical reappraisal and the debunking of the reactionary Confucian legacy could have played a positive role in the spiritual emancipation of the people of China. However, the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" left no doubt whatsoever that it pursued altogether different aims far removed from history, and, moreover, from the Marxist-Leninist analysis of Confucianism. In this connection, *Kwangming Jihpao* said at the very beginning of the campaign, when attempts were still being made to give it a scientific semblance: "In developing the revolution in the field of superstructure, along with the criticism of revisionism and the bourgeois world outlook, it is necessary to launch criticism of Confucius in order to knock the ground from under the ideology of revisionism, which is growing on the soil of old traditions.... Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and others like

them intended to restore capitalism, and, for this reason, they tried to appeal to the spirit of the dead Confucius."²⁶ It is clear that what was meant here was a fresh purge in the Peking leadership, and indicated a new stage of the struggle for power among Mao Tse-tung's associates. As a matter of fact, Peking made no secret of this. It loudly proclaimed that "the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius has nothing to do with science."²⁷ and that this was a "class struggle, the central issue of which is that of power", whereas "history is only a mirror of the present struggle."²⁹

In this respect, the campaign served as a convenient screen for Maoism and a sphere of action for the "left" Maoists who had launched the campaign. They had come to power in the then Peking leadership on the wave of the "cultural revolution". The more than two-millennia-old history of Confucianism provides ample historical material for seeking out historical parallels, and allusions to modern personalities and events. The campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" served as a smokescreen for the internal political struggle for power between the Maoist groups in Peking. In this sense, history made it possible, without naming names, to attack political opponents, to come forth with one's platform for the future state system of China following Mao's departure and to fight for influence in the Party, the army, and the state apparatus. In the light of the well-known facts, the attempts of the Maoists to present "Chairman Mao" as a "consistent fighter against the Confucius clique" cannot be taken seriously, to say the least. In this connection, it was not accidental that in the whole course of the campaign only *one* article, by Ching Chih-po, was published where an effort was made to portray Mao Tse-tung as a "staunch fighter" against Confucius and Confucianism, while "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was "basically the opposite of the teaching of Confucius and Mencius."³⁰ In fact, Ching Chi-po's article contained nothing but sheer propaganda pronouncements. Indeed, it was very hard to prove that which could not be proved: in Maoism, Confucianism stuck out a mile.

3. *The Struggle Between the Two Lines*

In the report which he delivered at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council, stated: "The downfall of the anti-party group of Lin Piao does not mean an end of the struggle between the two lines in the Party....The struggle of the two lines...will continue for a long time to come. It will be repeated another 10, 20, 30 times, and people of the type of Lin Piao, Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, Peng Te-huai and Kao Kang will reappear. This does not depend on the will of men."³¹ This was how the Maoists oriented the country towards repeated purges of the opponents of Maoism. Admitting and asserting "for ever" the struggle between two lines in China, Mao Tse-tung's group demonstrated its utter inability to deal with the widespread anti-Maoist sentiments in the country.

In the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", the Maoists drew a parallel between the "struggle [between the two lines] in China and the 'struggle between the 'Legists' and Confucianists.'" In the opinion of the Peking ideologists, "'Legism' reflected the political and economic requirements of the new class of landlords, and developed in a sharp struggle against Confucianism."³² The reasons for these historical remarks of the Maoist propagandists were quite clear; they wanted to show the "firmness and everlasting character" of Mao's teaching on the "struggle between the two lines", and to present it as an "objective law", which had even existed in hoary antiquity.

Ignoring some facts and exaggerating others, the Maoists endeavoured to "substantiate" the "struggle between Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the revisionist line of the Lin Piao-type scoundrels."

One could not but agree with the Maoists that an acute struggle was going on in China between two trends, the Maoist and the anti-Maoist, the latter being manifested in the spontaneous resistance of the masses. That is why the Maoists declared, "The struggle between the Confucianists and anti-Confucianists has long followed the principle: either they beat us or we beat them.....This struggle, in the final analysis, always

revolves round the question of power."³³ This admission reflected the true balance of forces in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius"; anti-Maoist resistance was growing, and doubts were being raised about the future of Maoism.

The Peking propaganda agencies characterised the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" as a "struggle between us and the anti-party group of Lin Piao,"³⁴ as a "struggle against scoundrels of the types of Lin Piao and Confucius."³⁵ As for the "line" of these "scoundrels", it reflected resistance to "Chairman Mao's line" in the enterprises, communes, institutions, educational establishments, etc. It turned out that there were quite a few such "scoundrels".

In the field of economy, this line was called "a revisionist line in the running of the enterprises".

What was this so-called "revisionist line in the running of enterprises"? The journal, *Hungchi*, outlined the main criteria in assessing this line: "either adhere to the principle that politics is the commanding force, or advance production targets to the forefront; either strengthen the management of an enterprise by leaning on the masses (i.e., hold rallies in working hours, hound the leadership, etc.—*Authors*), or do this with the masses gripped in a vice of rules and regulations; either respect the creative spirit of the masses and develop technology and production, or curb the activity of the masses and grovel before things foreign"³⁶ (i.e., continue using obsolete equipment, and under no circumstances think of making purchases abroad, —*Authors*).

Hungchi admitted in the summer of 1974 that many plant managers "still consider that running the enterprise with the old methods is very good, that old methods should be used, that the old way is customary, and that in order that assignments are carried out successfully, it is necessary to pay more."³⁷ It is quite clear that it was those executives who were inclined to pursue normal methods of management, like material incentives and bonuses, and rejected the "Great Helmsman's" economic conceptions, who were persecuted first of all. It was precisely such people who stood behind the authors of the sensational drama, *Three Visits of Taofeng*,

staged in China in February 1974. According to *Jenmin Jihpao*, it "discredits and abuses the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao, hinting that the cause of socialism in China has suffered from 'giddiness', that it 'must not gallop' like a flogged racehorse and that 'lessons must be learnt' from the races in the past."³⁸

In the people's communes, the peasants expressed dissatisfaction with the Maoist policy of "preparation for war", under the pretext of which grain was confiscated from the population allegedly for, "the building-up of reserves in the event of war and natural disasters." Because of this it was natural that the peasants, as *Jenmin Jihpao* put it, "went away at harvest time to find employment in urban communities and did not come back home."³⁹ This was their way of expressing their negative attitude towards the Maoists' policy in the countryside.

An important place in the campaign was occupied by the struggle against the "revisionist line" among the intelligentsia. Maoism had long shown its hostility towards Chinese culture, towards the historical legacy of the Chinese people. The latest campaign reaffirmed this fact. However, the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" showed at the same time that the Maoists had failed to break the resistance of the Chinese intelligentsia, and that behind the "revisionist line" lay the opposition of the latter to the policy of Mao Tse-tung's group in the cultural sphere.

In the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", as during the "cultural revolution", the Chinese intelligentsia was subjected to the most refined persecution. *Kwangming Jihpao* said that "the campaign of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius has a direct connection with the intelligentsia, because erroneous ideology is widespread in its midst."⁴⁰ What did this "erroneous ideology" amount to? The Peking propagandists pointed out that the Chinese intellectuals "rejected the cultural revolution" and the so-called "revolution in education"⁴¹ (the cancelling of examinations, enrolment in higher schools of only politically reliable applicants, spying on teachers and attacking them, etc.). In addition, the teachers correctly pointed out the "inferior quality of education, and

regarded present-day Chinese students as not being real students."⁴² They "gave lukewarm reception" to the former *hung-weipings* and *tsaofans* when they came to the higher schools.

In the field of literature and art, *Hungchi* considered as a "wrong style" among the intellectuals the so-called "four old styles": "the propagation of harmful stories, harmful operas plays and shows".⁴³ One such harmful play in 1974 was the abovementioned *Three Visits of Taofeng*, which the press compared with the widely-known drama by Wu Hang, *The Demotion of Hai Jui*.

The Peking ideologists did not forget the masterpieces of world culture. In the "authoritative" opinion of *Hungchi*, "the compositions of Bach, Beethoven and Mozart express the ideas, sentiments and political requirements of the bourgeoisie."⁴⁴ According to the same paper, the Chinese music critics, who popularised these works, had lost their sense of vigilance in relation to the "infiltration of imperialist and social-imperialist culture."⁴⁵

Thus, the desire to preserve and bring the treasures of world culture within the reach of the Chinese people was regarded as seditious, and for this the intellectuals were publicly dishonoured, attacked and hounded.

The whole of this struggle between "Mao's line" and the line of the majority of the Chinese people for development along the socialist road was manifested most strikingly and in a concentrated form in the "accusations" levelled at Lin Piao, the main target of the campaign. In reality, these charges represented in effect the sum and substance of the views of the anti-Maoist elements. If one ignores the personal attacks against Lin Piao as a follower of Confucius and charges of striving to establish a "feudal dynasty" in China, he was accused, above all, of setting the task of all-out effort for socialist construction", and of championing the "development of production", in defiance of the Maoist "theory" of "a continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", which repeated the Trotskyite idea of a "permanent revolution". Further, Lin Piao was accused of characterising the "great leap", and the people's communes as an "exaggeration and vaulting",

the political methods of Maoism as "despotic autocracy", the "cultural revolution" as "brutal internecine murder", the "May 7 schools" for functionaries as "modified unemployment", the exile of the youth to the rural and mountainous areas as "ineffective use of great abilities," etc. The abovementioned comments and remarks can hardly be regarded as anti-socialist. Regardless of whether or not Lin Piao was their author, their existence testified to the fact that there were leaders in the People's Republic of China who had a sober approach to major political problems, and that the Chinese people entertained strong sentiments for real socialism, which the Maoists labelled as "revisionism".

4. Chin Shih-huan and Mao Tse-tung

A prominent place in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" was occupied by the praising of the old despotic emperor Chin Shih-huan (3rd Century B.C.) and his reign. The propaganda agencies claimed that it was "necessary to approve the burning of Confucian books and the burying alive of Confucian scholars,"⁴⁶ and that "Chin Shih-huan was an outstanding politician,"⁴⁷ etc.

Who was Chin Shih-huan and what was he "famous" for? It is generally known that Chin Shih-huan was always considered to be a synonym for brutality and despotism. A noted historian of the People's Republic of China, Shang Yueh, characterising the reign of this emperor, stressed the "savage and harsh nature of his policy, which exhausted tremendous manpower and material resources of China and crippled social production."⁴⁸ In his essay, "Lu Pu-wei and Criticism of Government in the Chin Principality", published in 1966, Kuo Mo-jo, at that time President of the Academy of Sciences of the PRC, had said: "Chin Shih-huan was, indeed, a despotic man of unheard of cruelty. He ran everything by himself; the Ministers and high-ranking officials were simply his tools, while the scholars and craftsmen only thought of earning a living. Under his reign, the Celestial Kingdom was the kingdom of a jailor."⁴⁹

And then, suddenly, in 1972, Kuo Mo-jo made a *volte-face*. In his article entitled "Problems of the Periodisation of Ancient

Chinese History,"⁵⁰ he stated that "attacks against Chin Shih-huan are a blow at the revolution".

However, there was nothing surprising in this, considering Mao's attitude towards Chin Shih-huan.

"Chairman Mao" was always excited and tempted by the images of such ancient emperors as Chin Shih-huan and Hang Wu-ti. In his book, *Red Star Over China*, Edgar Snow cites one of his talks with Mao Tse-tung, in which the latter spoke of his admiration for Emperor Chin Shih-huan. In his poem, "Snow", written in 1945, Mao included Chin Shih-huan, Hang Wu-ti, Genghis Khan, and others of their kind among "well-known heroes", whereas in the same poem Mao placed himself above these emperors and called himself a "true hero". Already at that time Mao regarded himself as an emperor of the Chin Shih-huan type. In the winter of 1948 and early in 1949, when the People's Liberation Army of China was preparing to enter Peking, Mao Tse-tung kept telling the members of the Central Committee: "When I read novels in my youth, I often thought how wonderful it would be to be an emperor! We will soon be entering Peking. And as soon as we do this, I will be the emperor, won't I?" Following the entry of the Liberation Army into Peking, Mao began regarding himself as "an emperor in new conditions." At the same time, on his orders, the Main Political Department of the Liberation Army officially arranged lectures in the army units on the subject, "Chairman Mao is the New Emperor".

Also well known in China was Mao Tse-tung's speech at the Second Session of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China on May 8, 1958. He lamented over the fact that "Chin Shih-huan is not being used as an example. He buried alive only 460 Confucianists, whereas we buried 46,000.... However, we have not yet killed all the counter-revolutionary intellectuals. I entered into polemics with a democrat on this point. He cursed us as Chin Shih-huanists and despots. We admit this from beginning to end."⁵¹

The propaganda agencies now began referring extensively to this speech of Mao. It was an open secret in China that, in the campaign, Chin Shih-huan stood for "Chairman Mao" himself. Furthermore, in a classified Party document of the Maoists,

Chanwang, No. 4 of January 13, 1972, which contained the full text of the "Theses on 'Objective 571'"⁵², Lin Piao had frankly called Mao Tse-tung a "modern-day Chin Shih-huan."⁵³ This being so, the propagandists exerted every effort to whitewash Mao-Chin Shih-huan and his policy, which was totally incompatible with socialism.

Chin Shih-huan kept in deep secret all information concerning his whereabouts and movements, which was mainly explained by the awareness that, on account of the great number of crimes committed by him, he had become an object of nationwide hatred, and that in each man he saw a potential threat to his life. Was not the "Great Helmsman" leading the same kind of life? Did not his crimes exceed those of Chin Shih-huan?

In September 1973, *Jenmin Jihpao* said: "The burning of Confucian books and the burying alive of Confucian scholars were progressive measures in the spirit of 'power in present times—weakness in the past'."⁵⁴ (These were Mao's words at the abovementioned Second Session of the Eighth Congress—*Authors*).

This was how the propagandists went in for the allegorical eulogy of "Chairman Mao" and his infamous "cultural revolution". Indeed, was it not on Mao's instructions to "combine Marx with Chin Shih-huan" that the *hungweipings* had built bonfires of books, staged show trials of the intellectuals, looted museums, and defiled Chinese culture? Chin Shih-huan had only burnt Confucian books, whereas all books, except the "works of Chairman Mao", were fed to the "cultural revolution" bonfires. This certainly showed that the "modern-day Chin Shih-huan" had outdone his counterpart of antiquity.

On the other hand, this was overt propaganda of violent treatment of opponents. Intimidation had long been a method of the Maoists in the implementation of their policy. Mao Tse-tung himself had stated back in 1958: "The main thing is to frighten the people". Under the pretext of lauding Chin Shih-huan, the authorities and their agencies were, thus, whitewashing Mao Tse-tung and his anti-popular policy, waging a struggle against humanism, justice and legality, trying to remove

all ideological and moral obstacles whatsoever in the path of misrule, arbitrariness, and lynching of opposition forces, and propagating the cult of violence and pogroms.

5. *Question of Control Over the Army*

One of the directions that could be traced in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" was the struggle against "parochialism" of the regional military leaders and for the complete power of the "leftists" over the People's Liberation Army.

The question, for the Maoists, of either "support for centralised power" or decentralisation was a "fundamental one affecting the state system and the very essence of political power."⁵⁵ The men behind the campaign saw in the empire of Chin Shih-huan a prototype of such centralised power.

Mao Tse-tung regarded the army as one of the main instruments of his military-bureaucratic dictatorship. For him this was the most important apparatus for the suppression of all opposition. As V.I. Lenin had said, "The pogrom-makers need the army as an instrument for pogroms."⁵⁶

It was quite obvious that the Maoist regime could not exist without relying on the army and without according it an active role in the life of society. The army was needed by the opposing groups in Peking. For instance, Premier Chou En-lai had stated in the spring of 1971: "We are all connected with the army."⁵⁷ During the "cultural revolution", Chiang Ching had also underlined the importance of the army for the Maoist regime: "Whom can we rely upon if not the army?"

At the same time, the "September crisis" of 1971 had shown most clearly the danger of the growing influence of the army for the Maoist regime. For these and other reasons, the Maoists were faced with the vital problem of control over the army, camouflaged as propaganda of Chin Shih-huan's centralised empire.

Chin Shih-huan's brutality and despotism were explained by "support for centralised power."⁵⁸ It was pointed out that "this struggle continues to this day."⁵⁹ Criticising "the independent princes of antiquity, and the apologists for decentralisation and insubordination to central power," the propaganda

agencies stressed their following attributes: personal troops, concentration of military, political and economic power in the provinces, insubordination to the central bodies, etc.⁶⁰ The parallel became clearer when in the summer of 1974 Kwang-ming Jihpao pointed out that the old term, "independent princes and their domains" denoted in the present times "local militarists."⁶¹

Evidently, in this sense, "the Confucians of today, scoundrels of the Lin Piao type,"⁶² could be easily recognised in the regional commanders.

Despite a number of difficulties, the offensive of the "leftists" during and after the 10th Congress of the CPC, who utilised the urban workers' militia and the "criticism of Confucius" campaign, was successful to some extent. This ultimately led to an unprecedented reshuffle of commanders of large military areas in December 1973.

These military leaders represented strong army groups, and local Party, administrative and military power was concentrated in their hands. The removal of Lin Piao in 1971 and the purge in 1972-1973 of the top military leadership in the People's Liberation Army, and especially among the commands of military areas, resulted in the strengthening of centrifugal trends.

An attempt was made right after the "September crisis" to end the system by which a single person could hold more than one office. The commanders of the bigger military areas simultaneously held the posts of secretaries of Party committees and chairmen of "revolutionary committees" of the provinces. For instance, in 1972, Wang Pi-cheng was appointed commander of the Kunming military district and Second Party Secretary of Yunnan Province (he subsequently became a member of the CPC Central Committee of the 10th Convocation). He did not gain promotion to the posts of First Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of the "revolutionary committee" of Yunnan Province: they were given to a civilian, Chou Hsing. Chin Chi-wei became the commander of the Chengtu military area in the summer of 1973, but neither First Secretary nor Chairman of the "revolutionary committee" of Szechuan Province.⁶³ In that period, Yang Yung was appointed commander of the Sinkiang military area.⁶⁴

However, the situation in the provinces, as a whole, did not change much. The above-mentioned purges and appointments did not seriously alter the structure of power in the provinces.

By August 1973, the share of representatives of the "leftist" group in the organs of power at the provincial level had increased by only two per cent, whereas the share of the military had remained practically unchanged.

After strengthening their positions in the CPC Central Committee of the 10th Convocation, the "leftists" tried to seize power in the provinces. This was precisely the aim of the reshuffle of the commanders of the large military areas. The latter lost the posts of first secretaries and chairmen of the "revolutionary committees" of the provinces.⁶⁵ At the same time, the commanders were removed from their main bases which weakened their position. If one takes into account that Chi Teng-kuei, Wei Kuo-ching and Pai Ju-ping of the "cultural revolution" group were soon thereafter appointed as the new Political Commissars of the Peking, Kweichow and Tsinan military districts, respectively, it becomes obvious that this shake-up was a measure aimed at the tightening of the control of the "leftist" group over the People's Liberation Army.

However, judging by articles in *Hungchi* (January and February, 1974), and Wang Hung-wen's speech of January 14 of the same year, the "leftists" met with resistance, which further intensified the struggle within the Peking leadership. This was reflected in the official proclamation of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius".

There were no reports about the extension of the campaign of "criticism of Confucius" to the units of the People's Liberation Army up till January 1974. In that period, the central press mainly carried "theoretical" articles, outlining the "programme" of the campaign.

An article published on New Year's Day, 1974, pointed out that "criticism of Confucius was part and parcel of the criticism of Lin Piao". *Jenmin Jihpao* stressed editorially on February 2, 1974, that "the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" was a "matter of paramount importance to the entire Party, the entire army, and the people of the entire country".

The slogans and articles on "criticism of Lin Piao and

Confucius" in 1974 testify to the fact that, in relation to the People's Liberation Army, this campaign pursued quite definite aims, far removed from history, and having a clear connection with the desire of the "leftists" to establish control over the army.

The aims of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" in the People's Liberation Army were outlined in a classified document of the CPC Central Committee, *Chunfa*, No. 3, of January 22, 1974, drawn up on the basis of Chiang Ching's letter to a "chemical defence company of the Nth unit" of the 20th Corps of the Chekiang Military Area. It stressed, above all, that the campaign of "study" was to be launched on the basis of Chiang Ching's "instructions" so that "all units would be involved in studying Comrade Chiang Ching's letter as the main thing in the deepening of the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", because "this letter embodied the concern of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party with regard to the soldiers and commanders at large".

This revealed once again the desire of the "leftists" group, headed by Chiang Ching, to be in charge of the issuing of directives to the army.

The efforts of the "leftists" to convert the People's Liberation Army into an instrument of support for their policy in the provinces stemmed from the tasks formulated in this document. The aims of the "campaign of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" in the People's Liberation Army were : a) To study the works of Chairman Mao; b) To intensify the struggle against revisionism (i.e., against Mao's opponents—*Authors*); c) To master the socialist revolution in the field of superstructure, paying close attention to the class struggle in the ideological field (i.e., to suppress the non-conformists—*Authors*) ; d) To support all the new things which had emerged during the "cultural revolution", and to strengthen and develop the great achievements of this "revolution"; e) To respond in good time to the calls of the Party and to deliver blows at places to be indicated by the Party (i.e., to respond to the Maoist Party's appeals to make short work of the opponents of the "Great Helmsman"—*Authors*); f) To intensify preparations for war, etc.⁶⁶

The document was supposed to be "circulated all the way down to company level, with the army Party committees of all levels being made responsible for promoting the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius."

Another thing testifying to the fact that professional military men were not being fully trusted was that the document on the extension of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" to the People's Liberation Army was not dispatched to the Chekiang Military District through army channels, but delivered by special messengers: Hsieh Ching-ji (member of the Central Committee of the 10th Convocation, Deputy-Chairman of the "revolutionary committees" of Chinghua University and Peking), and Chih Chun (Chairman of the "revolutionary committee" of Chinghua University).⁶⁷

The circulation of this document among the units was followed by "deep criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius with the object of consolidating the gains of the cultural revolution."⁶⁸ The military districts held mobilisation meetings on "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". High-ranking functionaries in the areas were organised in "working groups", and attended courses in the units on "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". Courses, organised at the Party committees of the army units, trained primary-level functionaries for carrying on the campaign, while the political departments of the military areas set up "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius offices" to direct this movement in the units. The military areas held conferences connected with the campaign. Teams of agitators were also formed among the soldiers for "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". Students delivered reports at study courses organised in the companies. In addition to this, theoretical consultation groups came into existence in the companies, while activists were trained in the sections for "propaganda of the theory of Marxism". The secretaries of Party cells in the companies and battalions were made responsible for the promotion of the campaign, whereas general supervision was effected by the regimental Party committee. In other words, the new campaign virtually swept throughout the entire army.

As envisaged in Chiang Ching's letter, the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" spread throughout the army. The main

stress was on propaganda of "a sharp class struggle and the struggle between the two lines on questions of the cultural revolution, promotion and support of innovations, and the struggle against the revisionist trend of scoundrels of the Lin Piao-type."⁶⁹ Under the guise of the struggle against the "Lin Piao-type scoundrels" and defence of innovations, the activists launched criticism of the army commanders. Many regular commanders and political officers were accused of "denying the achievements of the cultural revolution, opposing socialist innovations, and displaying a conservative attitude towards the promotion of young cadres."⁷⁰ They were sent to the notorious "May 7 schools" for "re-education". On their return, these officers were demoted, while the posts held by them were given to activists of the "cultural revolution". The latter were groomed in special groups at the Party committee units.

However, this vigorous promotion of the henchmen of the "leftists" all the way up to the regimental and divisional levels, the spreading of "extensive revolutionary criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" in the units, under the slogan of which the "leftist" groups infiltrated the People's Liberation Army—all this could not but arouse the resistance of the military men. They tried more and more to conduct the campaign in a formal way and to curb it. For instance, *Jenmin Jihpao* pointed out three specific shortcomings in the promotion of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius": "Firstly, certain units proposed that, instead of the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, all efforts should be concentrated on something else; secondly, the ideological and theoretical analysis given by these units of Lin Piao's crimes is not deep (i.e., they simply refused to criticise—Authors); thirdly, a lot is said at the meetings and in a way that obscures the issue."⁷¹

That the campaign was being sabotaged in the People's Liberation Army was vividly illustrated by the following facts: only about 15 per cent of the articles on the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", published in *Jenmin Jihpao* in February 1974, were contributed by army servicemen, the majority of whom came from the "chemical defence company," mentioned in *Chunfa*, No. 3. The contributions dwindled to five per cent in May, and again the authors were mainly soldiers of the

chemical defence company or "soldiers of the 6th and 8th Companies of the Peking garrison". It should be stressed here that *Chunfa*, No. 3, had directed that "the experience of the chemical defence company of the Nth unit of the Chekiang troops" should be "extended throughout the whole army", but there was no further information indicating that this experience was being studied.

The provincial military leaderships were strongly opposed to the campaign. Though the "leftists" succeeded in putting their supporters in high places up to the divisional level, they, evidently, failed to penetrate the main echelon of the army leadership at the military area level. Certain estimates show that as of January 1974, in China as a whole more than 60 per cent of Deputy Commanders of the larger military districts and about 50 per cent of Deputy Political Commissars were Lin Piao's old cadres.⁷² This correlation of forces, naturally, impeded the offensive of the "leftists" launched by them under the slogan of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" in the provinces. This is strikingly confirmed by the wallposter (*tatsupao*) campaign of the summer of 1974.

Many of these wallposters, which appeared in June and July of 1974, noted that the "leftists" were being removed from the "revolutionary committees", that pressure was being brought to bear upon them, and that they were being forbidden to conduct the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius".

The targets chosen by the wallposters for criticism were prominent military leaders and political commissars. Of all the military institutions, the Main Political Department of the People's Liberation Army came under the strongest attack.

Accusations of suppressing the "masses", suppressing the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", "arresting the representatives of the revolutionary masses", and "promoting right-wing restoration and creating independent principalities" were levelled against such political officers and military leaders as Hsieh Chenhua, Chao Chun-nan, Tseng Ssu-yu, Lin Feng, Liu Te-sheng, Han Hsien-chu, Chen Kang, Wan Pi-cheng, Wan Chia-tao, Yang Tai-i, Pu Chang-ya, Cheng Shih-ching, Lo Juis-han, and others.

The widespread wallposter campaign intensified the struggle

in the provinces. Armed clashes took place in about a dozen provincial centres between the army troops and "leftist" supporters. Industrial production declined sharply.

In such a situation the role of the military was enhanced. They ranged themselves with the "pragmatists". The wallposter campaign began to show a decline in July. The centre of the struggle for the army shifted temporarily to the "theoretical" publications in the press.

However, the wallposter campaign left its traces. In the provinces of Kwangtung, Hunan, Kweichow, Kiangsu, Shantung, Fukien and Kiangsi, the military were relieved of the posts of First Secretaries of provincial Party committees,⁷³ while Li Te-sheng was dismissed from the office of Chief of the Main Political Department of the People's Liberation Army.

With the aim of regrouping forces and preparing for a fresh offensive against the political positions of the military men in the army and in local organs of power throughout the country, the faction of "leftist" ideologists began organising "theoretical teams" composed of soldiers "actively criticising revisionism under the auspices of the Party committees of the units". Formed in this way by "instructions from above", the "teams" (or "ranks") consisted of "theoretical training groups" in the companies and of "theoretical training corps" in the sections.⁷⁴ Operating under control of the Party committees of units the "teams" were called upon to discharge the following tasks: (a) Consult the soldiers in training and criticism; (b) Deepen the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius"; (c) Prepare criticism materials, and make reports so that the "soldiers know what to criticise and how"; (d) "Heroically and firmly head the struggle against revisionism"; (e) Promote ideological and political education; (f) Report in due time to the Party cell on signs of "non-proletarian ideology" among the "masses".⁷⁵

This was how the "leftists" built up wide support for themselves among the soldiers and NCOs of the army, and prepared the ground for a new offensive. The "leftist" directives in relation to the People's Liberation Army in that period were most clearly outlined in the "anti-Confucian" articles published in July 1974.

The need for the unlimited power of Mao Tse-tung and

subordination of the army to the directives of the "leftists" was "substantiated" by extracts from Hsun Tzu and Han Fei, who had popularised "the firm rule of the emperor over sovereign princes,"⁷⁶ i.e., over the regional military commands.

The promotion of supporters of the "leftists" to high positions was justified by the invocation of the "cadre policy of Tsao Tsao", who had "appointed capable men to posts in the army and the state."⁷⁷

However, the main question that was raised in the "historical" articles was that of fighting against parochialism and regionalism of the military commands in the provinces. The bulk of the articles which appeared in July and August 1974 in the Peking propaganda publications were devoted to the "struggle of the central organs of power against the sovereign princes."

A sweeping campaign of "criticism of the bourgeois military line of Lin Piao" was initiated on August 1, 1974, by the "soldiers of the 6th and 8th companies of the Nth units of the Peking garrison", whose experience had been intensively popularised earlier in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius".

The main place in the new campaign was occupied by the criticism of "Lin Piao's 'highlands' parochialism", i.e., in essence, the separatist mood of the military. Lin Piao had allegedly regarded the areas under his command as "independent principalities",⁷⁸ "acted contrary to the directive of Chairman Mao, the CPC Central Committee and the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, sabotaged centralised leadership and single command, and on many questions did not inquire about instructions in advance, and did not report after developments."⁷⁹

Such attacks against Lin Piao could be assessed as a warning to the military leaders in the provinces. This was indirectly admitted by the journal *Hungchi*, when it pointed out (No. 9, 1974) that "in the military field, a struggle is going on against the anti-party group of Lin Piao (and not against him personally!—*Authors*) on the issue as to whose line will command the rifle...Therefore, though Lin Piao is no more, this does not at all mean the end of the struggle."⁸⁰

Despite vigorous ideological pressure, the "criticism of the bourgeois line of Lin Piao", the holding of conferences on this subject in the military areas, and other measures were slowed down and even terminated. As was pointed out by *Jenmin Jihpao*, in the Peking Military District "the commanders of all units agreed with the need for criticising the bourgeois military line of Lin Piao" but "some of them proposed that everyone should wait first for instructions from above...i.e., they wavered on this matter."⁸¹

The situation in the People's Republic of China became more tense. As a consequence *Jenmin Jihpao* published an article on November 13, 1974, under the heading: "The Rifle Should Always be in the Hands of the Party and the People". The article emphasised: "It is necessary to subordinate the People's Liberation Army on a countrywide scale to the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, and the units in each area, to the single leadership of the local Party committee." This could be taken as a warning. Besides, an article in *Kwangming Jihpao* underlined the role of the military Party committees, which "in effecting collective leadership, should expose in good time the anti-Party face of ambitious men and intriguers."⁸²

This fierce struggle for "the rifle" in the Peking leadership had no effect on the essence of the Maoist military-bureaucratic regime. *Kwangming Jihpao* stressed that "the People's Liberation Army must support the broad masses of the left",⁸³ thereby revealing the basic content of the struggle for the army between the rival groups in the Peking leadership. In reality, military representatives held high positions in all the departments of the CPC Central Committee. We have spoken earlier about the State Council. As before, the posts of the Chairmen of "revolutionary committees" at the factories, in the mines, on the railways, in civil aviation, and in educational establishments were, in most cases, entrusted to the military.

In this connection, the appointment at the session of the National People's Congress of the Fourth Convocation, held in January 1975, of Mao Tse-tung as the "Supreme Commander-in-Chief" of all the armed forces of the PRC was not accidental. The same could be said about the appointment of Chang Chun-chiao, promoted during the "cultural revolution" to the

post of Chief of the Main Political Department of the People's Liberation Army. In this way, the "leftist" group tried to concentrate military and political power over the army in their hands.

In an atmosphere of a ceaseless struggle within the Peking leadership and the chronic instability of the regime, control over the army was of decisive significance. That was why objectively the struggle was sharpening, as convincingly shown by the continuing "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius."

6. *The Continuing Struggle for Power*

The ceaseless mass political and ideological campaigns, including that of the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" reflected the long-drawn-out nature of the internal political crisis stemming objectively from the contradictory character of the socio-economic policy of Maoism, and its inability to solve urgent problems of economic development on the basis of its "special" conceptions. This aroused even greater discontent in the Chinese society and aggravated internecine dissension in the Maoist leadership itself.

The growing disagreement on vital questions of domestic and foreign policy, the inevitability of a fresh round of the struggle for power in the Peking top clique, the objective deepening of the crisis of the Maoist regime and the growing unpopularity of "Mao Tse-tung's thought" were shown, as mentioned earlier, by the "top secret" 10th Congress of the CPC, which unambiguously oriented the Party and the country towards "the need for repeated launching of such a great political revolution as the proletarian cultural revolution."⁸⁴

It will be remembered that the foundation of the domestic policy of the Chinese leadership consisted in undertakings directed towards the perpetuation of the anti-popular regime and the concentration of power on a national scale in the hands of a small group of leaders (following the removal of Chen Po-ta, Lin Piao and the military faction of the Political Bureau) headed by Mao Tse-tung. This small group was temporarily divided into the so-called "leftists", i.e., the principal apostles of Maoism in its social-chauvinistic content (Chiang Ching, Yao

Wen-yuan, Wan Hung-wen, and others), and the "pragmatists", statesmen of a pragmatic trend, of which Chou En-lai was the leader.

The "leftists", relying on Mao and the apparatus of the CPC Central Committee, tried to remain firmly in the saddle by setting up as their main instrument a new political organisation, on the foundations of Maoism, under their control and under the mask of the CPC. Working towards this end, they adhered to positions of orthodox Maoism, and regarded it as their task to perpetuate Maoism among the people.

While paying lip service to allegiance to the "thought of Mao" the "pragmatists" concentrated practical state activities—economy, military affairs, foreign policy, etc.—in their hands, and tried to conduct a line which in the unsettled conditions following the "cultural revolution" would facilitate the nation's economic advance.

Since the time of the "cultural revolution" the sharp rivalry between the groups—the "leftists", "the pragmatists", and the military—was preconditioned by the unstable, constantly-changing correlation of forces in the leadership. (Mao Tse-tung's cadre policy was aimed at preventing either of the groups from gaining the upper hand. The 10th Congress of the Maoist Party reflected a definite shift in the balance of forces, stemming from the new compromise between the rival groups following the removal of Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta. Greater weight was acquired by the "leftist" wing of the leadership, which had emerged on the wave of the "cultural revolution" and which was represented by a new echelon of leaders reared in the spirit of Mao Tse-tung's chauvinistic ideas. However, the new balance of forces also proved to be unstable. For this reason, "on the next day" after the 10th Congress, the question of a fresh "redivision of power" rose in Peking.

The "leftist" leaders, who came out as sponsors of the campaign and relied on Mao Tse-tung's support, hoped to occupy, even in the lifetime of the "Great Helmsman", the overwhelming majority of key posts in the Party and state apparatus and the army, and especially in the local organs of power, where they were then in the minority.

The "leftists" made the journal, *Hsuehsi Yu Pipan* (Study

and Criticism)—it started coming out shortly before the 10th Congress of the CPC—a mouthpiece of the struggle for power. It is said that “Chairman Mao” himself drew the hieroglyphs of the title of the journal,⁸⁵ demonstrating in this way the importance of the new publication. The teaching of Confucius and the personality of this ancient philosopher were selected by the “leftists” for their veiled attacks against their opponents and for the popularisation of their platform.

On August 7, 1973, when preparations for the 10th Congress of the CPC were going on secretly in Peking, *Jenmin Jihpao* published an article entitled “Confucius : Reactionary Ideologist, Defender of the Slave-Ownning System”. It was contributed by Professor Yang Yung-kuo, a well-known Chinese philosopher.

When the results of the 10th Congress of the CPC became known, many historical parallels in this article became obvious. In Mao’s words, quoted by Yang Yung-kuo in his second article (August 1973), the new campaign was supposed to become a campaign “for the overthrow of power”, and for this “it was necessary, first of all, to condition public opinion.”⁸⁶

Whom did the “leftists” intend to “overthrow” with the direct support of Mao? In his article, Yang Yung-kuo named as one of Confucius’ main crimes the popularisation of the slogan, “Restore the perished kingdoms, revive the interrupted inheritance of titles, elevate the removed nobility.”⁸⁷

One could ask: who at that time in China could be regarded as “removed nobility”? Without a doubt, they were the leaders who had been subjected to repression during the years of the “cultural revolution,” and who had once again been lifted up to the Maoist Olympus by the 10th Congress. It was learnt from a classified Party booklet, published in October 1973, that at the 10th Congress of the CPC “certain objections were raised against the inclusion in the list of Alternate Members of the Central Committee of Comrades Teng Hsiao-ping, Tan Chen-lin, Ulanfu, Li Ching-chuan, Liao Cheng-chih, Li Pao-hua, Chao Chiyang, Liao Chih-kao, Chiang Wei-chi and Yeh-Fei. Since, in the course of the cultural revolution, headed personally by Chairman Mao, these people had been removed from their posts as being in power and following the capitalist road, and

were now again being included in the leading group of the Central Committee of the Party, some people (i.e., the ‘leftists’—*Authors*) considered that this was tantamount to the negation of the line of the great proletarian cultural revolution, whereas others (i.e., the ‘pragmatists’—*Authors*) believed that certain young functionaries lacked revolutionary experience, and, evidently, were being promoted too fast...”⁸⁸ Thus, the “leftists” needed the campaign of “criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius” for veiled attacks against the return of the old cadres, subjected to repression in the period of the “cultural revolution”. That was why the propaganda agencies called the campaign of “criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius” a struggle against a reactionary ideological trend negating the “cultural revolution.”⁸⁹ At the same time, for the same reason, these agencies urged that “close attention should be paid to the promotion of young functionaries from among the activists who have come to the fore during the great cultural revolution.”⁹⁰

In this connection, the “leftists” made great efforts in the campaign to seize power in the third echelon of the Chinese leadership. As mentioned earlier, they succeeded, with Mao’s support, in strengthening their positions in the Central Committee and the Political Bureau the 10th Congress. In this connection, *Jenmin Jihpao* pointed out with alarm that “a situation had currently taken shape where in a number of *uyezd* revolutionary committees, young functionaries, who emerged during the great proletarian cultural revolution, were still being crowded out and dealt blows.”⁹¹ The Shanghai *Chiehfang Jihpao* likewise discovered many impediments in the path of promotion of the new functionaries “possessing the courage to conduct the struggle and move against the current.”⁹²

In this most vital issue of the campaign, that of continuity of power, the “pragmatists” on the contrary did not like the idea of higher posts being given to men promoted by the “cultural revolution”. They expressed dissatisfaction over the promotion of a young Shanghai “leftist”, Wang Hung-wen. They claimed that people like him were being “promoted too fast” though, as was emphasised, he “stood in the vanguard of those who moved against the current, and was known to Chairman Mao personally.”⁹³ This was opposed in the central

bodies and a policy of "rehabilitation" of cadres, subjected to repression during the "cultural revolution" was adopted by them. As for the provinces, the promotion of "leftists" to high posts was simply sabotaged under the pretext of their "insufficient knowledge and qualifications for top posts."⁹⁴

In the campaign, the "leftists", under the guise of criticism of the teaching of Confucius on "knowing everything from birth", criticised the resistance in the provinces. For instance, in February 1975, in an article entitled "Promote Young Cadres to High Posts", *Jenmin Jihpao* emphasised that it was necessary to "destroy the conservatism of those who urge a go-slow course as regards the promotion of the activists of the cultural revolution." "This", the paper further underlined, "runs counter to Chairman Mao's instructions and is the outcome of the poisonous influence of the Confucian 'theory of genius.'"⁹⁵

Along with this, the propaganda agencies claimed that an "officials elite" of the kind educated by Confucius had come into existence and that the "leadership was shirking the introduction of arduous physical labour" in the special corrective labour camps. The propaganda agencies popularised the experience of Shanghai, the citadel of the "leftists", where plant managers who "conducted an erroneous line and distrusted the masses"⁹⁶ were being victimised. The old functionaries were sent for "re-education in the May 7 schools", built in the period of the "cultural revolution" and following the pattern of concentration camps, while high posts were given to "young activists who have come to the forefront during the cultural revolution."

However, Mao would not have launched such a powerful campaign only to criticise leaders at the grass-root level. Everything pointed to the fact that in criticising Confucius an influential figure in the Chinese leadership, or, as *Jenmin Jihpao* said, "a present-day Confucius",⁹⁷ was being criticised.

Who was this "present-day Confucius", for the sake of overthrowing whom a "campaign of criticism" had been started even in kindergartens? The answer to this question was given in the September issue of *Hsuehsi Tu Pipan*, which published a secret document of the General Council of Trade Unions of Shanghai. "We will not permit Chou En-lai to become the

successor,"⁹⁸ this document said: "...Lin Piao has hardly died, and another person is already striving for power....They (i.e., the pragmatists—*Authors*) believe that since they, together with the Party, have covered a road several decades long, the time has come, on the basis of their group, to prepare a successor to Chairman Mao....If we do not want our Party to change its essence and our country to change its colour, then we must expose and frustrate these traitorous, usurping machinations. We must name Chou En-lai".⁹⁹

Several fundamental questions which the "leftists" arraigned against the "pragmatists" could be singled out in this document. First, the question of power, or, as the document said, "the question of a successor"; second, the policy of "rehabilitation" of the old cadres, subjected to suppression during the "cultural revolution" in order that "when Chairman Mao dies, we do not have to accept the leadership of Liu Shao-chi"; third, the attitude towards the Maoist policy of "self-reliance", i.e., the economic policy; fourth, the foreign policy, and primarily, relations with the USA. The document emphasised that Chou En-lai had "entered into a contemptible collusion with the ringleaders of American imperialism and Japanese militarism....Is it not clear that the bourgeois specialists, headed by the intriguer Kissinger, have found agents for themselves in the person of certain pragmatists in China?"¹⁰⁰

There was no public sale of the journal, *Hsuehsi Yu Pipan*, in 1973; it was circulated through inner-Party channels. Naturally, this Shanghai publication found its way into the provinces, and from the very beginning of the "criticism of Confucius" all the "i's" were dotted and the "t's" crossed. However, in overt propaganda, the "leftists" resorted to camouflage in their attacks against the "moderates".

We have already described in detail the promotion of the "activists of the cultural revolution" and "criticism of Confucius" for his appeals for "elevating the removed nobility", i.e., questions of continuity of power and the policy of "rehabilitation". In many articles concerning the economy, along with extensive propaganda of the policy of "self-reliance," Confucius

was "criticised" as "the founder of the theory of admiration of things foreign". In this connection, *Jenmin Jihpao* specially stressed in March 1974 that the "worship of Confucius and admiration of things foreign were products of one and the same black root."¹⁰¹ The same paper sharply criticised Confucius for his appeals to "care for the people" and to "care for the interests of the people."¹⁰² This could not but remind one of the well-known words of Mao that "poverty is a good thing". Evidently, this criticism of "Confucius' economic ideas" served as a cover for the propagation of the slogan of unpaid "hard and persistent labour to prepare for war".

The criticism of Confucius for his "theory of admiration of things foreign" was closely connected not only with economic matters, but also with the problem of orientation in foreign policy.

In January 1974, *Jenmin Jihpao* published an article, "What Does the Murder of Shao Cheng-mao Show?"¹⁰³ contributed by a well-known writer on "criticism of Confucius", Tang Hsiao-wen, who "accused" Confucius of the following. "Confucius held up as an example a noble person who is able to live in harmony with everyone, but does not enter into a plot with anyone". According to Tang this was certainly not true. In reality, that noble person had "entered into collusion with belligerent foreigners."¹⁰⁴ In addition, "Confucius urged that China should attack neighbouring countries and seek rapprochement with distant countries". Who and what was meant by "belligerent foreigners, living in distant countries?" In November 1973, *Kwangming Jihpao* noted that "the ideology of Confucius was an ideological weapon of the imperialists for the enslavement of China."¹⁰⁵ All this leaves no doubt whatsoever that by "belligerent foreigners" the propaganda agencies meant the capitalist countries, and, first of all, the USA, and collusion with them for entering into a bloc with the most aggressive forces in the international arena. Since this policy was enunciated not only by Chou En-lai, but, above all, by Mao Tse-tung himself, this specific "accusation" levelled at Confucius appeared in only a few articles and was then quickly dropped.

On the other hand, the "leftists" retained that part of the "accusation" which said that "Confucius was able to live in

harmony with everyone". What was this if not direct criticism of the tactics of manoeuvring and compromise of Chou En-lai? Had not this "ability to live in harmony with everyone" enabled him to stay in power, while such well-known leaders as Liu Shao-chi, Chen Po-ta, Lin Piao and many others had vanished from the scene? The central Peking papers wrote more frankly on this subject in August and September 1974 when they lashed out at those "who understood the emphasis on cohesion as a desire to mix clay."¹⁰⁶ Everything falls into place if one recalls that the expression "to mix clay" (i.e., to agree to a compromise—*Authors*) was Chou En-lai's. At the time of the "cultural revolution" he had proposed that a compromise should be made with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.¹⁰⁷

Equally transparent was another main "charge" against Confucius, outlined in the above mentioned article by Tang Hsiao-wen, the "charge" of executing a certain Shao Cheng-mao.¹⁰⁸ Tang Hsiao-wen, like Yang Yang-kuo, considered this to be one of the principal "crimes of Confucius". What were the "crimes" of this semi-mythical historical personality whom Confucius ordered to be put to death? First of all, in the opinion of Confucius, Shao Cheng-mao had "wanted to seize power". Secondly, he "represented the interests of the new class of landlords". Thirdly, he had "engaged in dangerous subversion of power". Fourthly, he had "knocked together a party of his own, and recruited accomplices". Fifthly, he had "come out against the correct teaching."¹⁰⁹ Let us now recall the "crimes" of Lin Piao, enumerated in the report delivered by Chou En-lai at the 10th Congress of the CPC. Firstly, Lin Piao had sought to "usurp the supreme power in the Party and the state". Secondly, he had "tried to once again put the landlords and the bourgeoisie back on their feet in the country". Thirdly, he had "engaged in conspiratorial and subversive activities". Fourthly, "Lin Piao and the handful of his incorrigible accomplices are a group of counter-revolutionary plotters". Fifthly, "Lin Piao always came out against Chairman Mao's line."¹¹⁰ The impression was that the "charges" against Shao Cheng-mao were copied from the "accusations" levelled at Lin Piao. If one were to continue the analogy, why had Chou En-lai-Confucius helped to remove

Lin Piao-Shao Cheng-mao from power? In this connection, *Kwangming Jihpao* said the following in 1973: "Confucius executed his Shao Cheng-mao out of his selfish interests and to defend future....Today we must completely wipe off the makeup of 2,000 years ago from the face of Confucius and show his real face to all the Celestial."¹¹¹ It was not difficult to guess that the "leftists" were in this way, expressing their dissatisfaction with Chou En-lai, who had made use of Lin Piao's removal, and which did not suit the "leftists" at all.

However, this was such a ticklish and transparent topic that only two articles on it were published. On the other hand, the "pragmatists" were also not passive onlookers in this antiquity-camouflaged fight for power.

By November 1973, i.e., by the end of the fourth month of the campaign, not only was the voice of the "leftists" but of their opponents, the "pragmatists", too clearly heard in it.

It is generally known that up till December 1973 the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" went on only as "criticism of Confucius" and was not connected with the dethroning of the disgraced successor to Chairman Mao. This fitted in with the intentions of the "leftists", who were guiding themselves by an unpublished "speech of Chairman Mao". It was learned that this speech, circulated in early August 1973 at the Peking University, carried an appeal for mobilisation only for the "criticism of Confucius". It was emphasised that "criticism of Confucius was a great militant order of Chairman Mao."¹¹²

In December 1973, *Kwangming Jihpao* suddenly stated that "criticism of Confucius was among the main contents of criticism of Lin Piao; it was a part of it."¹¹³ Following the publication of an editorial in *Jenmin Jihpao* on February 2, 1974, under the heading, "Carry on the Struggle, the Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, to the End", and pointing out that the "criticism of Lin Piao, launched and led personally by Chairman Mao" was a "matter of paramount importance", it became clear that the "pragmatists" wanted to link the accusations against Confucius with Lin Piao. All the previous "crimes" of Confucius were attributed to Lin Piao in this editorial, while shortly before that *Kwangming Jihpao* stressed that "Lin Piao was a Confucius of modern-day China."¹¹⁴

By linking the "criticism of Lin Piao" with the "criticism of Confucius", the "pragmatists" actually inflicted a heavy defeat on the "leftists" in the struggle for power.

The *Jenmin Jihpao* editorial of February 2, 1974, was followed not only by articles in the press criticising the "pragmatists", but also by others "criticising" the "leftists" under the guise of "criticism" of Confucius and his teaching.

As mentioned earlier, Confucius was criticised for his appeals for "enrichment of the people", which conformed to Mao's directive about poverty being a good thing. In February 1974, *Kwangming Jihpao* began criticising Confucius for popularising the slogan, "there is joy in poverty."¹¹⁵ This article was an open reply of the "pragmatists" to the appeals of the "leftists" to completely abolish "the black revisionist commodity—material incentives".

This, however, was not a departure from or criticism of individual provisions laid down by Mao. The "pragmatists" were the same kind of orthodox Maoists as the "leftists", but after occupying key posts in the national economy of China they endeavoured to oppose certain directives which were harmful to the economy.

The struggle between the "leftists" and "pragmatists" in 1974 took not only the form of camouflaged polemics; the matters even reached the point of direct confrontation between their supporters in the provinces.

An editorial in *Jenmin Jihpao* of April 10 said: "Do not digress from and do not be bogged down in concrete questions in the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". What was meant by "concrete questions" was explained in the April issue of *Hungchi*. These were connected with the factional struggle in the provinces, a struggle between the hostile groups of the "leftists" and "pragmatists" for power.

The *Hungchi* editorial emphasised that "an extensive revolutionary alliance is one of the vital experiences of the cultural revolution."¹¹⁶ The hostile groups were told that "in the campaign of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" the following comment made by Mao Tse-tung during the "cultural revolution" should be strictly remembered. "There are no reasons within the working class for a conflict on fundamental interests.

All the more so, there are no reasons within the working class under the dictatorship of the proletariat for a split into two hostile groups".¹¹⁷ *Hungchi* urged that "a majority should be formed on the basis of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, while the reason for a split lies in the provocative activity of class enemies, who are trying to set the masses against the masses."¹¹⁸ That a serious situation had arisen was testified by the fact that most of the articles in the April issue of *Hungchi* reviewed the "experience of the split during the cultural revolution"¹¹⁹ and appealed for "a search for common ground while preserving minor differences (if, in the meantime, unanimity of views is out of the question), in order to unite on the basis of Chairman Mao's line".¹²⁰

These appeals, however, proved ineffective: the struggle continued. As before, "the masses fought against the masses"¹²¹ and there was continued "negation of the cultural revolution and manifestations against the new things engendered by it."¹²²

On the other hand, under the slogan, "the leadership must head the movement for criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", plant managers, local Party committees and "revolutionary committees" began to resist the Maoists. Plant managements began re-introducing "old rules and regulations", "popularising the principle of material incentives"¹²³ and opposing the slogan: "policy is the commanding force."¹²⁴

The culmination of this struggle was the June wallposter campaign, which demonstrated the resistance of the local pragmatically-minded leadership to the "leftists".

The first public wallposter in connection with the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" appeared in Peking opposite the office of the city "revolutionary committee" on the night of June 12, 1974. Up till then, wallposters were to be seen only in the provinces.

In most cases, the authors of these wallposters were former *tsaofans*, including those who had made their political career during the period of the "cultural revolution" and had become members of the "revolutionary committees", and who were later persecuted by the "pragmatists".

Many wallposters pointed out that in the provinces the "leftists" were being ousted from the "revolutionary committees"

that pressure was being brought to bear on them, and that they were forbidden to conduct the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius".

At the same time, the wallposter campaign revealed an ugly picture of corruption, favouritism, and arbitrariness in the struggle for power in the provinces between the "leftists" and their opponents.

However, this step, too, actually proved useless to the "leftists". In a classified Party document of the CPC Central Committee, *Chungfa*, No. 18, of May 5, 1974, it was stressed that "wallposters were allowed to be pasted up openly", and that this was done on Mao's "personal instructions."¹²⁵ But when these wallposters began endangering the "pragmatists", they were simply banned by the July "Resolution of the Peking City Committee of the CPC."¹²⁶

In another *Chungfa* issue of July (No. 21), dealing with the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius in industry", the harm caused by this campaign in the sphere of production was admitted indirectly.

When the "leftists" tried to publish an article by Nan Chung on the subject, "Explanation of the Chapter, 'The Murmur of a Solitary Man From the Treatise, 'Han Fei-chi', with its almost undisguised attacks against the "pragmatists", the entire edition of *Kwangming Jihpao* of July 23, 1974, was confiscated and destroyed.¹²⁷

In this way, even though Chou En-lai had gone to a hospital, the "pragmatists" did not remain inactive.

In this situation, the "leftists" set about forming the so-called "theoretical teams of workers, peasants, and soldiers" to consolidate the Maoist spirit and carry forward the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". This, in fact, constituted a revival of the institution of *tsaofans*, only this time with strict organisation, subordination and discipline.

On June 18, 1974, at the height of the wallposter campaign in Peking, *Jenmin Jihpao* emphasised editorially that "the Party committees of various levels must regard the strengthening of the army of theorists as a major undertaking in deepening the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius." It was pointed out that the "theoretical teams" must not consist of "bookworms", but,

instead, must, first of all, consist of soldiers mounting an assault against enemy positions in the struggle for the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius".

As has been pointed out before, in the early period of the campaign, the job of effecting the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" was entrusted to the "theoretical teams" composed of educated youth—students of institutes and universities. The instructions in the *Jenmin Jihpao* editorial of June 18, 1974, called for the setting up on the basis of these "professional theoretical teams" full-time "theoretical teams of workers, peasants and soldiers".

From the article on "theoretical teams", published in the July issue of *Hungchi*,¹²⁸ which outlined the tasks of these teams, it became clear that the "leftists" were not in the least ready to give up their fight, but, on the contrary, were actively preparing their forces for it.

Further developments showed that the regrouping of forces and the preparations for a new upswing of the campaign on the basis of "theoretical teams" had not been in vain. The session of the National People's Congress of the Fourth Convocation, which took place in January 1975, was a definite success for the "leftists". The "leftists" who had moved to the top, such as Chang Chun-piao, Chen Yung-kuei and Wu Kuei-hsien, were appointed Deputies to Chou En-lai.

However, as was to be expected, this did not lead to the stabilisation of the Maoist regime, but only intensified the struggle within the Peking leadership, which was convincingly demonstrated by new political and ideological drives for "the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "criticism of the novel *Backwaters*" which followed the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius".

7. "Legism" and "Revolutionary Line"

As has been pointed out earlier, the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" did not develop either into scientific polemics or even less into scientific criticism of the philosophical legacy of Confucius on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. An apt characterisation of the campaign was given in the following "revelation" of the Chinese philosopher, Fen Yu-lan:

"The criticism of Confucius and Confucianism is not a scientific and philosophical question, but one concerning actual political struggle."¹²⁹

This campaign of the Maoists again furnished irrefutable evidence of falsification of Marxism, history and philosophy with the aim of justifying the struggle for power, and for the further transformation of the country's social system in the spirit of the reactionary conceptions of "barracks-type communism", heavily impregnated with great-power hegemony and anti-Sovietism. With every reason, the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" could be characterised in the words of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as "a wholesale indoctrination in the spirit of chauvinism and malicious anti-Sovietism."

The same task of brainwashing the people on a mass scale in the spirit of Maoism was also being assigned to the campaign of popularisation of "Legism", a most appropriate teaching of antiquity to serve as an apologia for the "revolutionary line of Chairman Mao".

The building up of a "temple of Mao Tse-tung's thought" in China had long been the desire of the "Great Helmsman" himself. Comrade Wang Ming has noted in his memoirs that, from September 1941 onwards, Mao Tse-tung in his private conversations with members of the Political Bureau had frequently spoken of his desire to found "Mao-Tse-tungism": "when a leader has no 'ism' of his own, he can in his lifetime be overthrown by others, and, after his death, he can be subjected to attacks."¹³⁰ At the same time, Mao had also said that "with the establishment of Mao-Tse-tungism", he would allegedly "preserve Marxism". However, the history of the CPC and the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" testified that Maoism, far from having anything in common with Marxism-Leninism, was fundamentally hostile to this great teaching. In this connection, it was not altogether accidental that in the campaign "Mao Tse-tung's thought" was in consonance with "Legism".

An attempt was made in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" in 1974 to "dissociate" Mao Tse-tung's

thought from Confucianism, by sanctifying it as tradition, as having been handed down from generation to generation, and to erect, in place of the temple of Confucius, a "temple of Mao Tse-tung's thought". In this connection, it was also clear that the task of undermining traditional family ties, impeding the penetration of the Maoists into the social structure of the "primary cells" of Chinese society, had been put forward. The erection of a "temple of Mao Tse-tung's thought" demanded that certain provisions of Confucianism, which did not fit in with Maoism, such as "love of mankind", "respect for elders", etc., should be wholly eliminated. This, too, was not a question of abstract dogmas and aphorisms, but one which required real political action. Peking propaganda itself claimed that "filial respect" prevented the deportation of youth to remote areas,¹³¹ while the Confucian precept, "do to others as you would have others do to you", negated the "spreading of revolutionary criticism among the masses". The peasants were not always willingly responding to Maoist propaganda calls for self-abnegation and spying on others, including the spying of children on their parents. That was why the Maoists had set themselves the task of breaking traditional family ties.

The Maoist slogan, "go against the current", precisely revealed the true state of affairs in China where the majority of the people—the "current"—were reluctant to promote the Maoists' campaigns, and had no desire to recognise Maoism as the one and only ideology of the nation.

"Mao Tse-tung's thought" was hammered into the minds of the Chinese people in the form of "an inquiry into the struggle between the 'Legists' and Confucianists in history in order to put antiquity at the service of modern times."¹³² This directive sanctioned the distorted and arbitrary interpretation of historical material for the sake of finding "proof" that "Mao Tse-tung's thought" was anchored in the teaching of the "Legists".

The main thing in Mao Tse-tung's thought, the propaganda agencies claimed, was the "teaching on the continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", the teaching on the "continuous struggle between the two lines."¹³³ This Trotskyite and Maoist idea had long suffered an ideological and political setback, but the Maoists went on trying to find fresh

arguments in its favour. One such "argument" was the popularisation of the idea of "irreconcilable struggle between the line of the 'Legists' and the line of the Confucianists both in antiquity and today." It is not difficult to understand that in this way the Maoists wanted to perpetuate in China the "struggle between the two lines" as directed by the "Great Helmsman". We shall not dwell here on the obvious falsification of history: the struggle between these two schools is pure fiction, with no historical facts to substantiate it. What this falsification was meant to show, by the citing of a so-called "historical example", was the objective nature and firmness of Mao's directives on the "struggle between the two lines", and the need for the continuous purging of non-conformists, for mass political and ideological campaigns, etc.

We have dwelt earlier on such aspects of Mao's line in the campaign as the consolidation of authoritarian power of Chairman Mao in the country, the directives on permanent mass political and ideological campaigns of the "cultural revolution" type, the brutal treatment of non-conformists, the violations of legality and democracy, the struggle against the separatist tendencies of the provincial military leaders, and the establishment of firm control over the army. Justification for this campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" was sought in modernised "Legism". For instance, the need for the despotic authoritarian rule of the "Great Helmsman" was substantiated by extracts from Hsun Tzu and Han Fei, who had popularised "the firm rule of the emperor"¹³⁴ and also by the example of the empire of Chin Shih-huang. "Justification" of the "cultural revolution" was found in the "burning of books and the burying alive of the Confucians" by Chin Shih-huang,¹³⁵ and of the brutal treatment of non-conformists in the actions of Shang Yang, to whom "law was an instrument to make short work of traitors regardless of rank."¹³⁶ A "justification" for the strict centralisation of power in the country and the struggle against the separatist tendencies of the regional commanding officers was found in the *Treatise on Allotments* by Liu Tsung-yuan,¹³⁷ who had criticised the "disloyal generals" of the Tang epoch.

"Arguments", fortunately not very numerous, were also found for Mao's "economic ideas". In July 1975, *Jenmin*

Jihpao emphasised that the "development of agriculture as the foundation, and industry as the leading force is Chairman Mao's invariable thought, and it is also our main experience in the building of an independent socialist economy."¹³⁸ In fact, this postulate had nothing in common with scientific socialism, and was directed at the perpetuation of the low living standards of the Chinese working people, and at the intensification of the arms buildup. To justify their anti-popular economic policy the Maoists made use of the following remarks of the "Legist" Shang Yang: "A state which relies on agriculture and war is peaceful and the ruler is respected".¹³⁹

Naturally, "proof" was likewise "discovered" for another important militaristic slogan of Mao's, namely, "prepare for war and natural disasters, dig deep trenches, store up grain everywhere". In June 1974, *Kwangming Jihpao* showered compliments on the ancient philosopher Hsun Tzu, who had recommended that everyone should be "able to preserve surplus stocks". The paper explained. "Hsun Tzu spoke of the need to save grain and store it up".¹⁴⁰ No wonder that the propaganda agencies praised the "Legist" Shang Yang. The Maoists were impressed by his following political credo: "A noble person, who governs the country, makes the people inside the state take up farming, and outside of it, to plan war." Was not the picture that could be seen in China much like that?

The "justification" for war hysteria and, especially, for Mao's slogan, "everyone is a soldier", was found in the reforms of yet another personality of antiquity, Wang An-shih, of the Sung epoch. These reforms were, first of all, "directed towards intensifying military training of the population. He ordered the urban and rural population to take up military training in order that everyone should become a soldier."¹⁴¹

It should be stressed here that the preaching of militarism, hegemonism and preparation for the launching of a new world war was a salient feature of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius".

Naturally, in order to carry into life all the above-mentioned conceptions, "justified" by "Legism", Mao needed not an ordinary man, but a "rust-proof cog of Chairman Mao", who "needed no brains, because the Chairman did all the thinking

for him". In the campaign, in order to accomplish the task of rearing Mao's "new man", the propaganda agencies popularised "the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao in the field of education". Criticism was levelled at the "educational system devised by Confucius". Such "black commodities as examinations, marks, and assiduous study of a subject" were rejected. It turned out that the main thing was "loyalty to Mao's line". Everything else was not at all relevant. Addressing high-ranking functionaries during the spring festival on February 13, 1964, Mao had said: "When intellectuals come to power, internal sedition begins.... Too much reading is mortally dangerous to a man.... Examinations are in the interests of the enemies, and they must be banned."¹⁴² Naturally, an educated man could hardly become a "rust-proof cog of Chairman Mao", of the type of Lei Feng, who in his short life had read nothing else but *Quotations from Chairman Mao's Works*. That was why, in the campaign, Lei Feng was extolled, whereas the intelligentsia was persecuted; educated young people were sent off to remote areas for permanent settlement and were not allowed to have any contact with their parents. In order to translate his "line" into practice, Mao had no use for educated people, nor students poring over books on the eve of exams; he wanted only thoughtless "cogs". With the help of these "cogs" it was easier to "unfurl the banner of Chairman Mao's thought over the entire globe".

8. Propaganda of Aggression and Territorial Claims

In the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", the Chinese propaganda agencies touched upon many problems, including that of the relations between China and the tribal union of Huns (Hsiung-nu) during the Han dynasty (3rd-1st centuries B.C.). A study of many articles in the Chinese press on this subject convinces one that the Maoist leadership pursued most definite political aims which were far removed from history, but were in tune with Mao Tse-tung's anti-Sovietism.

It had become a "tradition" in Peking for the Maoist leadership to see a way out of the deepening crisis of Maoism by whipping up war hysteria and anti-Sovietism.

It had become clear to the Maoist propagandists that in the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" it was "not enough" to make countless hostile sallies against the Soviet Union of the type that "the Soviet Union and China are mortal enemies, and there is no room for both of them on earth."¹⁴³ Therefore, the propaganda agencies had been hunting in history for "arguments" for the anti-Soviet course, and especially in the pseudo-historical articles on the Huns.

The first of a great number of press articles on the Huns was the one by a certain Liang Hsiao, entitled, "On Reading the *Treatise on Salt and Iron*", which appeared in Issue No. 5 of *Hungchi*. In order that the reader should have no "doubts" as to what was meant by "Huns," the propagandists later explained that the "criticism of Lin Piao", who allegedly had "sought to establish contacts with the Soviet revisionists"¹⁴⁴ and had proposed that "the border question should be settled through negotiation",¹⁴⁵ "must be conducted in close connection with the criticism of the reactionary Confucians who capitulated to the Huns."¹⁴⁶

Why, along with overt attacks against the USSR, was it necessary for the Maoists to turn to history to find dubious parallels of their anti-Soviet policy?

Even a cursory study of these pseudo-historical articles would at once reveal the striking identity of "charges" levelled by the Maoists against the former "successor to Chairman Mao"—Lin Piao—and the Confucian scientists of antiquity. For instance, Lin Piao was accused of having characterised Mao Tse-tung's anti-Soviet policy as "erroneous and fraught with unpleasant consequences,"¹⁴⁷ while the charge against the Confucians was that they held that "no fundamental reasons existed for a clash between the Huns and China", and that "intensified preparations for war were disastrous for the country and the people."¹⁴⁸

It is quite clear that, under the guise of "criticism of Lin Piao's line of capitulation", an attack was being made against the healthy forces in the CPC, who saw the fallaciousness of Mao Tse-tung's anti-Soviet course. The Maoists could not, and did not want to, say this openly for the simple reason that this would be tantamount to admitting the failure of Peking's

anti-Soviet policy. Indeed, on reading these pseudo-historical articles, one could not but become convinced of the existence in China of a great number of supporters of friendship with the Soviet Union. The Maoists were unable to deal with them in the course of the previous campaigns, and, evidently, will not be able to do so in the future as well. In this context, it is not altogether accidental that Peking propaganda counted on a "long, nationwide, thorough-going development of the 'criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius.'"

Along with the striving to make short work of the opponents of anti-Sovietism, these articles revealed the desire of the Maoist leadership to find "historical" substantiation for the course of preparing for war—a course which led to a further decline in the living standards of the Chinese people—and for the laying of provocative territorial claims on the Soviet Union.

In presenting the "aggressiveness" of the Huns in relation to China in an exaggerated manner, the Maoist propagandists emphasised that already at that time "the people had hailed measures aimed at strengthening the army, storing up grain and fortifying the northern border".¹⁴⁹ That was how Mao Tse-tung's slogan, "prepare for war and natural disasters, dig deep trenches, store up grain widely", was being "historically" substantiated.

It was somewhat more difficult to "substantiate" territorial claims by invoking the example of the Huns, because historical events in that distant time had taken place within the present territory of China, a little further north of the Great Wall of China. This, however, did not trouble the men in Peking, who claimed that "the Huns had seized a vast territory in the north of our country."¹⁵⁰ The aim of these statements became clear as soon as one read an article by the above mentioned Liang Hsiao, entitled "The Struggle of K'ang Hsi in Defence of the Unity of the Country and for Repulsing Aggression by Tsarist Russia", and published in the Peking University journal (Issue No. 6, 1974). Liang Hsiao lauded K'ang Hsi (1654-1722), (emperor of the Manchurian dynasty which enslaved China) for his predatory policy in the area of the Amur River and the destruction of Russian settlements in that area. All this pursued

the sole aim of justifying the predatory policy of K'ang Hsi, and, on the basis of this, to lay claim to 1,500,000 square kilometres of Soviet territory.¹⁵¹

While making much of such emperors as Han Wu-ti and K'ang Hsi, the Maoists disseminated their aggressive hegemonistic ideas among the Chinese people. The peoples of the countries neighbouring on China were well aware that Han Wu-ti had destroyed the state of Choson (Korea) and had seized a part of North Vietnam.¹⁵² During the reign of K'ang Hsi, Mongolia had been seized as well as Burma, Annam and a part of Central Asia.¹⁵³ Therefore, historical examples of that kind served no other purpose than to disguise the whipping up of nationalistic passions and war hysteria and the laying of unjustified territorial claims on neighbouring states.

NOTES

1. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 2, 1974.
2. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 2, 1974.
3. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 8, 1974.
4. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 21, 1974.
5. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 3, 1974.
6. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 24, 1974.
7. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 29, 1973.
8. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 14, 1973.
9. *Kwangming Jihpao*, March 5, 1975.
10. *Hungchi*, No. 2, 1974.
11. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 17, 1974.
12. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 19, 1974.
13. *Kwangming Jihpao*, January 11, 1975.
14. *Hungchi*, No. 12, 1973, p. 48.
15. *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 9, 1973.

16. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 3, 1973.
17. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 20, 1974.
18. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 1, 1974.
19. *Kwangming Jihpao*, October 29, 1973.
20. *Hungchi*, No. 12, 1973, p. 57.
21. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 21, 1974.
22. *China Quarterly*, No. 19, 1964, p. 16.
23. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 24, 1974.
24. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 15, 1974.
25. *Jenmin Jihpao*, November 23, 1974.
26. *Kwangming Jihpao*, October 21, 1973.
27. *Kwangming Jihpao*, February 2, 1974.
28. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 31, 1973.
29. *Jenmin Jihpao*, October 27, 1974.
30. *Hungchi*, No. 7, 1974.
31. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 1, 1973.
32. *Kwangming Jihpao*, October 7, 1973.
33. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 31, 1973.
34. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 19, 1974.
35. *Kwangming Jihpao*, February 5, 1974.
36. *Hungchi*, No. 3, 1974, p. 41.
37. *Hungchi*, No. 3, 1974, pp. 54-55.
38. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 28, 1974.
39. *Jenmin Jihpao*, October 24, 1974.
40. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 2, 1974.
41. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 16, 1974.
42. *Hungchi*, No. 1, 1974.
43. *Hungchi*, No. 1, 1974, p. 65.
44. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974, pp. 59-60.
45. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974, p. 62.
46. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 28, 1973.
47. *Jenmin Jihpao*, October 31, 1973.
48. Shang Yueh, *Essays on the History of China*, p. 60, Moscow, 1959.

49. *Chungkung Yanchiu*, No. 3, 1974.
50. *Hungchi*, No. 7, 1972, pp. 56-62.
51. See *Chanwang*, No. 307, November 16, 1974, p. 27.
52. A Maoist-forged plan of a coup by Lin Piao.
53. See *Lin Piao Tsaofan Michian Tan Mi* (Study of Secret Documents on the Rebellion of Lin Piao), Singapore, 1972, p. 119.
54. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 28, 1973.
55. *Kwangming Jihpao*, November 9, 1973.
56. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 85.
57. *The New Republic*, May 22, 1971.
58. *Kwangming Jihpao*, November 9, 1973.
59. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 4, 1973.
60. *Jenmin Jihpao*, December 25, 1973.
61. *Kwangming Jihpao*, June 29, 1974.
62. *Jenmin Jihpao*, November 21, 1973.
63. *China News Analysis*, No. 952, March 8, 1974, p. 7.
64. *China News Analysis*, No. 929, August 10, 1973, p. 6.
65. *Hsinhua* announced on April 15, 1974, that Chang Tzu-yang had been appointed First Secretary of the Party Committee and Chairman of the "revolutionary committee" of Kwangming Province. This corroborated the fact that the commanders of big military districts were no longer concurrently heads of Party and administrative bodies.
66. *Chungkung Nienpiao*, 1974, Part 7, pp. 17-19.
67. *China News Analysis*, No. 974, September 20, 1974, p. 7.
68. *Radio Peking*, January 26, 1974.
69. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 4, 1974 and May 20, 1974.
70. *Kwangming Jihpao*, February 12, 1974.
71. *Jenmin Jihpao*, December 3, 1974.
72. *Chanwang*, No. 292, April 1, 1974.
73. *Chanwang*, No. 312, February 1, 1965, p. 6.
74. *Jenmin Jihpao*, December 27, 1974.
75. *Jenmin Jihpao*, December 14, 1974; *Kwangming Jihpao*, May 30, 1974.
76. *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 7, 1974, and July 16, 1974.
77. *Kwangming Jihpao*, July 17, 1974.
78. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 11, 1974.

79. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 13, 1974.
80. *Hungchi*, No. 9, 1974, p. 58.
81. *Jenmin Jihpao*, October 23, 1974.
82. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 26, 1974.
83. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 26, 1974.
84. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 2, 1973.
85. *Chanwang*, No. 303, August 16, 1974.
86. Yang Yung-kuo, "Struggle of Materialism Against Idealistic Apriorism in the Period of Chin and Han Dynasties", *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 13, 1973.
87. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 7, 1973.
88. See *Chunghua Yuehpao*, No. 708(9), 1974, pp. 526-533.
89. *Jenmin Jihpao*, October 11, 1974.
90. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 21, 1974.
91. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 12, 1974.
92. *Chiehfang Jihpao*, March 13, 1974.
93. See *Chunghua Yuehpao*, No. 708(9), 1974, pp. 526-533.
94. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 19, 1975.
95. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 19, 1975.
96. *Kwangming Jihpao*, June 18, 1974.
97. *Jenmin Jihpao*, November 21, 1973.
98. *Chanwang*, No. 296, May 1, 1974.
99. *Chanwang*, No. 293, March 16, 1974, p. 4.
100. *Chanwang*, No. 293, March 16, 1974.
101. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 22, 1974.
102. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 27, 1974.
103. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 4, 1974.
104. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 4, 1974.
105. *Kwangming Jihpao*, November 2, 1973.
106. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 11, 1974; *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 21, 1974.
107. *Chungkung Yan-Chiu*, No. 85 (10), 1974, p. 112; *Chanwang*, No. 310, January 1, 1975, p. 6.
108. The fact of existence of Shao Cheng-mao is not proved.

109. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 4, 1974.
110. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 1, 1973.
111. *Kwangming Jihpao*, October 31, 1973.
112. *Chunghua Yuehpao*, No. 703 (4), 1974, p. 35.
113. *Kwangming Jihpao*, December 7, 1973.
114. *Kwangming Jihpao*, January 29, 1974.
115. *Kwangming Jihpao*, February 4, 1974.
116. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974, p. 6.
117. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974, p. 6.
118. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974, p. 71.
119. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974, p. 70.
120. *Hungchi*, No. 4, 1974, p. 72.
121. *Hungchi*, No. 5, 1974, p. 29.
122. *Hungchi*, No. 5, 1974, p. 28.
123. *Hungchi*, No. 7, 1974, p. 54.
124. *Hungchi*, No. 7, 1974, p. 55.
125. *Chungkung Yanchiu*, No. 92(8), 1974, p. 60; *Chanwang*, No. 311, January 16, 1975, p. 9.
126. *Chungkung Yanchiu*, No. 93 (9), 1974, p. 3.
127. *Chungkung Yanchiu*, No. 94 (10), 1974, p. 18.
128. *Hungchi*, No. 7, pp. 9-13.
129. *Kwangming Jihpao*, February 2, 1974.
130. Wang Ming, *Fifty Years of the CPC and Betrayal of Mao Tse-tung*, (Moscow), 1975, p. 15.
131. *Kwangming Jihpao*, January 28, 1974.
132. *Hungchi*, No. 9, 1974, p. 16.
133. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 9, 1975.
134. *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 7, 1974, and July 16, 1974.
135. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 6, 1974.
136. *Kwangming Jihpao*, June 14, 1974.
137. *Kwangming Jihpao*, June 29, 1974.
138. *Jenmin Jihpao*, July 9, 1975.
139. *Kwangming Jihpao*, August 16, 1974.
140. *Kwangming Jihpao*, June 21, 1974.

141. *Kwangming Jihpao*, July 7, 1974.
142. *Chanwang*, No. 314, March 1, 1975, p. 26.
143. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 14, 1974.
144. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 11, 1974.
145. *Jenmin Jihpao*, January 29, 1975.
146. *Kwangming Jihpao*, February 7, 1975.
147. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 16, 1974, and February 14, 1974.
148. *Jenmin Jihpao*, May 18, 1974.
149. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 16, 1975.
150. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 6, 1974.
151. *Pieching Tahsueh Hsuehpao*, No. 6, 1974, p. 25.
152. Shang Yueh, *Essays on History of China*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 84-85.
153. Shang Yueh, *Essays on History of China*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 544 and 561.

National People's Congress and the Country's Constitution

1. Background to the NPC Session

The precarious compromise arrived at by the groupings within the Maoist leadership in the CPC following the culmination of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" in the late summer and early autumn of 1974 made it possible for the Maoist leaders to again raise the question of holding the National People's Congress whose convocation had been promised from the rostrum of the 10th CPC Congress on the eve of the campaign.

Actually, according to available information, Mao Tse-tung's initial proposals on the necessity of holding the NPC and changing the Constitution had been made in 1967.¹ The Maoists, however, decided to begin the elaboration of the country's new political system by 'putting right' (i.e., by creating a new party) the CPC, holding for this purpose, in particular, the Ninth Congress of the actually non-functioning Party in April 1969. The Maoists planned to formalise the new structure of the state machinery and validate the slogans of the "cultural revolution" constitutionally in 1970 or in 1971. According to an official document of the Chinese leadership² Mao Tse-tung had proposed "in March 1970 the holding of the National People's Congress of the Fourth Convocation to revise the Constitution". Characteristically, 'the great leader' had also proposed to "abolish the post of Chairman of the state", i.e., the

supreme state post (Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces), which was always an object of struggle in his entourage. It was now alleged that after the "cultural revolution" this post had been claimed by Lin Piao who had been supported by Chen Po-ta, but they had come up against the resolute opposition of Mao Tse-tung. Immediately after Mao's "proposal" to revise the Constitution the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee had begun to prepare a draft of the revised Constitution, and on July 12, 1970, had set up a Commission with Mao Tse-tung as its Chairman and Lin Piao as Vice-Chairman. On August 23 of the same year the Political Bureau and the Commission had submitted "a revised draft of the PRC Constitution" to be examined by the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Congress. In September the draft was "approved in the main" by the Plenary Meeting. Then, following Chairman Mao's special resolution, the draft was sent out to Party cells (Party committees had not yet been established at that time—*Authors*) in the provinces, cities under the authority of the central government, autonomous regions and the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee to be discussed in secret.

The distribution of the drafts was accompanied by the "Note of the CPC Central Committee" which stated, among other things, that "the revised draft of the PRC Constitution was a continuation and development of the PRC Constitution of 1954" which had "played a great historic role in building a socialist state of proletarian dictatorship and defending the motherland". The "Note" gave no explanation as to why this Constitution could not continue to be operative as the country's fundamental law, but only enumerated the "merits" of the draft which "gives a clear-cut definition of the leading role of the great Chairman Mao and his close comrade-in-arms, Deputy Chairman Lin Piao, and the Communist Party's leadership of the state; proclaims Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung's thought—the leading line in the work of the entire country—as the theoretical guidelines of all our ideas, and gives a clear-cut definition of classes, class contradictions, class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat under socialism and the continuation of the revolution under this dictatorship,

and the enormous role of the popular masses and the people's army."

This enumeration testified to the endeavours of the architects of the new Constitution to incorporate in this document certain theses of the "cultural revolution", but did not explain the need for a new Constitution. The point, however, is that the Constitution of 1954, which was a Constitution of the socialist type and which drew heavily on the experience of state building in the USSR and other socialist countries, had proved to be a hindrance in the implementation of the Maoist policy. Under this Constitution the system of state administration was based on the principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership and participation of the people in state administration. The system of judicial bodies was founded on democratic principles under which justice was administered only by courts, with people's assessors taking part in the judicial process. Judges were independent and under the sole authority of the law. Trials were public and afforded the defendant the right to defence. The organisation and work of the procurators was conducted on the principle of centralisation and in the discharge of their functions the procurators were independent of the local authorities. The Constitution proclaimed equality of citizens before the law and national equality, and guaranteed socio-economic and other rights. The Constitution of 1954 also incorporated a large-scale programme for the building of socialism in the country.³

Contrary to the Maoists' allegations the Constitution of 1954 had not exhausted its historical role. However the mechanism of government based on this Constitution was alien in principle to the Maoist conception of the form and content of power and was eliminated during the "cultural revolution". The Constitution of 1954 did not suit the Maoists because, among other things, it described as sacrosanct "relations of inviolable friendship with the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" and other socialist countries. These relations, based on proletarian internationalism, had been violated by the Maoists. The Maoist "cultural revolution" had made the Constitution a fictitious document; it had in effect been abolished.

Most of the articles in the draft Constitution of 1970 were incorporated into the PRC Constitution of 1975. Another draft was adopted by the Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the 10th Convocation in late August 1973. Like the earlier one, it was sent out to local administrative bodies to be discussed in secret.⁴ Both drafts were identical with the Constitution of 1975 as regards their main content and the number of articles. Radical changes were made in the preambles to the first draft and the Constitution (the second draft, in the version published abroad, had no preamble, and it was surmised that the version sent to local authorities lacked one), and in Article 2 there were differences between the first and second drafts. Inasmuch as a thorough analysis of the new Constitution is given below we shall now draw the reader's attention to the difference between the two drafts.

In the first draft Lin Piao's name was repeatedly mentioned alongwith that of Mao Tse-tung. Article 2 of Draft No. 1 read: "Chairman Mao Tse-tung is a great leader of all of the country's nations and nationalities, the head of our state of proletarian dictatorship, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the country's Armed Forces. Deputy Chairman Lin Piao is Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces". Lin Piao's name was also mentioned in the preamble of the draft ("under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Deputy Chairman Lin Piao") and once again in the main text where "the basic right and duty" of "supporting Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his close comrade-in-arms Deputy Chairman Lin Piao" was made incumbent upon the citizens of the PRC.

Naturally, Lin Piao's name was completely missing from Draft No. 2, while Mao Tse-tung was referred to as head of state and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the "right and duty" of supporting him was imposed upon the citizens. Besides, both drafts stated that the state bodies and their personnel were duty bound to "actively study and apply Mao Tse-tung's thought".

In the preamble to Draft No. 1 Mao Tse-tung's name was mentioned eight times: three times in connection with his

thought (one of these in the phrase Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung's-thought) and in all the other instances in connection with his person ("The Chinese people under the leadership of the great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China"; "The Chinese people following the course outlined by Chairman Mao Tse-tung"; he was called "the founder of the People's Republic of China", who "guides our victorious movement ahead", etc.). None of this was retained in Draft No. 2 of the Constitution.

Other differences between the drafts boiled down to immaterial changes of wording (Article 6 of Draft No. 2 dropped the word "waters" in enumerating the property of the state; Articles 13 and 14 were interchanged in Draft No. 2, etc.). Note must be made that in the final text of the new Constitution its authors in many cases used the wording of Draft No. 1. Thus, the basic propositions of the Constitution that was adopted and came into force in 1975 were formulated immediately after the "cultural revolution", i.e., five years before the holding of the first session of the NPC of the Fourth Convocation.

2. The Session

After the "cultural revolution" the convocation of the NPC had been first promised by the Chinese leaders at the Second Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the Ninth Convocation in 1970. The Maoists immediately made it known that the Fourth Convocation of the NPC would be held, and this despite the fact that the NPC of the Third Convocation had met only once — from December 11, 1964, to January 4, 1965⁵ — and that no official communique regarding its dissolution had been issued. The NPC of the Third Convocation, formed on the basis of universal franchise, was eliminated by the "cultural revolution", like other PRC state institutions. Many of its deputies were declared to belong to the "black gang" and were discredited. Others totally disappeared from China's political scene. Therefore it was impossible to hold the Third Convocation of the NPC, and hence the official declaration on the holding of the Fourth Convocation. In their New Year editorial (1971) the three central press organs (*Jenmin Jihpao*,

Chiehfangchiun Pao and the magazine *Hungchi*) had called 1971 the year of the opening of the NPC Session of the Fourth Convocation. However, due to the "September crisis" of 1971, resulting in the disappearance from the political scene and death of Mao Tse-tung's successor whose status had been officially proclaimed in the CPC Rules and the Draft Constitution of 1970, the NPC session was put off for several more years.

The NPC opened in January 1975, more than a year (16 months) after the last promised date of its convocation given in Chou En-lai's report at the 10th CPC Congress. The period after the Congress had been marked by an internecine struggle between the Maoist groupings under the guise of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". The composition of the new NPC was most probably decided upon in early November 1974 but for some reasons the session was put off till the following year. Perhaps at the last moment the distribution of state posts between the Maoist groupings or the wording of the Constitution had become the stumbling block.

There were no elections to the NPC of the Fourth Convocation. According to the *Hsinhua* report on the NPC session⁶ its deputies were elected on the basis of broad democratic consultations and numerous discussions. The words "on the basis of democratic consultations were" not new in Chinese political terminology. As mentioned above, the Ninth and 10th Congresses of the CPC were held in the same way: their delegates were appointed without the holding of local Party congresses or conferences. Contrary to the official electoral law,⁷ there were no local meetings of people's representatives. According to "elections on the basis of democratic consultations the deputies or delegates were appointed by the respective local organs (Party committees and "revolutionary committees") after consultations with the central authorities, with total disregard for the opinion of the electors (or collectives authorised to act as electors).

The total number of deputies to the NPC of the Fourth Convocation was 2,885 (against 3,040 at the previous session) with 12 deputies representing Taiwan. No information was given as to Chinese representatives from abroad. No explanation

was given as to why the number of deputies had gone down in spite of the increase in population. Most of the deputies were described as "advanced persons who had distinguished themselves in the great proletarian cultural revolution and the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius movement." It can be surmised on the strength of this that "fresh blood" prevailed in the NPC, i.e., that its deputies had started their political career at the time of the "cultural revolution" and the subsequent political and ideological campaigns. According to the list of deputies published by the Presidium of the Session and the Standing Committee of the NPC veteran political leaders from among non-party people and leaders of other parties and groups were broadly represented.

The official sittings of the NPC were preceded by a Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee (January 8-10, 1975) on whose behalf the reports and the draft of the new PRC Constitution were presented at the session. Undoubtedly, the Plenary Meeting had taken a decision on the appointments to the supreme state posts that were approved at the session. There were two stages in the work of the session. A preparatory sitting was held between January 5-11, where according to an official *Hsinhua* report "the deputies discussed the basic documents of the session and all the preparatory work." To all appearances, the deputies were "coached" as to the content of the documents intended for the session and were indoctrinated in view of the forthcoming formation of the state's supreme organs. It is characteristic that the preparatory sitting was held simultaneously with the Plenary Meeting of the CPC Central Committee, a fact testifying, among other things, to the exceedingly formal character of the two forums—everything had been decided by a narrow grouping of the supreme leaders of the new CPC.

The session was held officially between January 13-17, 1975. Its agenda contained the following three items: (1) amendments to the Constitution; (2) report on the work of the government; (3) election and appointment of leading state workers.

The first item undoubtedly received the foremost attention at the session. However, inasmuch as an analysis of the new

Constitution is a subject for separate discussion, we shall begin our study of the session's work from the second item on the agenda.

The report of Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council, on the work of the government, was anything but a government report. It was rather a set of Maoist political slogans and full of rabid anti-Sovietism. It would have been hardly possible for the Premier to produce a worthwhile report on the work of the State Council which had ceased functioning as a collective government body in the period under review (which began, in all likelihood, at the beginning of 1965 after the closing of the preceding NPC session), a time when nearly all of the Premier's deputies and the overwhelming majority of the Ministers and Chairmen of State Committees had been included in the "black gang" and the entire apparatus of the State Council had been placed under strict military control. A distinctive feature of Chou En-lai's report as compared with his pronouncements in the course of the previous decade, was the citing of some economic data taken at random mainly to confirm the allegedly effective policy of "relying on one's own forces". Even this biased (and possibly, falsified) information testified to the declining rate of economic growth. Another characteristic fact was that Chou En-lai compared data for 1964 and 1974, which enabled him to conceal the considerable economic decline that had followed the "cultural revolution."

Chou En-lai's report could not have been free from contradictions. Firstly, the report, like other documents of the session, was the result of a compromise between various groupings of Chinese leaders; secondly, it reflected the contradictions between the vital interests of the Chinese people and the great-power ambitions of the Maoist leadership, between the country's socialist base which continued to exist in its main elements and the anti-socialist policy of its leaders. On the one hand, the report was full of apologetic sentiments in regard to the "cultural revolution", the "theory of continuing the revolution in conditions of proletarian dictatorship" and the corresponding Maoist slogans and directives. On the other, this was the first official document of the Chinese leaders since 1966 that dwelt on "the necessity of strengthening still further

the material base of socialism", whereas the prospects of accomplishing this task were made conditional on the planning and organisational activities of state bodies at all levels, and on "industrial facilities, production teams, and other low-level organisations". Like the policy of "relying on one's own forces" all this was incompatible with the slogan of "apply for foreign aid" even if this aid were to be regarded only as an "additional means". The country's economic prospects were expressed in the reiteration of the "draft on the possible economic development of China" originally drawn up by the Premier 10 years earlier "on the instructions of Chairman Mao Tse-tung". This draft lacked any concrete figures whatsoever and boiled down to "creating by 1980 a self-sufficient and comparatively integral system of industry and agriculture" and "achieving by the end of the century a comprehensive modernisation of agriculture, industry, the defence industry, science and technology", thereby enabling China to take its place "among the world's economically most advanced countries". These "estimates" expressed Mao Tse-tung's hegemonistic ambitions showing a total lack of any concern for the Chinese working man.

It was also difficult to link the Maoist slogan on the increasing sharpening of class struggle with the demand to unite "all forces that it is possible to unite"; moreover, one of the paragraphs of the report stated that cohesion was "the basic guarantee of the victory of our cause" (in the preceding paragraphs it was stated that the "cultural revolution", which could hardly be said to have promoted the unity of Chinese society, was such a guarantee). The report gave the impression of having been written by people belonging to different trends of thought. However, there is no doubt that the existence of differing directives in official documents served to disorient the masses while offering the ruling clique greater possibilities for political manoeuvring.

The greater part of Chou En-lai's report dealt with questions of foreign policy, i.e., a sphere least known to the people at large. In his report the Premier gave a distorted picture of the international situation, typical of Maoist propaganda. The political division of the world into socialist and capitalist countries was replaced by the categories of advanced and developing

countries the latter allegedly exclusively concerned with defending their independence from the encroachments of the "two super-powers" vying with each other to subordinate all countries and people, a rivalry fraught with the danger of a new world war.

According to this Maoist scheme, socialism as a factor of global significance did not exist at all and the world socialist community had ceased to exist. The Maoists utterly rejected the postulate that class motives determine a state's foreign policy. In their opinion, reflected in Chou En-lai's report, world politics and the entire developments in the world were determined by the urge of all countries irrespective of class distinctions to free themselves from the control of the "two super-powers" and the latter's endeavours to enslave the peoples. According to the Maoist classification the Soviet Union was allegedly a greater enemy of the peoples' freedom than US imperialism.

Chou En-lai's report at the NPC session showed once again that the achievement of world hegemony continued to be the chief aim of the Maoists' foreign policy. It showed that they regarded the world socialist system and above all the Soviet Union, the vanguard of contemporary revolutionary forces, as the chief impediment in the path of the realisation of their ambitions. This accounted for all the talk about "social-imperialism" and the endeavours to win allies among the most aggressive imperialist quarters, i.e., the concrete policy of teaming up with imperialist and other reactionary forces against the forces of peace, democracy and socialism, for the achievement of chauvinistic aims presented by the Maoists as the national goals of the Chinese people.

In his report Chou En-lai once again said that China belonged to the third-world countries. This was not only a claim to leadership in the "third world", a step in achieving world hegemony, but also evidence of the Maoist leaders' departure from the struggle for socialist goals, their rejection of socialism as the decisive factor of world development.

However, the PRC Constitution—the chief document adopted by the NPC session—made no mention of China as being one of the developing countries. This was obviously the result of

the struggle inside the Chinese leadership and the ensuing contradictory character of the documents adopted at the session. This can also be attributed to the Maoists' endeavours to make political capital by alternately resorting to socialist slogans and laying claims that China belonged to the "third world" countries, depending on the situation.

The Maoist leaders used the rostrum of the NPC session and Chou En-lai's report to claim that "there is no detente in this world". By advancing, in the conditions of their collusion with imperialism, their thesis of the inevitability of a world war, and referring to the Soviet Union as the chief source of military threat, the Maoists, seeing no other prospects for the waging of an active struggle for their hegemonistic aims in conditions of peace, tried to instigate the most aggressive Western quarters to step up military preparations and to undermine the cause of peace.

Nothing is known of the reaction of NPC deputies (even formally) to Chou En-lai's report. No information was given as to whether the report was discussed at all. The Chinese people were not allowed to discuss the materials of the NPC session in a proper manner. These materials were soon utilised in a new mass campaign often running counter to the decisions adopted by the supreme government body. This will be discussed later on.

The session concluded its work with the formation of the highest government bodies. This was carried out on the basis of the newly-adopted Constitution and involved the formation of only two bodies : the Standing Committee of the NPC and the State Council (the PRC Government); the NPC was no longer authorised to appoint the Chairman of the Supreme Court, and the posts of the Chairman of the PRC and the General Procurator were abolished.

The newly-elected Standing Committee of the NPC comprised a Chairman, 22 Deputy Chairmen and 144 members (formerly there had been 18 Deputy Chairmen and 96 members). The Standing Committee was headed by Marshal Chu Te, one of the oldest leaders of the CPC and the PLA. Most of his deputies were also among the country's oldest state and public leaders. Among them one could find the late Tung

Pi-wu, Liu Po-cheng, Nieh Jung-chen, Sung Ching-ling, Kuo Mo-jo and Chen Yung, Chou Chian-jen, brother of the writer Lu Hsun, and Chang Ting-cheng, former Procurator-General. All the veteran members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, with the exception of Mao Tse-tung himself, made up the leadership of the NPC Standing Committee. Worthy of note was the greater number of women in the Committee and the NPC in general, a fact of political significance serving to create conditions for the further rise of Chiang Ching, and persons of non-Chinese nationality (among the Deputy Chairmen of the Committee one came across such well-known leaders from China's national minorities as Ulanfu, Saifuddin, Ngapod Ngagwang-Jigmed and Wei Kuo-ching). Subsequent events showed the obvious attempts of the Chinese leaders to substitute the Standing Committee for the NPC as such, particularly in those cases where it had become necessary to keep back from the people and the world public certain information shedding light on the situation inside the country. Thus soon after the first session of the NPC of the Fourth Convocation its Standing Committee adopted the Budget and the National Economic Plan for 1975, although according to the new Constitution this was the prerogative of the NPC session.

The membership of the newly-appointed State Council was smaller than before the "cultural revolution". The number of the Premier's deputies decreased from 16 to 12 and the number of Ministers and State Committees from 46 to 29. Chou En-lai retained the post of Premier. For the first time, the leadership of the State Council began to include representatives of the "left" faction of the Maoist leadership, including the Premier's deputies Ching Chun-chiao, Chen Yung-kuei (member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, formerly Secretary of the Party group in the Tachai production team), Wu Kuei-hsien (alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, formerly a *tsaofan* leader in Changan), Sun Chian' (alternate member of the CPC Central Committee, who had made a career in Tientsin during the "cultural revolution"). It is most likely that the Premier's deputies, Chen Hsi-lian (member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Commander-in-Chief

of the Peking Military District⁸), Hua Kuo-feng (member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, also appointed Minister of Public Security) and Chi Teng-kuei (member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, First Political Commissar of the Peking Military District) also belonged to the "left" faction. Most of the Ministers and Chairmen of State Committees were former military men who had made their career during the "cultural revolution" and at one time had headed military-control organs in the ministries. Three women were appointed to government posts (the number of women in the previous PRC governments had never exceeded three). It is worth noting that representatives of non-Chinese nationalities were completely missing in the government body exercising real power. The Committee for the Affairs of Nationalities, disbanded during the "cultural revolution", was re-established; neither the Commission for Nationalities of the NPC nor any of its standing committees were elected at the session.

The adoption of the new Constitution was not accompanied by the passing of laws defining in detail the principles of organisation and work of the state bodies (the first session of the NPC of the first convocation had adopted five such laws).⁹ The absence of the laws left room for an arbitrary interpretation of the Constitution. The new PRC Constitution contained no legal barriers to preclude arbitrariness. Moreover, several articles (chiefly those consolidating the practices of the cultural revolution) actually legalised arbitrary rule.

Bearing in mind all that has been said above it is impossible to agree with the appraisal of the NPC session given by bourgeois Sinologists who called it the victory of "moderate" forces, provided, of course, one does not use this term to denote all who were ready to collaborate with the imperialists who were glad at the anti-Soviet character of the session and the Constitution. The results of the session also testified to the important successes scored by the "leftists"; this was the first time they had attained such broad representation in the State Council.

The materials of the session also showed that various factions in the Maoist leadership were united on the basis of great-power chauvinism and anti-Sovietism. The NPC session

did not denote a retreat from the "cultural revolution" but signified the consolidation of those of its results that were advantageous to the Maoists.

3. *The New Constitution of the PRC*

The report on the draft of the new Constitution, known as the "Report on the Amendments to the Constitution", was made at the NPC session by Chang Chun-chiao, a prominent member of the group of Shanghai "radicals". At that time he did not hold any state post. Bearing in mind that at the first session of the NPC of the first convocation the report was delivered by Liu Shao-chi, at that time No. 2 in the Chinese leadership, this fact can be regarded as Chang Chun-chiao's introduction as one of the country's leading state figures. At this forum he represented a definite group in the Maoist leadership. The two main reports at the session were delivered by representatives of the leading groups.

To a certain degree Chang Chun-chiao's report was a more integrated document than the one made by Chou En-lai. Despite its contradictory character, inherent in Maoism as such, it gave a relatively consistent outline of his faction's policy. The Constitution was discussed by Chang Chun-chiao mainly from the premise of the Maoist thesis on "the unflagging continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat". He defined this as "the main task in the present revision of the Constitution", and called the PLA and the people's militia the main support of the dictatorship of the proletariat (in its Maoist interpretation).

Chang Chun-chiao's report was nothing less than an eulogy on the "cultural revolution", but in contrast to Chou En-lai's report there was not even the slightest hint of the need for a swift augmentation of the productive forces in order to strengthen socialism. As the spokesman of the "leftists" he proposed that all efforts should be concentrated on the superstructure, "to devote the utmost attention to socialist revolution in the sphere of the superstructure, to the solution of questions dealing with production relations". The method suggested was one typical of the "cultural revolution": "trash never disappears of itself if

it is not swept out by a proletarian (i.e.; a Maoist—*Authors*) broom.

In effect Chang Chun-chiao's report was wholly devoted to substantiating the Maoist theses included in the preamble to the Constitution and its first chapter. Questions of building up the state apparatus and ensuring the rights of the citizens, which form an essential part of all Constitutions, were wholly omitted. Nothing was said about any proposals having been submitted during the discussion of the Constitution.

Chang Chun-chiao characterised the draft as "the continuation and development of the Constitution of 1954, whose main principles are applicable to this day". A study of the two documents, however, shows that their common features consisted in only their structure and titles of chapters. Their content was different in principle.

As mentioned above most of the propositions developed in the drafts were incorporated into the Constitution of 1975. It made no mention of the appointment of Mao Tse-tung as Head of State, and only Article 15 gave the information that the Chairman of the CPC Central Committee "commands the country's armed forces". Article 2 left out the question of the head of the state. It defined the CPC's role in the state and claimed that "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung's thought is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking of our nation", i.e., Maoism was blasphemously attached to Marxism-Leninism, its political and ideological enemy, and was proclaimed to be the state ideology.

The preamble to the new Constitution was devoid of formulations pertaining to Mao Tse-tung's person and only referred to his thoughts which were blasphemously combined with Marxism-Leninism. This fact, as well as the changes in Article 2, were evaluated by certain Sinologists as the weakening of Mao Tse-tung's political influence. However, the reason for this was perhaps quite different; following the deposition of Liu Shao-chi, Mao Tse-tung was not anxious to hold the supreme state post. What he wanted was to ensure for himself complete sway over the armed forces. Another thing which Mao Tse-tung most probably wanted was that the Constitution should remain in force after his death.

A striking feature of the new PRC Constitution was its brevity. Despite the identical nature of its structure with that of the Constitution of 1954 (preamble and four chapters) the number of the articles was reduced from 106 to 30. This was achieved mainly by abridging the second and third chapters ("The State Structure", "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens"), i.e., those chapters that call for detailed legal regulation. The second chapter ("The State Structure") contained only 10 articles (against 64 articles in the old Constitution) and the third chapter ("Fundamental Rights and Duties") only four articles as against 19 in the old Constitution. The first chapter ("General Principles") which had retained 15 articles out of 20, had suffered the least. It accounted for one-half of the text of the Constitution (formerly taking up 19 per cent of the document) and was written in a declarative form which was also true of the other chapters.¹⁰

It was difficult to classify the new PRC Constitution as a fundamental state law. It was rather a declaration by definite political forces, exponents of different views, in regard to the prevailing situation and the country's future development.

Textual differences began first of all in the preamble. The Constitution of 1954 was intended for the transitional period, defined in its preamble as "the period from the establishment of the People's Republic of China to the construction of a socialist society." The state's basic goals, including the gradual development of socialist industrialisation and gradual completion of socialist changes, were outlived for this period. The statement on the transitional period was removed from the new preamble. Instead, it contained the Maoist postulate that "socialist society covers a considerably long historical period" and that "throughout this historical period, there are classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road." China, it claimed, could be saved from the danger of capitalist restoration only by consistently "depending on the theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and on practice under its guidance."¹¹ In effect this meant the prevalence in the country's domestic policy of repressive methods, the legalisation of reprisals against the political adversaries of Maoism.

accused of being "proponents of the capitalist way of development". The political practice of the "cultural revolution" and the subsequent political campaigns showed that these accusations and consequent reprisals were resorted to equally both against the real enemies of Maoism and against those whom practical work, particularly in the sphere of management, compelled to introduce modifications into Maoist instructions and even object to them.

The preamble to the Constitution of 1954 contained a paragraph dealing with the nationalities policy. It stated among other things that "in the course of economic and cultural construction, the state shall display concern for the needs of all the nationalities, and take full account of the specific features of their development."¹² The new Constitution retained only the formula "The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state,"¹³ thereby ignoring the need to ensure genuine equality for all nationalities. The Constitution mentioned national autonomy but, contrary to the previous fundamental law, did not define the autonomous rights of national districts and envisaged the establishment of organs of self-government in forms typical of ordinary administrative-territorial units. Thus, from the standpoint of their legal status national autonomous districts were reduced to the level of these units.

The retrograde character of the constitutional provisions on national autonomy was quite obvious. Even the local national autonomy stipulated in the Constitution of 1954 and the consistent application of its articles on the national question, particularly those dealing with the actual ensuring of national equality, had not contributed to the progressive development of all the nationalities of China. But it was precisely these articles which were removed from the Constitution.

Another radical difference of the new Constitution from the previous Constitution was the total removal of the parts dealing with the principles of friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It also did not contain the final thesis of the old preamble that "the struggle for the noble goals of world peace and mankind's progress is our country's invariable line in international affairs."¹⁴ This was replaced in the new Constitution by the theses: "We should be prepared

for war" (*pei chan*); "we should build socialism independently and with the initiative in our own hands, through self-reliance" (in Maoist practice this meant ending of cooperation with socialist countries and reorientation of foreign economic ties towards the capitalist countries); "oppose the imperialist and social-imperialist policies of aggression and war and oppose the hegemonism of the super-powers." Taking into account that by social-imperialism the Maoists meant Lenin's homeland, the first socialist country, the theses had a direct anti-Soviet implication. For the Maoists were out to "excommunicate" the USSR from socialism and break up the socialist community, all the while camouflaging their own betrayal of the interests of world socialism. Need one comment after this on another thesis of the preamble which stated: "In international affairs we should uphold proletarian internationalism." For even though in the same document the Peking leaders attempted to convince the Chinese people and the world public that "China will never be a super-power", the entire Constitution was permeated with Great-Han and hegemonistic ambitions. When one read in the preamble about China's expectation "to make a greater contribution to humanity", this was only a mitigated variant of Mao Tse-tung's notorious phrase: "Our object is the whole world where we will establish a mighty power."

The same Maoist rhetoric was presented in the first chapter entitled "General Principles". Here one read that China must step up its "preparedness against war", that "cadres at all levels must participate in collective productive labour", that "the proletariat must exercise all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture", that "holding of great debates and writing of big-character posters are new forms of the carrying out of the socialist revolution."

In the previous Constitution the first chapter outlined the general principle of the PRC's socio-economic structure (character of the state, political basis, socio-economic structure of society, planned economic development, tasks of the armed forces, etc.). It contained concrete guidelines for the development of the various sectors of the economy. The first chapter of the new Constitution was full of socialist phraseology. In utter disregard of the actual situation in the country the

Constitution gave the impression that positive steps towards socialism had in effect been taken. Article 1, for instance, defined PRC as "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (the former Constitution called it a state of the democratic dictatorship of the people). Article 5 claimed that "in the People's Republic of China, there are mainly two kinds of ownership of the means of production at the present stage : socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist collective ownership by the working people" (the Constitution of 1954 maintained that China had a multi-sectoral economy with respective forms of ownership) ; the second part of this article implied ending of man's exploitation by man ("The state may allow... individual labour involving no exploitation of others..."). Article 9 contained the socialist principles, "he who does not work, neither shall he eat", and "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work", which had not been included in the former Constitution. These statements were purely fictitious, for the PRC was not a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat but one of military-bureaucratic dictatorship which among other things retained the class of national bourgeoisie living off unearned incomes. This fact reduced to naught the Maoists' constitutional proclamations.

There was nothing wrong with the theses that "the Communist Party of China is the core of the leadership of the whole Chinese people", that "the working class exercises leadership over the state through its vanguard, the Communist Party of China", were it not for the plain fact that the CPC was no longer leading the state and society. As mentioned above, it had turned into an organisation giving mass support to the regime of military-bureaucratic dictatorship, into a peculiar organisation of "rust-proof cogs of Chairman Mao", an instrument in the hands of the Maoist upper crust.

The first chapter of the new Constitution consolidated the rural "people's communes", engendered by the "great leap forward" of the late fifties, as "an organisation which integrates government administration and economic management" (Article 7). In formulating the theses on the "people's communes", the mistakes of the great leap and other Maoist experiments were taken into account. The Constitution retained, as the basic

cost-accounting unit, agricultural cooperatives known now as "production teams of the people's communes", and confirmed the right of their members to "farm small plots for their personal needs, engage in limited household side-line production, and in pastoral areas to keep a small number of livestock for their personal needs".

As in the previous Constitution, the last article of the first chapter (Article 15) defined the tasks of the armed forces. It was considerably expanded : firstly, it now maintained that the armed forces of the PRC included the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the people's militia engaged chiefly in performing police functions, with emphasis on the fact that they were "led by the Communist Party of China". This phrase was highly symbolic in the atmosphere of China's internal political struggle and had nothing to do with the enhancement of the Party's leading role in the armed forces; secondly, a special statement to the effect that "the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Mao Tse-tung—*Authors*) commands the country's armed forces" was included, thereby reducing to naught the content of the preceding paragraph on the Party's leadership of the country's armed forces, for, as noted above, Mao Tse-tung tried to maintain undivided rule over the armed forces, a rule independent of any collective body—that was precisely why the appointment of a definite person to the highest military post was envisaged in the Constitution; thirdly, the army's functions had been extended to the sphere of the economy : it was proclaimed to be not only a combat "but also a working and production detachment", thereby spreading the illusion of the "self-sufficient" character of the armed forces, on the one hand, and legalising the interference of the armed forces in the economy, on the other, the idea being to present the army as the vanguard of the proletariat; fourthly, the external function of the PRC's armed forces was given a definite political orientation : "the defence of the country against subversive activity and aggression on the part of imperialism, social-imperialism and their henchmen."¹⁵ The anti-Soviet trend of this statement is quite obvious. The possibility of using armed forces not only against aggression but also against

subversive" activity legalised armed interference in the affairs of other peoples.

Radical changes were made in the second chapter — "The State Structure". The most drastic change made in the system of higher state bodies was the elimination of the post of Chairman of the PRC—an object of sharp struggle among the Chinese leaders. The abolition of this office, which under the Constitution had authority also over the country's armed forces, led to the liquidation of the Council of National Defence (the Chairman of the PRC was also the Chairman of this Council) and the Supreme State Conference (the Chairman of the PRC convened this Conference consisting of his deputies, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the Premier of the State Council, among others, and presided over the meeting). In contrast to the Constitution of 1954, which regulated in detail the basic principles of organisation and work of state bodies, the new Constitution contained only a general and extremely vague definition of the terms of reference of state bodies.

The powers of the National People's Congress of the PRC were greatly curtailed. Its right to form other supreme state bodies was reduced to the appointment and dismissal of the Premier of the State Council and other members of this body. The Constitution did not even define the responsibility and accountability to the NPC of its Standing Committee. The NPC no longer had anything to do with the formation of the Supreme People's Court, and the Constitution made no provision for the appointment of the Supreme People's Procurator. The new Constitution of the PRC made no mention of the NPC's duty to check on the implementation of the Constitution, the NPC's right to take decisions on questions of war and peace, grant amnesty or approve the system of government. Provisions stating and guaranteeing the rights of NPC deputies, such as the right of a deputy to address enquiries to the State Council or Ministry (and the duty of these bodies to reply to such enquiries), or the right of a deputy's to inviolability of person, among others, were expunged from the Constitution. The new Constitution lacked the previous provisions regarding the formation of the standing committees of the NPC, for nationalities, draft

laws, the budget, etc., and of commissions dealing with the investigation of specific questions. This reduced the work of the NPC to yearly sessions which could be put off "in case of need".

The new Constitution drastically reduced the powers of the NPC Standing Committee. Neither was anything said about its supervision of the work of other supreme state bodies (State Council, Supreme People's Court), its right to appoint officials (with the exception of official representatives to foreign states), its right to grant amnesty and declare war.

The competence of the State Council was defined in a highly vague manner. Its concrete powers were reduced from 16 in the Constitution of 1954 to five; it had lost its former functions of defending the interests of the state, maintaining public order, guiding work in the sphere of culture, education and public health services, supervising the building of the country's armed forces, etc., as well as the right to endorse the administrative division of autonomous regions, *uyezds*, autonomous districts and cities. Nothing was said about the competence of Ministers and heads of State Committees. In the former Constitution, a special article (51) was devoted to these questions. It read: "The Ministers and Heads of Commissions direct the work of their respective departments and may issue orders and directives within their jurisdiction".

The Constitution of 1975 stated that "revolutionary committees", the offspring of the "cultural revolution", would be the organs of local government bodies. According to Article 22 of the Constitution, "The local revolutionary committees at various levels are the permanent organs of the local people's congresses" (i.e., take the place of people's committees). Inasmuch as the Constitution gave them equal rights with the people's congresses (Article 23), they were given the right to tackle at their meetings (which in practice meant at the meetings of their "hard nuclei") all questions falling within the competence of local government bodies without holding sessions of people's congresses. Moreover, the people's congresses were now to be formed from bottom to top through a system of democratic consultations, i.e., without the participation of electors. Under the new Constitution local government bodies had lost their

former authority "to ensure the equality of national minorities".

The new Constitution abolished the people's Procuratorates, which were law-enforcement bodies. Their functions were turned over to organs of national security which now had the right to sanction and make arrests. The categories of people's courts continued to exist as before (the Supreme People's Court, local people's courts, special people's courts), but changes were introduced in the procedure of appointing the Presidents of the people's courts, "who are appointed and subject to removal by the permanent organs of the people's congresses at the corresponding levels", i.e., the NPC Standing Committee and "revolutionary committees" (formerly the President of the Supreme Court was elected by the NPC, and the Presidents of local courts by local people's congresses). The democratic principles regulating the courts' organisation and work were removed from the Constitution. They were replaced by an obscure statement (Article 25) claiming that "the mass line must be applied in procuratorial work and in trying cases". Another characteristic phrase was that "in major counter-revolutionary criminal cases the masses should be mobilised for discussion and criticism". What was implied by "counter-revolutionary cases" was well known in China. This thesis could be regarded as the legalisation of mob trials involving executions at stadiums as during the "cultural revolution".

The third chapter of the Constitution, "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens", no longer contained the proposition: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China are equal before the law" (Article 85 of the PRC Constitution of 1954). The basic right and duty of the citizens was "to support the leadership of the Communist Party of China", i.e., Mao Tse-tung.

The Constitution of 1975 was extremely retrograde as compared with the old Constitution with regard to the citizens' socio-economic rights (right to work, leisure, education, material security in old age, in case of illness or disability). The former Constitution specified each of these rights in a corresponding article which defined respective material guarantees for them. As regards the right to work Article 91 of the Constitution of 1954 read: "Citizens have the right to work. To guarantee the enjoyment of this right, the state, by planned

development of the national economy, gradually creates more employment, and better working conditions and wages". Material guarantees of the right to leisure were ensured in Article 92: "To guarantee the enjoyment of this right, the state prescribes working hours and holidays for workers and office employees; at the same time it gradually expands material facilities to enable the working people to rest and build up their health". The right to "material assistance in old age, illness or disability" was guaranteed by providing "social insurance, social assistance and public health services and gradually expanding these facilities" (Article 93). And lastly the right to education (Article 94) was guaranteed through the establishment and extension of "various types of schools and other cultural and educational institutions". Material guarantees were provided for social and political freedoms of citizens (Article 87).

All provisions regarding material guarantees of civil rights were removed from the new Constitution. Many of these had come into conflict with the Maoist postulates and political practice. From Mao Tse-tung's point of view such guarantees of the right to work as "creating better working conditions and raising real wages" boiled down to "economism" and "revisionism." No statutory vacations or fixed working hours for factory and office workers, guaranteeing the constitutional right to rest and leisure, existed in China. The overwhelming majority of Chinese citizens did not enjoy social security rights. By systematically reducing the allocation of funds for sanitation and medical services to the population, the Chinese leaders foisted upon the people a system of "barefooted physicians", i.e., hastily trained medical orderlies. Four out of every ten Chinese children in the school age brackets could not attend school. Meanwhile the state continued to reduce the allocations on school education and tried to shift the financial burden on to the shoulders of the production teams in the people's communes and urban settlements.

Article 95 of the Constitution of 1954, according to which "the People's Republic of China safeguards the freedom of citizens to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activity and encourages those

engaged in creative work", was removed from the new Constitution.

The new Constitution annulled all previous provisions concerning the right of the citizens to freedom of residence and change of place of residence, and to privacy of correspondence. Although provisions regarding personal immunity were retained, there were no guarantees of their implementation. With the abolition of procurators' organs arrests could be sanctioned by the public security organs, i.e., the same organs that made the arrests and which were free of all control.

An interesting feature was the right of citizens "to strike" which, as stated in the "Report on the Amendments to the PRC Constitution", was introduced on the personal intervention of Mao Tse-tung. This provision was only a post-dated legalisation of the actions undertaken by the *tsaofans* (at the time of the cultural revolution) who had resorted to strikes in order to "seize power", (i.e., to remove leaders who had lost favour with the Maoists) at enterprises, and of possible actions of this kind in future. It was not by chance that the report stated: "Certain enterprises are formally considered socialist property but actually the management there does not belong to Marxists or the people's masses. Many positions, if they are not taken over by the proletariat, are seized by the bourgeoisie".

On the whole, the new Constitution, despite the claims of its makers, did nothing to promote China's progress. As compared with the former Constitution many of its provisions (particularly those dealing with the state structure and civil rights) were plainly retrograde.

An analysis of the new Constitution of the PRC shows that its main object was not to bring the country back to the path of constitutional legality but to consolidate the results of the "cultural revolution" that had been profitable for the Maoists. Besides, it was obviously the result of a compromise between different groupings in the Maoist leadership (along with its appeals to make ready for war it contained the five principles of peaceful coexistence). The general tenor of the Constitution ran counter to the statements on the gradual improvement of the people's material and cultural level (Article 10), or on the payment of wages according to work (Article 9), etc. This

made possible the utilisation of some of its provisions in future in the interests of socialism and progress. But its text provided even greater opportunities for the utilisation of this document for anti-popular purposes. The Constitution could be widely utilised by the Maoists to justify any kind of zigzags in the political course of the Chinese leadership, new repressions and illegal actions.

NOTES

1. The "Note on the Opinion Poll as Regards the Holding of the Ninth CPC Congress", sent to local administrative bodies by the CPC leading group in November 1967, plainly stated: "After the Ninth Congress the NPC will be convened to relieve Liu Shao-chi of his post and to elect the Chairman of the state".
2. "Note of the CPC Central Committee", *Chungfa*, No. 56, 1170.
3. While giving a positive evaluation of the PRC Constitution of 1954 as a whole one cannot agree with its provision for the solution of the national question in a multinational socialist state, inasmuch as it confined this solution to administrative autonomy and the setting up of national rural districts, and ignored the right of nations to self-determination.
4. The draft Constitutions were not made public in China. *Tohio Shimbun* of November 5, 1970, the Hong-Kong magazine *Chunghua Yuehpao* in its No. 117 issue of 1974, and some other foreign press organs carried the texts of the drafts which had been smuggled out of China.
5. There were eight items on the agenda of the first and only session of the NPC of the Third Convocation, including the items on the work of the government, the Supreme Court and Supreme Procurator, the National Economic Plan and Budget for 1965, and the formation of the highest state organs.
6. See *Hsinhua* report of January 18, 1975.
7. Officially known as the law on elections to the National People's Congress and local people's congresses, adopted at the 22nd Session of the National People's Congress of the PRC on February 11, 1953.
8. Chen Hsi-lian, however, was not appointed Minister of Defence (the post went to Ye Chian-ying) with the result that the new Minister of

Defence became subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of a military district.

9. Law on the organisation of the NPC, the State Council, local people's congresses and local people's committees, the courts and procurators.
10. With the exception of Chapter 4 ("National Flag, State Emblem, Capital") consisting of a single article, and the only chapter which had not suffered any change.
11. *Peking Review*, January 24, 1975.
12. *Europa Book*, Vol. II, p. 352.
13. *Peking Review*, January 24, 1975.
14. *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, September 20, 1954.
15. According to the Constitution of 1954 the duty of the armed forces was "to safeguard the gains of the people's revolution and of national construction, and to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the country". (Article 20)

6

Growing Instability of Maoist Regime

1. Campaigns and more Campaigns

The Maoists' failure to solve the urgent problems facing China in the sphere of economic and political development on the ideological basis of Maoism, a failure so strikingly demonstrated by the National People's Congress of the Fourth Convocation, a failure which clearly increased the discontent of the broad sections of the Chinese people and created fresh differences of opinion within the Maoist leadership itself, all pointed to another flare-up of the internecine struggle. A major feature of the socio-political manoeuvring of the Maoists was their stepped-up exploitation of Marxism-Leninism and the launching of massive campaign under the slogan: "Study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat".

In an editorial published in *Jenmin Jihpao* dated February 9, 1975, Mao Tse-tung tried to justify the new campaign by references to Lenin's works. On February 22 the paper published some 30 quotations arbitrarily torn out of context from different works of Marx, Engels and Lenin in an effort to prove the need for and the relevance of the campaign of the "Study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat". The newspaper tried to portray the "recent instructions of Chairman Mao" on how best to conduct the campaign as an example of "the profound treatment of the Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat."¹

These futile attempts of the Maoists failed, however, to cover up the anti-Marxist character of the new campaign. On the contrary, by quoting the founders of Marxism-Leninism

out of context, the Maoists revealed their real intentions and aims in launching the campaign which had nothing in common with the great historical mission of the working class.

The dictatorship of the proletariat has two basic tasks to fulfil. On the one hand, as Lenin wrote; "The dictatorship of the proletariat is class struggle waged by a proletariat that is victorious and has taken political power into its hands against the bourgeoisie that has been defeated but not destroyed, a bourgeoisie that has not vanished, not ceased to offer resistance, but has intensified its resistance."² On the other hand, along with the task of crushing the resistance of the exploiting classes, Lenin emphasised that "another task comes to the forefront just as inevitably and even more imperatively as time goes on, namely, the more important task of positive communist construction, the creation of new economic relations of a new society."³ It follows then that the suppression of the resistance of the exploiting classes in one of the basic tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but that the essence of this power cannot be reduced to violence and repression alone which, as we shall see, was exactly what the Maoists were trying to do. The aim of the dictatorship of the proletariat consists in the construction of a new society. In Chapter V of his well known work *The State and Revolution* Lenin specifically dealt with the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the construction of the new society.

Lenin outlined a transitional period during which emphasis is laid on the first task, and also a period of socialism when the second task of the dictatorship of the proletariat takes precedence.

Let us now examine the tasks the Maoists set before the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The February 1975 issue of *Hungchi* carried an article by one Lu Yang pretentiously entitled, "To Exercise the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Respect of the Bourgeoisie" which listed the following tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat as seen by the Maoists: "repression against traitorous elements" (which in Peking jargon meant repression against those who stood for friendship with the Soviet Union), "struggle against the new bourgeois elements" (later it was explained that

this category encompassed workers, Party members and leading officials), "re-education of the working class and the peasantry" in the spirit of "Mao Tse-tung's thought", "stepping up of war preparations", "restricting bourgeois law" (thereby meaning the abolition of material incentives), and "struggle against the revisionists" (Peking jargon for those who opposed Mao). It will be seen that in this catalogue of tasks no mention was made of the suppression of the resistance of the bourgeoisie. The reason for this can be easily appreciated if one remembers that in line with the instructions issued by the "Great Helmsman" the national bourgeoisie in China even at that time derived unearned income in the shape of interest payments on invested capital and that successive campaigns under awe-inspiring slogans had left the Chinese bourgeoisie untouched. Secondly, the author of the article made no mention whatsoever of the constructive functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, it can be seen that this Maoist campaign totally neglected and even misinterpreted the true tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat notwithstanding its rather pretentious slogan of the "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat". The various articles that appeared later and which spelled out current policy reduced the above-mentioned "tasks" to so-called "restricting of bourgeois law" and "struggle" against "new bourgeois elements" which demonstrated once again that the Maoists had abandoned such crucial tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the strengthening and constant improvement of socialist state power based on the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and other sections of the working people; creation of a socialist economy based on public ownership, and developing according to a single plan in the interests of raising the living and cultural standards of the masses; development of socialist democracy, the carrying out of socialist revolution in ideology and culture; the pursuit of the policy of proletarian internationalism which implied active work for closer unity among the socialist countries and for the strengthening of the anti-imperialist front.⁴

Thus, from the theoretical standpoint the campaign of the "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" was merely another stratagem whereby the Maoists were trying to sell

"Mao Tse-tung's thought" and the Trotskyite-Maoist "permanent revolution with the dictatorship of the proletariat in force throughout the socialist stage" under cover of a false version of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The *Hungchi* of February 9, 1975, in an editorial entitled, "The way to Master the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", quoted Chairman Mao's recent instructions in which he had given examples of "bourgeois law", namely, "the eight-grade system of wages, distribution according to work and exchange through the medium of money." The "Great Helmsman" had proposed "to restrict" all this. Yao Wen-yuan, in the article, "On the Social Basis of Lin Piao's Anti-party Group" published in the March 1975 issue of the magazine, spelled out the meaning of "restriction of bourgeois law" and the struggle against new bourgeois elements. Yao Wen-yuan vehemently attacked the idea of "material incentives" which, according to him, would eventually "wreck the socialist planned economy". In his view, the root cause of China's troubles lay in "material stimulation", which the Maoists had been banning since the time of the "cultural revolution" (1966-1969) but had failed to do so completely.

As for the other aspect of bourgeois law, namely, the "eight-grade system of wages", Yao Wen-yuan was not proposing to do away with wages completely, something that was once tried with disastrous consequences during the "great leap forward" in 1958. Instead, he came up with a no less ingenious suggestion: "to narrow the pay differentials between different grades". What this meant of course was that hundreds of millions of the working people were asked to accept wage cuts.

It was an open secret that China had one of the lowest standards of living in the world. The average wage of worker's amounted to 50-60 yuan a month. Food and other essentials were rationed. Watches and radios, let alone TV sets, were considered luxuries. In this situation the Maoists proposed to reduce the workers' wages still further, although no further reduction seemed possible.

Yao Wen-yuan's article triggered off a large-scale propaganda campaign to abolish material incentives. *Jenmin Jihpao* wrote in April 1975: "The masses should be stimulated to

work better and put in greater effort not through material incentives but through education in the spirit of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."⁵ The campaign was of course accompanied by the loud fanfare of high-sounding pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric with the help of which the Maoists were trying to "sell" the idea of wage levelling—the "Great Helmsman's" pet idea.

Marx, while criticising Proudhon, who "regarded equality of wages as the aim of the social revolution" had opposed wage levelling.⁶ Lenin had also opposed levelling of wages and had emphasised that "the state not only persuades, but also rewards good workers by creating better living conditions for them."⁷

Thus, the Maoists launched an onslaught on the vital interests and economic well-being of the Chinese working people on the basis of the bankrupt "philosophy" of poverty as a blessing, under cover of the Marxist-Leninist terminology borrowed from the teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Instead of working to ensure, in Lenin's words, "the full well-being and free, all-round development of all the members of society,"⁸ the Maoists, during the course of the campaign, urged the workers "to demand less from the state and to give more to the revolution,"⁹ "to demolish by criticism the insidious black revisionist commodity of material incentives" and thereby carry out "a crucial measure to restrict bourgeois law."¹⁰ Maoist propagandists urged the workers to follow the example of one Sun Wen-hsing from Kiangsi Province who "does the work of three but refuses to accept increased pay or bonuses."¹¹

Amazingly, the Maoists thought it quite proper to justify their appeals to the workers to follow the example of Sun Wen-hsing by references to the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat and to Lenin's work *A Great Beginning* and other works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. It would be in order at this point to quote what Lenin had written about priority in labour. "Priority is preference, but it is nothing without preference in consumption. If all the preference I get is a couple of ounces of bread a day, I'm not likely to be very happy. The preference part of priority implies preference in consumption as well. Otherwise, priority is a pipe dream, a fleeting cloud and we are, after all, materialists. The workers

are also materialists; if you say shock work, they say, let's have the bread, and the clothes, and the beef."¹²

The question arises : why were the Maoists campaigning, in Lenin's words, for "priority without preference in consumption?" What did they intend to use the resources thus saved for?

To answer this question all one has to do is to read any of the articles in the Chinese press about the campaign. The single theme repeated in practically every article can be summed up by Mao Tse-tung's well-known appeal "to prepare for war". "Guns instead of butter"—this was the goal on the altar of which the living standards of the Chinese people were being sacrificed by the Maoists. By whipping up war hysteria, the Maoists, according to *Jenmin Jihpao*, planned by the end of the century "to join the advanced countries of the world"¹³ and thus fulfil their great-power ambitions.

One other major goal of the campaign was the struggle against what the Maoists called "the new bourgeois elements". In his article Yao Wen-yuan vehemently attacked the new "bourgeois elements among the Party members, industrial workers, well-to-do peasants and office workers", who, in his words, "have completely betrayed the cause of the proletariat and working people."¹⁴ However, the charges which the Maoist propagandists levelled against "the new bourgeois elements" indicated the reverse—the Maoist leadership had in fact betrayed the proletariat and was now waging war on the people of China.

Yao Wen-yuan's article was significantly entitled "On the Social Basis of Lin Piao's Anti-Party Group." Indeed, opposition to the Maoist regime, judging by the propaganda blasts emanating from Peking, rested on a fairly broad social base. Until a few years ago the Maoists had spoken of "a handful" of opponents whereas Yao Wen-yuan was now speaking of ten per cent and of "a social base". Facts indicated, and this was admitted by the Maoists, that resistance to the Peking leadership was being offered by members of every section of the Chinese population, including workers, peasants, army personnel, the intelligentsia, youth and leading officials of every echelon.

According to foreign news agencies, a wave of mass strikes

swept across many provinces, especially in industry and mining, during which the striking workers protested against wage cuts and demanded pay increases and improvements in their living standards.

Perhaps the strongest resistance to the Maoists was offered by the workers of Hangchow, a major industrial centre in Southern China. Here the Maoists had to face strikes involving more than 20 industrial enterprises. To deal with the situation, military units were moved in to occupy the strike-effected enterprises.

The campaign had also been resisted by the Chinese peasants. *Jenmin Jihpao* called for the "restricting of bourgeois law in the countryside" in the form of "private plots and subsidiary handicrafts, the pursuit of profit, the desire to be well off and the existence of village markets."¹⁵ However in the same article the paper lamented not only the passive attitude of the peasants towards the new campaign, but even spoke of some efforts being made "to carry on the revisionist line". In other words, the Chinese peasants countered the Maoists' offensive in the countryside by sabotage. In August 1975, *Jenmin Jihpao* carried an article by Chi Yan entitled "On How Best to Carry Out the Socialist Revolution in the Countryside", in which he lamented the "conditions generating capitalism and bourgeois elements in the countryside". According to Chi Yan, these conditions included "high bonus payments, pay differentials, the increase in the size of private plots and increased financial inducements for better performance and material stimulation by other means."¹⁶ As this example shows, the Chinese peasants could hardly be accused of taking any anti-socialist action. The question naturally arises as to what sort of socialist revolution in the countryside did the abovementioned author have in mind?

Faced with the opposition of the peasants, the Maoists had to move the army into action in the countryside as well as in the cities. According to *Jenmin Jihpao*, "military units were sent to a number of villages in Kansu Province to help in the efforts to impress upon the peasant masses the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat."¹⁷ One does not have to stretch one's imagination too much to guess just what type of

"help" and what "tasks" the army was trying to impress upon the peasants.

From the very outset the campaign encountered broad resistance on the part of the officials and managers in the lower and middle echelons. Since February 1975 one and the same quotation from Mao Tse-tung's speech delivered at the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPC (Ninth Convocation) in April 1969 was repeated in article after article on the campaign. The quotation ran as follows : "Apparently the great proletarian cultural revolution is something we cannot do without for this particular base is not sufficiently strong. On the basis of my observations at far too many enterprises hegemony is not in the hands of true Marxists."¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung was of the opinion that the managers of most of the industrial enterprises "are not true Marxists", since they "engage in some sort of material stimulation, lay emphasis on profit, and launch all sorts of bonus schemes." *Jenmin Jihpao* wrote later that "this instruction of Chairman Mao's shocked us. Indeed why can't we counter the 'black commodity of material stimulation'?"¹⁹ Indeed, why over the past six years had Chairman Mao's instructions to this effect not been carried out?

Peking propagandists admitted that the chief reason here was that the ideology of bourgeois law was still very much alive in the minds of leading cadres,²⁰ that "the managements of some of the enterprises are not in the hands of Marxists and that the influence of the revisionist line on industrial management has not yet been eradicated."²¹ It is clear that the Maoists pinned these labels on the managers of enterprises for their gravitation towards the socialist methods of management and their opposition to the methods being advocated by the Maoists. A revealing example was provided by reports in the *Jenmin Jihpao* on the situation at the Anshan iron-and-steel complex which was built with Soviet help. The paper admitted that at Anshan "they have allowed a let-up in the class struggle, slowed down political work in the spirit of Chairman Mao's line and stepped up material stimulation."²² In other words, the campaign had practically suffered a total failure.

Opposition to the Maoist course had even been put up by members of the top-echelon leadership who were warned by

Yao Wen-yuan : "Comrades, regain your senses while it is not too late!"²³ Cheng Chun-yuan had also these leading officials in mind when he wrote that "the greatest harm is done by those of the leading cadres...who are in fact part of the new bourgeois elements."²⁴

Thus it can be seen that the campaign based on extra economic coercion of the working people of China and of the working class, in the first place, came up against widespread and powerful resistance. In this situation the Maoists resorted to the help of the army which they, according to Chinese press reports, were orienting towards a struggle against the "new bourgeois elements that have emerged in the ranks of the workers."²⁵ In other words, against the most advanced sections of the Chinese people. And it was this struggle that the Maoists cynically called "the dictatorship of the proletariat".

As already mentioned, the army was being used in the campaign to put down the strikes of industrial workers and "to impress upon the peasant masses the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat". As *Kwangming Jihpao* emphasised in August 1975, "the People's Liberation Army by its actions has created essential conditions for the restricting of bourgeois law."²⁶ But the army was carrying out the campaign not only at industrial enterprises and in the countryside, but also in schools and higher educational establishments. In view of the intensified resistance to the campaign in the last seven months of 1975, *Jenmin Jihpao* openly called upon the army "to join the vanguard of the struggle and criticism of the bourgeoisie and the revisionists."²⁷ There was yet another revealing admission from *Kwangming Jihpao* which emphasised that "only the presence of a powerful army enables our Party to effectively suppress the resistance offered by the internal class enemies, to carry out socialist transformations in the countryside, in the handicraft and capitalist enterprises, in industry and retail trade."²⁸

At the same time it should be emphasised that opposition to Mao Tse-tung was mounting within the army itself. In January 1974, in his report to those attending advanced training courses sponsored by the Central Committee of the CPC, Wang Hung-wen, Mao's deputy, had admitted that there was "sharpening of contradictions within the army", and had

complained that in some places "Chairman Mao's instructions are not made known to the masses."²⁹ The fact that the Hangchow strikes were put down not by the local garrison but by military units from Wuhan was also very indicative.

At the same time the campaign of "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" caused a split among the "leftists" from the very beginning. Yao Wen-yuan's article was followed by another by Cheng Chun-yuan. On the face of it this article did not seem to contradict the directives of Mao Tse-tung and Yao Wen-yuan. Cheng Chun-yuan, too, attacked "the new bourgeois elements" and called for "action to restrict bourgeois law." However, the fact that he subjected to a careful analysis the system of ownership in industry, agriculture and trade could hardly be regarded as accidental. Cheng Chun-yuan made no mention of the need for the narrowing down of pay differentials between different grades. On the contrary, he stated that "the existence of bourgeois law is inevitable for a fairly long time to come", and that "in the field of ownership (in industry, agriculture and trade—*Authors*) bourgeois law has not yet been fully done away with." And since this was so, "on no account shall we allow elements of communism to establish themselves at this juncture". This was the real purpose of Cheng Chun-yuan's article. In effect he opposed the immediate "restriction of bourgeois law", that is to say, he was against wage cuts since this could not be justified by the economic and political conditions existing in China, provided of course one ignored the recent instructions of Chairman Mao, about the need to prepare for war.

Jenmin Jihpao on its part urged that action should be taken "to demolish by criticism the black revisionist commodity of material stimulation." *Kwangming Jihpao*, however, criticised Lin Piao for "disseminating communist principles which took the form of leftist appeals to do away with commodity production and money" and emphasised "the need to allow the existence of bourgeois law. Indulging in illusions about its early abolition is tantamount to indulging in 'leftist opportunism and adventurism.'"³⁰

It can thus be assumed that differences of opinion in the top echelon of the Peking leadership had filtered down to the

lower echelons and to the masses. Indeed after reading one set of articles, one could start reducing wages, while after reading another set, one could do just the opposite.

These differences of opinion and confusion at the top provoked a sharp factional struggle in the provinces. Not surprisingly, a month after the publication of Cheng Chun-yuan's article, Peking propaganda began calling for "stability and cohesion". In August 1975 Mao's instructions of the 1968 vintage (the year when the struggle between the different warring factions was at its peak) began to be widely publicised once again. Mao had claimed that "within the working class there is no essential basis for clashes and conflict."³¹

This triggered off a familiar reaction — the launching of yet another political and ideological campaign.

On August 23, 1975, *Kwangming Jihpao* carried on the second page of its literary section a selection of articles containing criticism of the novel *Backwaters*. Two weeks later this modest beginning sparked off a new political and ideological campaign against this novel of the medieval period about a peasant uprising at the end of the Sung epoch.

An analysis of the spate of publications that appeared in the course of this campaign leaves one in no doubt that the new campaign was launched and directed by the leftist group, which was closest to Mao Tse-tung. Evidence of this is provided by the following facts.

Firstly, the campaign was launched in response to a personal instruction from Mao Tse-tung. In its editorial of September 4, *Jenmin Jihpao* cited "Chairman Mao's recent instructions" concerning this campaign. It is a fact that Mao associated the continued implementation of Maoism after his death with the leftists (Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, Wan Hung-wen) and the publication of his "instructions" at the beginning of the campaign was evidence of its leftist sponsorship.

Secondly, the new campaign was closely linked with the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius", notably with the early forms this campaign had taken, which also indicated its leftist authorship. For instance, central to all the articles was the assertion that "Confucius' theoretical propositions on loyalty, filial affection and sense of duty made up the ideological basis of Sung

Chiang's capitulatory group", that "the ideology of loyalty to emperor Sung Chiang was closely bound up with the 'heavenly commands' theory espoused by Confucius and Mencius".³²

Thirdly, a number of well-known "leftist" authors published a series of trend-setting articles. For instance, in August 1975 an anonymous political writer, whose writings appeared under the name of Liang Hsiao, published an article entitled "Lu Hsun Criticised Well the Novel *Backwaters*".³³ This writer had written a number of articles which were published as part of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" on "the critique of Confucius' followers who capitulated to the Huns". The articles had a pronounced anti-Soviet slant. A number of articles were written by "groups of wide revolutionary criticism" from Chinghua and Peking Universities.³⁴ In the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" articles written by these "critical groups" had furnished the basis for the document of the Central Committee of the CPC, *Chungfa*, No. 1, January 1974, which had constituted the go-ahead signal for the launching of the campaign of "criticism against Lin Piao and Confucius".

Fourthly, the sponsors of the new campaign used profusely the highly specific terminology of labels pinned on Lin Piao in the course of the above-mentioned campaign, the same labels that had been used by the leftist authors in their articles. Sung Chiang, for instance, was described with contempt as a "woodworm" who "is compelled to seek temporary refuge in the tiger's lair", etc. Besides, certain charges originally levelled against Lin Piao by the authors of the articles were now also levelled against Sung Chiang and analogies were drawn between the two. It was alleged that Sung Chiang like "Lin Piao's anti-party grouping" had extolled the postulate of "surpassing oneself and restoring ceremonies" and had vainly attempted "to revive the fallen principalities, continue the interrupted inheritance of titles and to elevate the toppled noblemen" and so on.³⁵

Fifthly, after a long break (for the first time since January of the year, in fact), the leftist slogan, "to go against the current", made its appearance again.³⁶

The choice of the target for criticism was not fortuitous either : the peasant uprising under Sung Chiang at the end of

the Sung epoch. The Chinese press concentrated its fire on "Sung Chiang, the capitulationist" and extolled the noble deeds of the rebellious peasants, and their leader Chao Kai.

If we follow the path of historical analogy, we can clearly discern in the character of Chao Kai the image of Chairman Mao himself. The ecstatic extolling of Chao Kai as the first leader of the rebellious peasants in Lianshanpo removes all doubts about it.

In 1959 Mao, while attending the Lushan Plenary Session, had told Peng Te-huai (then the Defence Minister): "If your liberation army fails to follow me I will find another Red army."³⁷ Mao then gave him to understand in no uncertain terms that if his authority and political line were threatened, he would go "to the countryside, raise a new Red Army and march on the capital to smash the government". The articles that appeared in the course of the criticism of the novel *Backwaters* repeated a similar call through the character of Chao Kai who had urged the armed peasants "to march on the capital".

As in the previous campaigns the question of succession to power in Peking was in the focus of attention. Mao Tse-tung intended eventually to make "the leftists" (his wife Chiang Ching, his son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan and others) his successors. Mao hoped that they would follow his line after his death. Otherwise, Mao feared that "capitulation and a return to revisionism will take place" (that is to say, a return to the line adopted by the Eighth Congress of the CPC which had in effect rejected Maoism), as had happened in ancient China when Sung Chiang had "usurped supreme power" after Chao Kai's death.³⁸ In this connection the *Jenmin Jihpao* of September 4, 1975, emphasised editorially that "the criticism of the novel *Backwaters* must ensure the unswerving implementation of Chairman Mao's line today and in the future, in this century and the next". In this sense the new campaign had nothing in common with literature, marking as it did yet another round in the "crucial struggle on the ideological and political front". By no manner of means was the campaign to be an occasion for a discussion of Chinese classical literature, but rather a crucial issue of the class struggle and the struggle between different lines. "It is a major issue in the struggle to strengthen the dictatorship of the

proletariat and step up the fight against revisionism, to prevent its emergence."³⁹

We may well ask (and the Chinese who are pastmasters at working out riddles must have asked themselves the same question) as to what sort of a man Sung Chiang was and in what way did his position constitute 'a revision of Chao Kai's correct line?'⁴⁰

The author of one of the articles published in *Hungchi*, No 9, 1975, was incensed over the fact that the "capitulationist" Sung Chiang had "on repeated occasions removed the fetters from imprisoned generals of the imperial court", and had "received a large group of them and helped them to join the insurgent army". All this, according to the author, was part of "Sung Chiang's organisational preparations for the final implementation of his capitulationist line".

In late July 1975, Lo Jui-ching, former Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, was "rehabilitated". Earlier in 1974 Yang Cheng-wu and other prominent military leaders were "rehabilitated". Could it be that the Peking propagandists had them in mind when they wrote about "imprisoned military leaders" who had their "fetters removed from their hands and feet". Apparently they did, which is perhaps the reason why in the course of the campaign of "criticism of the novel *Backwaters*", the leftists once again feared the possible undesirable consequences of the rehabilitation policy, since to them this spelled removal from positions of power.

The mass "rehabilitation" campaign had perturbed the leftists and Chairman Mao himself. This policy was clearly aimed at a redistribution of power within the Peking leadership in favour of the opponents of the leftists. As *Kwangming Jihpao* emphasised, this situation was but one step from "creating a vacuum around Chao Kai" (Mao Tse-tung), and then "after his death... attempt to oust the *tsaofans* from the leadership of the insurgents and replace them by the capitulationists."⁴¹

If one examines the campaign from the standpoint of existing divergencies between the articles by Yao Wen-yuan and those by Cheng Chun-yuan—and these divergencies were then very much in the focus of the Chinese press—it is easy to see that the capitulationist Sung Chiang symbolised Cheng

Chun-yuan. Indeed, at the Fourth Session of the People's National Congress, Cheng Chun-yuan had been the only leftist who was given the high post of Chou En-lai's deputy, and appointed head of the Central Political Board of the People's Liberation Army. In this connection Peking propagandists criticised the "meeting of the chrysanthemums" at which Sung Chiang had come to power rather than the "supporters of the revolutionary line". The "meeting of the chrysanthemums" was not attended by Chao Kai as he had been killed by then. Mao did not attend the session of the National People's Congress as he was pointedly busy receiving Franz Joseph Strauss. Was this not evidence of the dissatisfaction of the leftists with the results of the session, where they had failed to obtain all the posts they had planned to get?

Apart from questions of continuity of power and the struggle between different Maoist groupings, the campaign revolved around another no less important issue—that of the future of Maoism. Judging by everything, Mao was seriously concerned at the possibility of a departure from "his line" after his death. Mao correctly realised that an alternative to his line lay in China's return to the socialist road, to friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

In this connection Peking propagandists deliberately emphasised the connection between Sung Chiang's capitulationist policy with the capitulationist policy of Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao who allegedly had been prepared "to capitulate to the Soviet Union". The Chinese newspapers stressed that "if Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, the two capitulationists, like Sung Chiang in the past, had come to power, they would have inevitably capitulated to the Soviet revisionist social-imperialism."⁴²

In other words, Mao and his clique saw the main threat to themselves in the healthy forces within the CPC, who were resisting the Maoist attempt to push China off the socialist path completely.

The true Marxists-Leninists within the CPC are yet to have their say.

2. Conclusions

The developments in China after Mao Tse-tung's death showed that the political processes going on in that country were contradictory and far from simple.

The death of Mao Tse-tung, who held the reins of leadership of the Communist Party of China, and the removal of his followers from among the Party's top echelon, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan—failed to mark the beginning of a process of normalisation of the life within the Party and its emergence from the profound and protracted crisis in which it found itself as a result of the smashing up of its healthy forces during the "cultural revolution", the substitution of Maoism for Marxism-Leninism, and the incessant reprisals and struggles for power within the Party elite.

The redivision of power in Peking moved into the limelight a group of leaders headed by Hua Kuo-feng, a group which could be described as centrist. Its advance to the forefront of the political life in China was objectively related to the maturing of a new compromise political platform—a process which had started during Mao's lifetime—capable of assimilating the chief elements of the Maoist megalomaniac course while taking into account as much as possible of the actual conditions prevailing in the country.

The removal of the so-called "Gang of Four" was an act performed from the top with the main aim of liquidating rivals who had contended for supreme power in the country. The group of military, Party and administrative executives which entrenched itself in power in China emphasised by its very first acts (decisions concerning the construction of a mausoleum for Mao Tse-tung and the publication of his works and quotations) that Maoism had been and continued to be the basis of the Party's activity, a guide for the domestic and foreign policy of the country.

The internal political situation in China after Mao's death and the overthrow of the "Gang of Four" continued to be marked by political instability resulting from the fact that the cardinal socio-economic problems confronting

the country remained unresolved and it was impossible to solve them on a Maoist basis.

Besides, China's new leaders, presided over by Hua Kuo-feng, proclaimed the task of "transfer to universal order" and of achieving "stability and cohesion". Although some of the more odious aspects of Maoist political practice were being abandoned, the new leaders did not renounce the methods and slogans of Mao Tse-tung and the "Gang of Four". Naturally, these slogans and methods were now utilised against the political opponents of the new leadership—against the "Gang of Four" and their followers—and on an expanding scale. The new leaders no longer confined themselves to "narrowing the scope of the blows and concentrating them on the 'Four' and the handful of their diehard accomplices". On the contrary, a sweeping purge of the "bourgeois system of the Four" was undertaken, which affected various sections of the central and local Party and government bodies, the mass media and the Communist Party of China. This purge was evidence, above all, of the opposition being put up locally by the supporters of the "Four". Also, it was an indirect proof of the fact that in its day the so-called "Gang of Four" had managed quite successfully to promote its supporters to the leading bodies of the Maoist government, especially to local administrations and the mass media. That is why it was necessary to judge very cautiously some slogans and initiatives of the new leadership which were democratic in form; for instance, the task set by Hua Kuo-feng of calling in 1977 meetings of people's representatives in the localities under the slogan of "normalising the democratic life in the Party and among the people". These meetings were to form "through democratic consultations" new "revolutionary committees". It is more likely that the task was really to purge the "revolutionary committees" of the supporters of the political opponents of the CPC leadership, rather than "normalise democratic life" within the Party and the country.

After the overthrow of the "Four", the role of the army in the country's political life increased. Nor could it have been otherwise. The military leaders, supported by old-timers in the Party and government apparatus, many of whom were ex-military men, had had the final say in Hua Kuo-feng's succession

to Mao. After the removal of the "Four", the army leaders took steps to render harmless the people's guards and liquidate their "chief headquarters", depriving them of heavy weapons and subordinating them wholly to military commands. Troops were sent to factories and communes to suppress by force the opposition put up by local supporters of the "Four". Later on—as could be judged from press reports—these troops acted as agitators and political supervisors, the functions previously performed by the guards and "theoretical detachments".

It is safe to say that the course adopted by the new leaders had, on the whole, clearly emerged as one relying on an extensive use of militaristic punitive and repressive methods both to ensure stability and "universal order" and to settle other problems. This became clear, among other things, from the materials of the All-China Conference on the Railways which set the objective of turning the railways into a "semi-military production organisation".

In the economic field, the PRC leaders set out to attain the old nationalistic ends by other, less blatantly leftist, methods relying on tested experience and rational economic management. It is worth noting that as the already removed "Gang of Four" was being exposed and all failures of Maoist policy ascribed to it, some directives of Mao himself were also indirectly subjected to criticism.

The basic aim of the campaign of criticism against the "Gang of Four", launched at the initiative of the Chinese leadership, was to whitewash the failure of Maoism by making the "Four" responsible for it and to provide an outlet for the accumulated popular discontent. At the same time, in the course of this campaign all direct attacks on Mao Tse-tung and the main lines of his policy as well as on the ruling group were immediately curbed.

The correlation of forces within the Chinese ruling camp both in the centre and provinces was in favour of this group, although it was yet too early to assume that the redivision of power was complete. The top posts in the state and the Party were filled by Hua Kuo-feng in circumvention of the Constitution of China and the Party Rules. He can always be accused by his political opponents of having usurped power.

The hurried build-up of the Hua Kuo-feng personality cult, alongside a concentration of power in the hands of one man to an extent unusual even for China, showed that the ruling group was somewhat nervous and uncertain of the final outcome of the struggle for power.

On the whole, an analysis of the tendencies that became apparent in China after Mao's death and the removal of the "Four" enabled one to evaluate the domestic policy of China's new leadership as a policy of compromise with elements having a rational approach to the solution of urgent economic and socio-political problems in China with the far-reaching aim of a more successful realisation of the great-power nationalistic course formulated by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Maoism continued to remain the basis of the policy pursued by the Chinese leadership.

At the same time, the negative attitude to Soviet experience was invariably emphasised. Anti-Sovietism continued to be an important factor in China's political development. An unbri-dled anti-Soviet campaign was continued under the cover of which the Chinese leaders were seeking to discredit the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union, undermine international detente and aggravate the world situation to the utmost.

The most vigorous activity of Peking was spearheaded at opposing detente in Europe and sabotaging the results of the European Conference. The Chinese press assiduously spread the inventions of foreign spokesmen connected with NATO circles about the "growing Soviet threat" to the West, the "perfidious designs" allegedly entertained by the Soviet Union, and the need for "retaliatory measures".

The overall strategy of pushing the world to the brink of war was being implemented in the practical political measures taken by the new Peking leadership. This could be seen from the fact that in Peking they continued, as before, to indefatigably denigrate detente and opposing it in every way. The Chinese leaders supported whatever was done by the rightists in the West to thwart detente.

This hobnobbing of Peking with imperialist reaction was evident, among other things, in the programme of foreign visits to China drawn up by the Chinese leadership evidently

not without an intention to influence the general world climate. The Western leaders who visited China in the period from 1975 to 1977 were predominantly representatives of the extreme right with whom the Maoists found a common language so far as the joint efforts to oppose detente were concerned. After the visit to China by the leaders of the West German Right-wing opposition, H.Kohl, G. Schroder and F.J. Strauss (the latter went there twice in 1975), the country was visited, at the invitation of the Chinese government, by Christian Democratic Union Deputies, W. Marx and A. Dregger. The Maoists made no secret of the fact that they had joined their guests from Bonn in their dislike of the *Ostpolitik* conducted by the ruling coalition in West Germany, called upon the Western capitalist countries to join in a struggle against the USSR and had talks on cooperation between China and West Germany in the military field. During this visit to China of revenge-seekers from West Germany, Peking leaders were trying to persuade them that detente "is opium for the people".

Thus, Peking put its stake on the extreme right in the capitalist countries, hoping that if any changes occurred in the situation in these states, the rightists would come to power, bring stronger pressure to bear on the USSR and its allies, and give more effective support to the great-power aims of Maoist China.

The true nature of Maoism was most clearly manifested in its "overt, odious collaboration," to quote the Cuban *Granma*, with the fascist military junta in Chile, and its no less infamous collaboration with the enemies of the national liberation of Angola.

One could not but wonder at the amazing shortsightedness of some Western leaders who were so blinded by anti-communism that they did not want to see the immense danger of Maoist policy to their own peoples. In this connection it will be apt to recall some pronouncements of "Chairman Mao" which forms the basis of the foreign policy of the Peking leadership. "The Pacific Ocean," Mao had declared at a meeting of the sections of the enlarged conference of the Military Council in June 1958, "is in reality not so pacific. In future, when we take it under our control, it will be possible to consider it

pacific indeed." "After some years", he went on to declaim, "we shall certainly build a major empire and be ready to land in Japan, the Philippines, and San Francisco."

It would be an unpardonable mistake for the world's peace-loving forces to take a passive attitude towards Peking's adventurist policy and to adopt a watch-and-see attitude till the danger reaches disastrous proportions. All who cherish peace and want to engage in constructive work must jointly direct their efforts at exposing the most pernicious designs and actions of the Maoist incendiaries.

NOTES

1. *Jenmin Jihpao*, February 2, 1975.
2. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 381.
3. V.I. Lenin *Collected Works* Vol. 29, p. 419.
4. See *Kommunist*, No. 12 (8), 1975, p. 109.
5. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 24, 1975.
6. Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, London 1963, p. 77.
7. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 508.
8. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 54.
9. *Jenmin Jihpao*, July 15, 1975.
10. *Jenmin Jihpao*, July 13, 1975.
11. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 6, 1975.
12. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 28.
13. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 6, 1975.
14. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 1, 1975.
15. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 17, 1975.
16. *Jenmin Jihpao*, August 3, 1975.
17. *Kwangming Jihpao*, August 25, 1975.
18. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 26, 1975.
19. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 26, 1975.

20. *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 11, 1975.
21. *Chiangshi Jihpao*, May 4, 1975.
22. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 22, 1975.
23. *Jenmin Jihpao*, March 22, 1975.
24. *Hunchi*, No. 4, 1975, p. 12.
25. *Kwangming Jihpao*, February 12, 1975.
26. *Kwangming Jihpao*, August 2, 1975.
27. *Jenmin Jihpao*, July 14, 1975.
28. *Kwangming Jihpao*, April 2, 1975.
29. *Chanwang*, No. 310, January 1, 1975, p. 21.
30. *Kwangming Jihpao*, July 3, 1975.
31. *Kwangming Jihpao*, August 8, 1975.
32. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 17, 1975.
33. *Kwangming Jihpao*, August 30, 1975.
34. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 5, 1975; *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 11, 1975.
35. *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 13, 1975.
36. *Kwangming Jihpao*, August 23, 1975.
37. *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 3, 1972, p. 136.
38. *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 17, 1975.
39. *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 6, 1975.
40. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 24, 1975.
41. *Kwangming Jihpao*, September 17, 1975.
42. *Jenmin Jihpao*, September 7, 1975.

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